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NO (political) Identity, NO (political) Information, NO VOTE: The decline of 
electoral turnout among young voters in Britain 
Edward Phelps 
Abstract 
This thesis examines the extent of turnout decline at general elections since 1992. Its 
first contribution is to reveal that turnout decline amongst the youngest age groups was 
significantly more pronounced in the period 1992-2001 than for other age groups. The 
central argument is that there are sufficient grounds for suspecting that life-cycle factors 
cannot alone account for the unprecedented decline in turnout between 1992 and 2001, 
and that generational factors may be at work. The second contribution of the thesis is to 
test a variety of explanatory models of political participation on these youngest groups 
to ascertain if the results provide any insights of the dynamics of a suspected 
generational change. The thesis argues that a weakening of the psychological anchors to 
social and political life have left recent generations exposed and more susceptible than 
their older counterparts to factors that have been shown to decrease the likelihood of 
voting such as weakness of electoral competition; little perceived difference between 
political parties and an environment of negative images of politics and politicians.  
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 Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Why research political participation?  
In the twenty first century with democratic systems triumphing over all others, all over the 
globe, rather than questioning which political system is best or which mostly adequately 
addresses or represents the needs of its citizens, attention has turned to the adequacies or 
inadequacies of democracies themselves. One of the most appealing features of 
‘democracy’ is its quintessential popular definition: ‘Government by the people’. The 
extent to which this is actually the case is therefore naturally likely to be of interest to its 
proponents who seek ways in which to facilitate the effective functioning of democracy, 
whether this is to strengthen government by the people and widen citizen participation, or 
whether from those who recognise there are limits to the extent to which citizens can and 
should be involved and who therefore seek to ensure representative democracy functions 
properly. But the extent to which democracy comes close to being government by the 
people may also be of great interest to groups such as anti-capitalists whose agenda is to 
highlight the degree to which modern variants of democracy deviate from the ideal of 
government by the people. This contemporary snapshot of why political participation might 
be important to different groups of people is encapsulated in one of the great historical 
debates about politics which I will return to in Section 1.3.  
 
1.2 Elections and democracy  
 
These types of concerns are perhaps best exemplified by what is for many the defining 
feature of democracy: elections. Elections are critical to a functioning democracy because 
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they confer legitimacy on the political system in which they are held. This in turn provides 
a degree of stability via citizen’s perceptions of system legitimacy. Given that elections 
confer legitimacy it follows that participation in elections and voter turnout are an 
important measure of how well a democracy functions. This is the underlying reason that 
people all over the world study election and electoral behaviour – because elections are the 
prime measure of the health of a democracy.  
 Table 1.1 shows that in Britain turnout at general elections has tended to be high 
and stable with around 70 per cent of British electors casting a vote at each general election 
since 1964. 
 
Table 1.1 Turnout at British general elections 1964-2001 
 
1964  77.1 
1966  75.8 
1970  72 
1974Feb 78.8 
1974Oct 72.8 
1979  76 
1983  72.7 
1987  75.3 
1992  77.7 
1997  71.4 
2001  59.4 
 
Source: Rallings and Thrasher 2007  
  
Young adults have tended to vote at lower levels than their older counterparts and this has 
tended to be attributed, as will be discussed in Chapter two, to their age, or position in the 
political life-cycle. But as Table 1.2 shows, after 1992 turnout amongst this age group 
began to plummet. In 1997 only 59.7 per cent of 18-24 year olds reported having voted, 
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compared to 75.4 per cent at the previous election in 1992. In 2001 the proportion reporting 
having voted dropped even further to 49.4 per cent.  
 
Table 1.2 Reported turnout at British General Elections among 18-24 year olds 
1964-2001 
 
Year 18-24 
  
1964 88.6 
1966 67.1 
1970 73.6 
1974 78.2 
1979 70.1 
1983 73.1 
1987 76.2 
1992 75.4 
1997 59.7 
2001 49.4 
 
Source: British Election Survey data 
 
The central questions this thesis will address are: how can we best explain this pronounced 
decline in turnout post 1992 amongst the youngest age groups; to what extent do life-cycle 
explanations of electoral turnout account for these declines; and, is it possible to identify a 
generational effect in electoral turnout on the basis of these declines? In attempting to 
answer these questions this thesis makes important contributions to our understanding of 
contemporary political participation in Britain and the extent to which it may be changing. 
It will also identify directions for future research in the area of youth politics and 
engagement.  
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1.3 Participatory democratic theory 
 
The origins of the participatory theory of democracy can be traced back to ancient Greece 
and most commonly to the work of Aristotle, although its later proponents include 
Rousseau, John Stuart Mill and the Guild Socialist thinker G.D.H. Cole (Pateman 1970). In 
this broad theory, the health of democracy is measured by the extent of citizen involvement. 
Civic virtue was an underlying principle of Athenian democracy – a dedication to the 
republican state and the subordination of private life to public affairs and the common good 
(Held 1996). In this view it is only possible for individuals to truly fulfil themselves 
through the polis as ethics and politics were merged in the life of the political community. 
This view was based on a very different understanding of the individual and his or her 
rights and obligations. These were not defended or enforced by the state as a means of 
protecting the private rights of individuals, but were upheld as public rights and duties 
(Held 1996). This was very different to the distinction between the people and government, 
individuals and the state in the work of other political theorists such as Machiavelli or 
Hobbes.   
 Even at this early stage in the evolution of the participationist theory, thinkers 
recognised that differences in ability meant that citizens were not equally able to fill all 
roles. But this was not seen as a fundamental problem as the educative role of democracy 
meant that citizens could develop and realise their potentials and skills through 
participation. This pre-empted to some degree the criticisms of the second broad set of 
theorists whose assumption tends to see the individual rather than the polis or community 
as the fundamental unit of political activity. In the Social Contract, Rousseau attempted to 
address this problem by arguing that in their original state of nature, before the 
development of civil governments, humans were fundamentally equal. For Rousseau 
human weakness, egoistic desires and natural disasters drive humans to the creation of a 
‘social contract’ (Rousseau 2003). This contrasts with the assumption of the realist or elitist 
theory of democracy that the human traits identified by Rousseau are inherent to human life 
as are the differences between individuals, both of which make the ‘social contract’, or 
state, a necessary tool for organising and managing individuals.  
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 The participationist model at the very least implies a direct form of democracy, but 
in the context of large modern states there are serious limitations to this which primarily 
stem from the difficulty of organising huge numbers of people taking part in a decision 
making process at once. But this criticism of the participationist ideal of maximum citizen 
involvement is now far less convincing than ever before. The continual rise of the internet 
and online methods of citizen engagement makes mass direct participation a far more 
realistic prospect.  
 
1.4 The ‘realist’ response 
 
The second broad theory of democracy which one might argue is more firmly rooted on the 
actual experience of political systems commonly described as democracies is the elitist or 
realist conception of democracy. The ‘realist’ school is sceptical about widespread and 
‘deep’ participation. Perhaps the two most important early proponents of this view are Max 
Weber (1864-1920) and Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950). Weber agreed with many aspects 
of Marx’s critique of capitalism, including that class was fundamental to the understanding 
of political conflict. Marx and many Marxists viewed the state and bureaucratic 
organisations as ‘parasitic’ entities. But Weber’s subtle understanding of bureaucracy was 
reached partly through his appraisal of the organisational impracticalities of direct 
democracy (Held 1996). 
 
Where the group grows beyond a certain size or where the administrative function becomes 
too difficult to be satisfactorily taken care of by anyone whom rotation, the lot, or election 
may happen to designate. The conditions of mass structures are radically different from 
those obtaining in small associations resting upon neighbourly or personal 
relationships...The growing complexity of the administrative task and the sheer expansion 
of their scope increasingly result in the technical superiority of those who have had training 
and experience, and will thus inevitably favour the continuity of at least some of the 
functionaries. Hence, there always exists the probability of the rise of special, perennial 
structure for administrative purposes, which of necessity means for the exercise of rule. 
(Max Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. 11, pp. 951-2 cited in Held 1996: 162).  
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Weber clearly understood that whilst there were examples of direct democracy among the 
aristocracies in late medieval Italian city republics, town-ships in the United States and 
among selected occupational groupings – the ‘size, complexity and sheer diversity of 
modern societies make direct democracy simply inappropriate as a general model of 
political regulation and control’ (Held 1996: 163).  
 Schumpeter’s critique of the classical theory of mass democracy adds a second 
dimension to the critique of high levels of citizen involvement in politics, one which is less 
about the practicalities of citizen involvement and more about the capacities of citizens 
themselves. For Schumpeter democracy was a political method – a set of institutional 
arrangements for arriving at political, legislative and administrative decisions (Schumpeter 
1943: 24). Citizens for Schumpeter were ‘incapable of action other than stampede’ (Ibid: 
283) and their role in democracy should be limited to being able to change governments at 
elections. Democracy is distinguished by competition between leaders for the support of the 
mass population, which is expressed at periodic elections (Parry et al 1992). Between 
elections citizens should refrain from ‘back seat driving’ (Schumpeter 1943: 295).  
 His most important contribution as far as setting up the research questions for this 
thesis was to argue that citizens are only capable of a limited form of participation. In his 
eyes citizens are weak and prone to strong emotional impulses. To encourage participation 
by such persons would be to introduce into government ignorance and indifference in place 
of expertise, however cynically motivated, of the professional politician (Held 1996). So, 
whilst the participatory theorists measure the health of a democracy by the extent of citizen 
involvement, realist or elitist theorists emphasise the stability of the system and its capacity 
to permit checks and balances (See also Berelson 1954; Dahl 1956 and Sartori 1962).  
 
1.5 Contemporary expression 
 
These broad frameworks of democratic participation provide a useful entry point to the 
contemporary debate on citizen engagement. Whilst much of the literature on 
disengagement reviewed in the following chapter precedes The Power Report (2006) – it is 
particularly relevant here as it embodies the populist version of the participationist critique 
of representative democracy in its diagnosis of the problem of political disconnect in 
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Britain. In her foreword to the report, Helena Kennedy, the chair of the Commission, states 
that the evidence presented to the inquiry suggests that voting itself ‘seems irrelevant to 
increasing numbers of people’ and that there is a feeling ‘that there is no choice, despite our 
living in the era when choice is the dominant political mantra’. Commenting that the world 
has changed enormously during the past fifty years and that lives are being lived in very 
different ways she suggests that ‘the political institutions and the main political parties have 
failed to keep up.’ Drawing attention to the way in which people continue to volunteer to 
raise money for charity, join protest marches, undertake voluntary work within their 
communities and sign petitions, Helena Kennedy comments that political apathy is a myth. 
Accordingly, people ‘no longer want to join a party or get involved in formal politics’ and 
the solution is to download power by ‘rebalancing the system towards the people’. Later in 
the report the Commission identifies a ‘democratic malaise’ which is not just manifested in 
the recent downturn in general elections. Apart from a decline in party membership the 
Commission found that there was a ‘well-ingrained popular view across the country that 
our political institutions and their politicians are failing, untrustworthy, and disconnected 
from the great mass of the British people’ (Power 2006: 28).  
The executive summary to the report says it presents ‘a detailed analysis of why this 
disengagement has occurred and a series of recommendations to address the problem. This 
is a broad agenda for major political reform’ (Ibid: 15). There are thirty recommendations; 
the first group addresses the rebalancing of power between the Executive and Parliament 
and between central and local government to ‘allow the freedom for our elected 
representatives to be the eyes, ears and mouths of British citizens at the heart of 
government. (Ibid: 21). The second group of recommendations includes measures designed 
to develop an electoral and party system which is ‘responsive to the changing values and 
demands of today’s population.’ (Ibid: 21-2). That the report follows a populist- 
participationist vein of thinking is evident in some if its recommendations as well as in the 
response from academic specialists and media commentators. The recommendation to 
lower the voting age to 16 is perhaps the best example of this which is at best contentious 
and for many fundamentally flawed as a mean of increasing voter turnout and therefore 
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reversing democratic discontent.1 Peter Riddell took specific issue with the Report’s 
demand to more direct democracy, saying: 
 
This is treacherous ground. Direct democracy risks giving too much influence to 
unrepresentative groups of activists - like phone-in programmes. A march by lots of 
people, even the one million against the Iraq war in February 2003, captures attention 
but does not of itself convey legitimacy. Government and Parliament have to decide, 
as they did over Iraq, and it is up to voters to respond, as they did. (Riddell 2006).  
 
Bale et al (2006) put it succinctly, noting that the Report overstates the extent to which 
most citizens are active and identifies the causes of disconnect as lying with the system 
rather than with people. This embodiment of participationist thinking tends to see a so 
called democratic deficit from the citizens point of view as being the fault of the state, its 
institutions and processes and its actors. Rather than to ask another question underlying this 
thesis, if democratic disconnect is caused by the system and its actors – the elite – how have 
these changed in the period in which citizens have disconnected? Is it possible to identify 
changes that could account for this disconnect? Underlying the research questions posed in 
this thesis is a critique of the assumption that these types of changes have occurred and an 
evidence based suspicion that citizens have changed in ways that might accurately help 
account for their political behaviour. An important contribution to the contemporary debate 
is made by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002), skeptical of the will of people to engage en 
masse with politics, who argue that: 
 
The last thing people want is to be more involved in political decision-making: They do not 
want to make political decisions themselves; they do not want to provide much input to 
those who are assigned to make these decisions; and they would rather not know the details 
of the decision-making process…This does not mean that people think no mechanism for 
government accountability is necessary; they just do not want the mechanism to come into 
play except in unusual circumstances… 
 
                                                 
1
 See Cowley and Denver (2004) for an examination of the arguments for and against.  
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Participation in politics is low not because of the difficulty in registration requirements or 
the dearth of places for citizens to discuss politics, not because of the unseemly nature of 
debate in Congress or displeasure with a particular public policy. Participation is low 
because people do not like politics even in the best circumstances; in other words, they 
simply do not like the process of openly arriving at a decision is the face of diverse 
opinions. They do not like politics when they view it from afar and they certainly do not 
like politics when they participate in it themselves. (Hibbings and Theiss-Morse 2002: 
1-3).  
 
Thus Hibbings and Theiss-Morse place the emphasis back on people, arguing that 
‘deliberation will not work in the real world of politics where people are different and 
where tough, zero-sum decisions must be made…real deliberation is quite likely to make 
them hopping mad or encourage them to suffer silently because of a reluctance to voice 
their own opinions in the discussion.’ (Ibid: 207). The American public, on whom, 
Hibbings and Theiss-Morse focus their research does not want a stronger, or more direct 
voice as most do not care about politics and would therefore much rather hand over the 
decision making authority to someone else. What citizens do want, however, is to see that 
their system is being run by non-self interested politicians. In fact, ‘their strongest and most 
earnest political goal is to get power away from self-serving politicians’ (Ibid: 130).  
 
People appear to want to be more active and involved in politics only because it is one of 
the few ways they can see (or the only option presented to them) of stopping decisions from 
being made by those who directly benefit from those decisions. People often view their 
political involvement as medicine they must take in order to keep the disease of greedy 
politicians and special interests from getting further out of hand. (Ibid: 131).  
 
If it is the case that citizens have changed more than politics, institutions, processes and 
actors then have perceptions of politics changed more than politics itself? And if so, why? 
One of the most recent embodiments of the realist criticism can be found in Meg 
Russell’s Fabian Society contribution, where she asks ‘Must Politics Disappoint?’ (Russell 
2005). For Russell, at the heart of the problem lies the inability of politicians and the media 
to communicate the essence of politics which is about negotiation and compromise, 
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difficult choices and taking decisions together’ (Ibid: 4). Instead, ‘it is now seen as 
something largely divorced from everyday life, where politicians are expected to “deliver”, 
and increasingly talk their profession down rather than up, within a media environment that 
is hostile rather than supportive’(Ibid: 4). Of the causes, Russell identifies consumerism is 
one of the main culprits.  
 
The development of mass politics has been accompanied by – and indeed has actively 
facilitated – mass consumerism…It is difficult to find anything more antithetical to the 
culture of politics than the contemporary culture of consumerism. While politics is about 
balancing diverse needs to benefit the public interest, consumerism is about meeting 
the immediate desires of the individual. While politics requires us to compromise and 
collaborate as citizens, consumerism emphasizes unrestrained individual freedom of choice. 
While politics recognises that there are always resource constraints, modern consumerism 
increasingly encourages us to believe that we can have it all now. (Ibid: 10).  
 
But she also goes on to recognise a variety of other factors including the media coverage of 
politics, ideological convergence between the major political parties, and the growing 
mutual autonomy of leaders and the parties that should sustain them (Webb 2007). 
Russell’s solutions contain some elements of enhanced participation (e.g., within political 
parties) and are mainly concerned with the need to construct a new, franker, more open and 
positive culture which emphasises the value of politics and its central institutions. ‘Politics 
should come to be regarded as a source of pride, ‘a cause not for despair, but for 
celebration’(Webb 2007: 19). Of her proposals for reconnecting, three of seven relate to the 
way in which politics is mediated and in which the public receive their information about 
politics. Emphasis on greater participation is downplayed. 
 This brief discussion provides a sense of the context in which this thesis is set. It 
enables the consideration of a variety of questions that rest a level beneath the research 
questions specified in the next chapter such as; is political participation desirable? If so, to 
what extent? I will return to discuss these two broad themes in the concluding chapter.  
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1.6 Structure of the thesis 
 
Chapter two reviews the existing literature on political participation and situates the work 
on youth engagement more firmly within the broader, established studies of electoral 
change and partisan identification. I argue that understanding how the political behaviour of 
young people is changing needs to be grounded in the well documented literature on 
electoral change and partisan dealignment. These relatively long-term changes are the lens 
through which the impact of short-term changes should be viewed. It is argued that there is 
currently insufficient evidence on the relationship between the new forms of social and 
political participation that young people are involved in to suggest that these may be 
replacing formal participatory norms such as voting and party membership. Moreover, 
Chapter two suggests that, even if this is the case it is necessary to understand why this is 
the case and what explanatory factors are involved. The chapter identifies a number of 
major gaps in the existing research and questions a number of assumptions that run through 
it. It concludes by outlining the key research questions to be addressed in the remainder of 
the thesis.  
Chapter three provides a detailed rationale for the methods selected to address the 
proposed questions and sets out in detail the methods and data to be used in the 
investigation. It argues that given the primary concern of the thesis is over-time changes in 
electoral turnout, a quantitative methodological approach is most appropriate. It outlines 
some of the key methodological concerns and problems that the research design was forced 
to face and details how these were overcome, or the extent to which the conclusions are 
limited. The chapter also introduces the main source data for the investigation, the British 
Election Survey. 
Chapter four investigates turnout amongst young people at British General 
Elections since 1964 and reveals strong, though not conclusive evidence of a generational 
change in electoral turnout, witnessed through the electoral characteristics of the two 
youngest age groups voting in 1997 and 2001. It argues that whilst conclusions as to the 
existence and extent of a possible generational effect in electoral turnout are limited by the 
difficulties associated with separating life-cycle, period and generational effects, it is at 
least possible to conclude that young voters enfranchised since 1992 are unique and their 
12 
 
electoral turnout characteristics have not been witnessed before. Chapter five introduces a 
series of explanatory models of electoral turnout from the existing literature on political 
participation. In Chapter six these models are operationalised and subjected to rigorous 
multivariate analysis to ascertain which, if any, explanations best account for declining 
turnout amongst today’s young people. It concludes that the general incentives model fares 
best amongst the models tested, mirroring the findings of Clarke et al (2004). However, the 
analysis shows that there are a number of unique explanatory factors of the disinclination of 
young people to vote in 2001. Social capital, social class, political knowledge and political 
recruitment were influential factors in determining whether or not this group voted. The 
second section of Chapter six advances a theory of youth disengagement from voting based 
on these results. The results of the data analysis support the interpretation of the literature 
advanced in Chapter two and I argue that the political socialisation of those young people 
who came of voting age in 2001 meant that they were uniquely affected by a combination 
of long-term and short-term factors for declining voter turnout. This theory is tested in 
Chapter seven using evidence from the existing literature combined with additional data 
analysis and concludes by testing a multivariate model of youth turnout. The chapter argues 
that the decline in partisanship and working class social networks in the Thatcher era meant 
that working class young people became particularly susceptible to other influences on their 
voting behaviour. Exposure to a unique array of short-term factors during their formative 
political socialisation impacted on their decision to vote in 2001. In Chapter eight I 
conclude by returning to the research questions specified at the end of Chapter two, 
outlining the contributions made by the thesis as well as discussing future areas of research 
that need addressing as a result of the findings.  
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 Chapter 2 
 
Political Participation in Transition? 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a review of the key theoretical and empirically 
based literature underpinning the present research. Firstly, the discussion examines 
some of the key literature on the sociological underpinnings of political participation in 
Britain and explores how the early research examining how citizens became anchored to 
political parties is crucial to our understanding of contemporary political participation. I 
argue that explanations for youth disengagement tend to emanate from two schools of 
thought: the traditional political science understanding of youth turnout based on life-
cycle explanations (eg, Verba and Nie 1972), or the anti-apathy approach, which has 
tended not to situate young people’s political activity within its context of their political 
life-cycle. The increasing dominance of rational choice models of political participation 
in the wider literature of political participation has meant that explanations for voter 
turnout among young people have tended to focus on short-term factors. I argue that 
crucial gaps in our understanding of youth participation in politics are rooted in this 
shift away from sociological understandings of participation. Furthermore, the rational 
choice explanations have greater explanatory power than ever because of the changes to 
the social structure that have occurred, particularly since the 1950s. These changes 
mean that voters are socialised into a political world that is different to that of their 
predecessors and these differences are critical to understanding emerging patterns of 
political behaviour.  The chapter concludes by identifying gaps in understanding about 
young people’s participation in politics and how it has changed over time and 
formulates a number of research questions that the subsequent chapters will seek to 
answer.  
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2.2 The social basis of political support 
 
One of the aims of this thesis will be situate the research on youth participation in 
politics into the context of the broader literature on political change in Britain and 
Europe. The central research question lying at the heart of this thesis and which will 
underpin the more defined specific research questions that I will develop is why do 
young citizens abstain from voting at general elections at a greater rate than previous 
generations? The thesis is concerned with understanding the political behaviour of 
young citizens in Britain, but as will become explicit throughout the chapters, my 
approach is to view changing youth behaviour in the context of broader social and 
political changes, rather than to concentrate on ‘young people’ as separate from the rest 
of the electorate. Before we can understand political change it is necessary to 
understand the underlying social reasons for change and to understand what were the 
traditional social bases of political support prior to any change. At the core of this thesis 
is the investigation of voters, as stipulated above. However, as voters vote through 
political parties and parties have traditionally reflected the social composition or 
cleavages of a polity, considerable attention will be paid to the way parties have come 
into being, how they adapt to changes in the electorate and their success in doing so. 
Finally party competition will be a crucial factor in understanding political support.  
One of the fundamental ideas for understanding the social basis of political 
support has been that of social ‘cleavages’. These divisions in society have played a 
critical role in the development of political parties in Europe. What we might term the 
orthodox sociological model of electoral stability and party formation consolidated 
around the classic work of Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) who I will 
return to shortly. But the ground for understanding cleavages and particularly the class 
cleavage was laid by Marx who placed emphasis on class as the key antagonism in 
capitalist societies. Class became particularly relevant in a relatively homogenous 
British society that experienced industrialisation earlier than other European countries 
and where the class division between owners on the one hand, and workers on the other, 
became most distinct. For Lipset and Rokkan (1967) social cleavages were produced by 
complex historical processes, most notably the national and industrial revolutions 
experienced by European societies from the Seventeenth century on. These cleavages 
became the basis of political support in western European countries, according to Lipset 
and Rokkan, and one which the party systems of these countries would be built on.  
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 Four lines of cleavage opened up in the development of modern industrial 
societies, according to Lipset and Rokkan. Centre-periphery issues were the first of 
these sources of division to develop in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, centring 
on the reformation and counter-reformation and were part of the process of ‘national 
revolution’. The first issue to be reconciled was whether the society’s religion was to be 
national or international. But in Britain, there was the absence of any significant dispute 
with an alien church for the loyalties of its citizens (Ware 1996). The second centre-
periphery issue was the conflict between Latin as an international unifying language and 
indigenous languages. In the British case as a single language was spoken by the 
majority, it became possible to impose its use on the peripheries. The second cleavage 
to arise out of national revolutions was that between state and church. This was a 
conflict between the standardising nation state and the historically established corporate 
privileges of the church. This was a particularly salient cleavage in countries with large 
Catholic populations such as Italy or France, but remained relatively minor in Britain. 
The remaining two cleavages, arising out of the industrial revolution are particularly 
salient to the British case. Firstly, the land-industry cleavage emerged out of the 
industrial revolution between agricultural and industrial issues. In Britain a mid 
nineteenth century conflict over the tariff on corn production produced a crisis for the 
governing Conservative party, but in the longer term it paved the way for the coming 
together of landed and industrial elites (Ware 1996). These durable social cleavages 
meant that the party systems of Europe were characterised by a remarkable degree of 
stability. Deeply rooted and prolonged cleavages led to voters strongly anchored to the 
social segment resulting from these historical developments and in turn to strong 
associations with the political parties who represented these social segments.  
 Until 1918 the dominant cleavage in British politics had been religious. 
Established national churches in England and Scotland provided a support base for the 
Conservative Party, whilst support for the Liberal Party came mainly from non-
conformist Protestant sects (Franklin 1992). But by 1964 earlier cleavages had almost 
completely lost their political salience. The crucial cleavage, particularly for 
understanding the development of the British party system was that between owner and 
worker. The Russian revolution in 1917 crystallised the division between workers and 
owner, although not as Marx had envisaged it. It produced two conflicting claims: those 
of a commitment to an international revolutionary movement and those of the national 
polity (Ware 1996).  
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 Lipset and Rokkan argued that after these European party systems were 
established they froze as parties consolidated their support bases, absorbed new social 
cleavages and developed long standing party images (Norris 1997): 
 
The party systems of the 1960s reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the 
cleavage structure of the 1920s. This is a crucial characteristic of Western 
competitive politics in the age of ‘high mass consumption’: the party 
alternatives, and in remarkably many cases the party organisations, are older 
than the majorities of the national electorates (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 50).  
 
Essential to Lipset and Rokkan’s theory was the idea that in order to survive political 
parties needed to reflect older divisions in society. This will become important when we 
consider the debate around class dealignment and partisan dealignment. Implicit in the 
idea that parties formed to express the functions of cleavages with society is that where 
cleavages began to wane, so did support for political parties.  
Party group linkages, founded on the dominant cleavage in each society, 
permeated all aspects of electoral politics stabilising and ‘freezing’ these party systems. 
Some organisations were mobilised into politics and once well entrenched, it proved 
difficult for new parties to challenge the status quo. Lipset and Rokkan provided 
important insights into the stability of western European party systems. Mass parties 
insulated and captured their supporters, developing political sub-cultures which gave 
supporters a psychological sense of belonging (Norris 1997). Writing shortly after 
Lipset and Rokkan, Rose and Urwin’s study of nineteen western nations between 1945-
1969 showed that except in countries with a regime change, ‘the electoral strength of 
most parties has changed very little from election to election, from decade to decade, or 
within the lifespan of a generation’ (Rose and Urwin 1970). Lipset and Rokkan’s work 
provide the socio-structural context in which studies of voting behaviour can be 
understood. As Lipset (1960) noted, the key cleavage in many European countries 
meant that lower income groups came to vote mainly for parties on the left, while 
higher income groups vote mainly for parties on the right’. It is clear that these 
cleavages detailed by Lipset and Rokkan were the social basis for political support. But 
what did the early studies of voting behaviour have to say about the strength of these 
cleavages in forming political support and how far can we understand electoral change 
based on the waning of political cleavages? 
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The notion that a ‘frozen’ party system gave rise to stable patterns of political 
support was strengthened by the earlier work on the social basis of voting which came 
to be very influential in British voting studies. The proponents of sociological models of 
voting argued that it was possible to predict with some accuracy how an individual or 
individuals would vote on the basis of a few social characteristics (Lazarsfeld 1944). In 
their later work Berelson et al (1954) paved the way for those who later focused on the 
salience of the psychological aspects of group membership for voting. They argued that 
social group differences are reinforced through these groups having differing material or 
symbolic interests which are affected by government policy. They also argued that 
conditions of physical and social proximity meant that these differences were 
transmitted across generations. 
 
The solid foundations of American political parties are in distinctive social groups that 
not only have “interests” involved but have sufficient social differentiation from other 
groups, sufficient continuity between generations, and sufficient closed or in group 
contact in successive generations to transform these initial political interests into 
persistent and durable social traditions. (Bereleson et al 1954: 147)  
 
These early writings were influential in the development of social deterministic and 
socialisation models of political behaviour in subsequent years.  
 
2.3 Electoral alignments  
 
Within this framework of historical cleavages we can understand how the electorate in 
Britain and in other west European countries became aligned around specific issues and 
how the party system came to reflect that of these cleavages. The impression of a 
‘frozen’ party system based on stable patterns of electoral alignment was reinforced in 
the 1960s by the work of Angus Campbell and colleagues (Campbell et al 1960). The 
Michigan model of partisan identification became one of the central models in electoral 
research.  
Campbell et al argued that many Americans voters lacked sufficient information 
about politics as well as political sophistication. For Americans to vote on the basis of 
issues, Campbell et al argued that firstly, people had to be familiar with the issue; 
secondly, the issue needed to arouse some feelings, and; thirdly, people had to see a 
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party difference on the issue (p. 170). These insights are important for understanding 
modern voting. The authors point to ways in which we might understand declining 
turnout since 1992 in Britain. As we shall see, for voters (particularly young ones) 
unshackled from political parties to make choices, they need information/knowledge of 
issues (familiarity in Campbell et al’s terminology) and they need to be able ascertain 
differences between parties which give them choice.  
 According to Campbell et al, in addition to voters lacking the information and 
sophistication about politics to vote on the basis of ‘issues’, they also lacked a coherent 
set of beliefs, or an ideology, to order their political attitudes. Even in the absence of 
these factors Campbell et al found that American voters, despite being faced with a 
range of complex electoral choices for candidates at American elections, did vote, and 
consistently so. The central finding of Campbell et al’s study was that ‘most Americans 
have an enduring partisan orientation, a sense of party identification, which has wide 
effects on their attitudes toward the things that are visible in the political world.’ 
(Campbell et al 1960: 529). This sense of partisan identification, according to Campbell 
et al, became a guide through which voters structured their understandings of complex 
political issues, candidates and campaign events. This work also offered the 
measurement of partisan identification still used by political scientists today; measuring 
both the direction of and strength of partisan identification.  
Crucial to this social psychological conception of partisanship is that individual 
party identification developed before an individual had their formative participative 
experiences. They were learnt within an individual’s immediate social environment and 
particularly from one’s family: ‘It is apparent from his presentation that an orientation 
towards political affairs typically begins before the individual attains voting age and 
that his orientation strongly reflects his immediate social milieu, in particular his 
family’ (Campbell et al 1960: 146-7). This is interesting in itself, although I will discuss 
this in relation in the British context shortly and return to it both explicitly and more 
implicitly at various points in the thesis. One of the changes to the political socialisation 
of young people in Britain is that the social group points of identification have 
weakened. As a result, rather than these familial social group reference points being 
crucial to political socialisation, it would appear, in their absence, that formative 
political experiences have a stronger effect in the absence of other factors (see for 
example Franklin 2004). In most cases this is likely to be either an election (the 
experience of voting itself) or an election campaign (context).  
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Changing political socialisation is one of the key underlying themes of this 
thesis and I will argue throughout the course of the later chapters that in order to 
understand the changing British electorate we need to understand changes in the 
political socialisation received by different cohorts. Social change naturally means that 
the environment and contexts in which voters receive their early political experiences 
are different. In their influential work on Political Change in Britain  (1969, 1974) 
Butler and Stokes similarly emphasised the role of social groups in fostering a sense of 
party identity. In particular they argued that the family had a crucial role in transmitting 
parental political loyalties to the sibling. This process was seen to be particularly strong 
where both parents shared the same party loyalty 
 
A child is very likely indeed to share the parent’s party preference. Partisanship over the 
individual’s lifetime has some of the quality of a photographic reproduction that 
deteriorates with time: it is a fairly sharp copy of the parent’s original at the beginning 
of political awareness, but over the years it becomes somewhat blurred, although 
remaining easily recognisable (Butler and Stokes 1974: 50).  
 
Perhaps critically, this identity with a political party was founded on the rock of class 
identities. As discussed in Lipset and Rokkan’s model of stable party alignments, class 
became the pre-eminent influence on party identification. For Butler and Stokes ‘The 
individual, identifying with a particular class, forms a positive bond to the party which 
looks after the interests of the class’ (1974: 88). Butler and Stokes were also aware of 
the significance of groups within the individual’s ‘social milieu’ such as 
neighbourhood, workplace and community. These social groups served to reinforce and 
strengthen existing attitudes. As we will see later in this chapter and in subsequent 
substantive chapters, one of the contributions of this research to the literature on 
political participation will be to place the recent work on youth participation firmly 
within the wider literature on political and particularly electoral change in Britain. In 
addition it is argued that attempting to understand how social group involvement has 
changed and how the identities associated with these changes have declined is key to the 
investigation of youth politics.  
 Butler and Stokes identified what has become known as the ‘paradox of voting’. 
Using British Election survey data from 1963 to 1970 they showed that the majority of 
the electorate has little involvement in political life outside voting:  
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only one in two voted in local elections and only one in ten went to an election meeting. 
Only one in fifty took an active part in the campaign and the number engaged in party 
activities between campaigns was altogether negligible (Butler and Stokes 1974: 21).  
 
In the context of this research, I will argue that one of Butler and Stokes most important 
arguments was that: ‘the limits of the public’s overt political activity are matched by the 
limits of its political information’ (Ibid: p.22). The argument was based on their survey 
of the existing literature which found a range of evidence showing how limited the 
electorates’ knowledge of political issues was. One of the central models of electoral 
turnout this thesis will come to discuss, test and evaluate is the cognitive mobilisation 
model and it will be fully detailed and operationalised in Chapter six. The thesis will 
suggest that there is at least some evidence that the huge increase in education and the 
availability of mass media resources since the 1950s has not had purely positive effects 
on civic engagement.  
Butler and Stokes found that most British citizens were not well informed about 
politics and did not have consistent opinions or deep rooted positions on particular 
policies. However, despite seemingly not being engaged with politics, the paradox 
emerged that around three quarters of the electorate turned out to vote at general 
elections in Britain. They argued that, as found in the United States by Campbell et al 
(1960), voters in Britain were rooted to one of the major political parties for long 
periods of time, or even for the duration of their lifetime: 
 
It is clear that millions of British electors remain anchored to one of the parties for very 
long periods of time. Indeed many electors have had the same party loyalties from the 
dawn of their political consciousness and have reinforced these loyalties by 
participating in successive elections (Ibid: 47).  
 
Butler and Stokes used the idea of class and partisan ‘self image’ to understand how 
voters became attached to political parties for long periods of time. Party attachments 
provided a frame of references which allowed voters to process new problems into an 
established pattern (Norris 1999).  
 I will argue that the decline in this informational function of partisan identity 
and of wider social group identity has meant that young people in Britain are now 
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without one of the basic tools for their psychological engagement with politics. In the 
second edition of their book, Butler and Stokes (1974) reported on changes in these 
enduring patterns of political support that characterised the British electorate. We can 
see these changes in the electorate as being the foundations for understanding political 
support amongst young people today. One thing we can observe from the above passage 
is that Butler and Stokes argue that party loyalties were reinforced by participating in 
successive elections. This is confirmed in more recent cross-national research (Franklin 
2002). As these identities have weakened, firstly people have become less likely to 
participate in elections, and, second the election context itself has become a stronger 
factor in nurturing future participation.  
For Butler and Stokes, given the class based nature of British politics and the 
existence of homogenous class groups, long-term political change was only likely to be 
the result of generational changes in the distribution of partisanship. They argued that 
there were two possible reasons for inter-generational change. Having found evidence 
of a long-term drift to Labour in the distribution of partisanship they sought to explain 
this. Firstly, older voters leaving the electorate were more likely to have a Conservative 
partisanship than younger voters. This was not because people became more 
Conservative as they got older, but because when older voters had entered the electorate 
- in some cases before 1914 - Labour was not an established major political party and in 
consequence they were much less likely to have been socialised in childhood into a 
Labour vote.  
The second reason was that partisanship was most subject to change during early 
adulthood. As a consequence new voters were particularly likely to be influenced by the 
political climate of the day. Butler and Stokes argued that if there was a major change in 
that climate then voters entering the electorate at that time may well drop the partisan 
cues learnt in childhood in favour of those received at their first voting experience. 
Butler and Stokes argued that 1945 was one such occasion as this happened with the 
election of the first majority Labour government. A particularly large cohort of new 
voters (there had not been an election since 1935) exhibited unusually strong pro-
Labour sympathies and this further bolstered Labour’s partisan strength.  
Later in the chapter I will review in detail the contemporary literature which 
focuses on the importance of the political period, but here Butler and Stokes provide an 
important impetus for this research – showing that long-term change can be triggered, 
or accelerated by factors associated with the political period. This will become one of 
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the central arguments developed in the course of the thesis. One thing that will become 
clear is that these shorter-term aspects of the political period have become more 
important to young people’s political socialisation as the long-term anchors to political 
support have declined. Butler and Stokes, in the second edition of their book, were 
amongst the first to notice that important changes were taking place. They argued that 
there had been a weakening of class alignment, finding that while the level of Labour 
partisanship was weaker amongst the working class in Britain in 1970 than it had been 
in 1963, it was stronger amongst the middle class. They also found the classes to be less 
polarised in their subjective class identities.  
 
2.4 Electoral change: the decline of traditional cleavages 
 
Central to the more specific research questions I will be formulating is how and why  
traditional social cleavages have changed in recent decades and how is this reflected in 
the political support if modern British voters? We know that the social structure of 
Britain and Europe has undergone changes in the period since the 1950s when the 
empirical connection between social position and party choice was first found 
(Oskarson 2005). The thawing of cleavages is made all the more plausible because of 
the magnitude of technological, social and economic change in this period. Today, 
Britain is what we might call a post-industrial society and this implies that group 
solidarities and stratifications derived from previous industrial relations are, today, 
largely obsolete (Dogan 2001). But few areas have been contested as rigorously as 
social cleavage voting (eg Dalton 1984; Franklin 1992; Clark and Lipset 1991, 2001; 
Evans 1999).  
We can identify three distinct schools of thought in the debate surrounding the 
persistence of social cleavage voting (Kreisi 1997). Much of the literature in the area 
takes a comparative European focus. One set of arguments examines carefully the 
original conceptualisation of Lipset and Rokkan’s freezing hypothesis and argues that 
political cleavages in party systems endure and thus party systems themselves show few 
significant signs of increased instability (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Klingemann and 
Fuchs, 1995; Mair, 1993, 1997). The second groups of scholars argue that in many 
advanced west European democracies there has been an important decline in the ability 
of social divisions to structure individual voting choice. This school of thought, which is 
now is widely accepted, argues that there is a universal process of decline in cleavage 
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politics, which has gone more or less far in the different Western European and 
Northern American countries (e.g., Franklin et al 1992). A third vein of thought, one 
which we can describe as the ‘new politics’ approach agrees with the notion that 
traditional cleavages are weakening, argues that alongside this weakening has been the 
emergence of a new ‘value cleavage’ rooted in the opposition between materialist and 
post-materialist orientations (Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997). Whilst there has been a 
significant surge of academic interest in the politics of recent generations of young 
people, there is a lack of understanding as to how the politics of today’s youth might fit 
reflect these models. Is it possible to understand the changing politics of youth through 
the lens of one of these broad models? Or is there another model, as yet unspecified, 
that accounts more accurately for youth turnout? 
Franklin (1992) argues that the decline in the structuring capacities of traditional 
cleavages is nowhere balanced by increases in the structuring properties of new 
cleavages. For the second group of scholars, mentioned above, the origins of this long 
drawn out process of decline are to be sought in the successful resolution of the social 
conflicts which had been embodied in the traditional cleavages (Franklin et al 1992). 
The above is an important point for the research to be carried out in this thesis as it gets 
to the core of the much of the literature on youth participation, which at least implies 
that ‘new’ types of politics – those we might associate with this ‘new politics’ cleavage 
have replaced conventional political activity (e.g., Henn et al 2002, 2005). One of the 
contributions of this research to the literature on electoral change will be to place the 
youth literature and its findings, along with the methodological issues which dominate, 
within the wider picture of social and political change, rather than understanding youth 
just as a moment in the life-cycle.  
 We might best understand the decline in cleavage politics by saying that 
cleavages  have become less relevant to voting behaviour, rather than irrelevant. I will 
argue later in the thesis that social cues are still likely to be a potent influence on 
political choice for people who are integrated into traditional class networks and who 
share the values of the milieu (Dalton 1999). This is particularly relevant to segments of 
young people from less advantaged backgrounds who have not met, as many have, their 
basic economic needs and accordingly have not had the luxury of becoming ‘post-
materialist’ in their political attitudes and behavioural characteristics. These, I will 
argue, are socially excluded young people and their social and political exclusion is 
exacerbated by their lack of cognitive engagement with conventional politics as 
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traditional anchors have declined. Today there are fewer people who fit into the clearly 
defined social groups and citizens tend to be more fragmented and individualised. This 
will become more evident in later chapters when I discuss young people’s involvement 
in associational activity. Again, we see the crucial underlying theme of this thesis that 
social change has weakened the structure of political cleavages that traditionally framed 
party competition and provided voters with a simple framework for making their 
electoral decision (Dalton 1999). In the absence of these frameworks, the costs of 
positive engagement with conventional politics are higher, simply in terms of acquiring 
the information and the benefits may seem less as they are individual rather than group 
ones.  
 
2.5 Electoral change: partisan dealignment  
 
Changes in the way the electorate are engaged with politics and political parties has 
perhaps most often been measured, following the seminal studies of voting behaviour 
discussed above, by partisanship. Following Butler and Stokes realisation that the 
nature of political support was changing in Britain and research by Norman Nie, Sidney 
Verba and colleagues (1979), there was a plethora of research investigating the extent of 
what became known as ‘partisan dealignment’ (Crewe et al 1977). Dealignment meant 
that citizens are no longer attached to political parties. As traditional affective loyalties 
have weakened, short-term influences have become more salient in voting choice; and 
as a result voters are more willing to desert the major parties (Norris 1997). Ivor Crewe 
argued that since 1974 there had been a decline in both the number of party identifiers 
and, more especially, in the strength of party identifiers’ identification. For example, the 
percentage of very strong identifiers fell from 44 per cent in 1964 to 19 per cent by 
1987. It was argued that this meant that voters were less likely to be loyal to one party, 
producing higher levels of electoral volatility and a greater willingness to vote for third 
parties. In another important critique of the Butler and Stokes model of 
intergenerational change, Crewe et al (1977) noted that the decline in partisanship in 
1974 was not confined to new voters but actually was greatest amongst those who had 
entered the electorate in the 1930s - that is amongst voters who first came of age at the 
height of the depression and for whom the class-based appeal of the two main parties 
might have been expected to have had most resonance. These findings were echoed later 
by Richard Rose and Ian McAllister (1986) who argued that the majority of the 
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electorate in Britain is no longer anchored to a stable partisan loyalty determined by 
class and family socialisation. Other commentators argued that party identities have 
become more fluid over time, producing a major change in the social psychology of 
political choices (Crewe and Denver (eds.) 1985; Dalton et al 1984). Whilst class 
dealignment was fiercely contested there was less debate over partisan dealignment. As 
the analysis in subsequent chapters shows, the electorate retains a party identity but they 
tend to do so less strongly than before. These arguments led to the suggestion that, if 
voters were less influenced by these longer-term structural factors, they are more open 
to short-term effects such as images of political leaders; government record in office 
and campaign events.  
 To summarise these theories of electoral support: Butler and Stokes (1969, 
1974) attempted to explain the two party dominance of the electorate in Britain by 
arguing that its basis was to be found in long-term stable patterns of political support. 
This support rested on long-term structural historical factors as argued by Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967). However, in the 1970s support for third parties in general elections and 
in by-elections served to undermine this explanation. A large literature developed 
seeking to explain these changes. Three types of explanations became commonplace. 
Firstly, revisionist theories argued that the link between class and party was as strong as 
ever but what was required was a reconceptualisation, classification and measurement 
of social class to take account of more complex social inequalities. Whilst during the 
1980s the view that there was an ongoing process of class dealignment occurring was 
the orthodoxy amongst most electoral analysts, an important debate emerged centring 
around definitions of class and how best to measure class voting. Heath et al (1985) 
argued two central points: firstly they rejected the frequently used measures of social 
class, proposing a new class schema which divided manual workers across three 
separate groups. Secondly, they rejected absolute measures of class voting in favour of a 
relative measure based on odd ratios (Heath et al 1991). Whilst the ensuing argument 
represented a major challenge to the orthodoxy that there had been a class dealignment 
(see Crewe et al 1985, Dunleavy 1987), there is now considerable evidence to support 
the dealignment thesis and it is widely accepted (Denver 2003).  However, although 
there is now widespread agreement that a process of class dealignment has taken place, 
subsequent research has begun to cast doubt on the strength of class alignments in the 
first place (see Clarke et al 2004).  
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Another set of arguments argued that the traditional class cleavages discussed 
above have been replaced by new forms of social identities based on region, generation 
and gender. The most important of these cleavages as far as young voters are concerned 
is what has become known as the ‘new politics’ cleavage, associated with the work of 
Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997).  
 A final set of arguments suggest that today’s citizens have become more 
rational and less likely to vote habitually, instead supporting parties based on short-term 
factors. This process can be attributed to a process of cognitive mobilisation whereby a 
huge increase in educational standards and an increase in information sources has meant 
citizens are more sophisticated. Political parties have, according to this view, become 
increasingly defunct as citizens become less dependent on political parties for bundling 
issues into coherent policy packages. In the absence of parties providing this function 
we might wonder the extent to which citizens are able to do this for themselves, or 
whether the outcome is the separation of issues from one another. There is not scope 
within this thesis to address this question fully, but it will be possible to make some 
prima facie and speculative conclusions on the basis of the findings in the later chapters. 
These suggest that as voters and issues have become increasingly atomised – so social 
and political issues are equally considered in isolation from each other by citizens. This 
change, I argue, could represent a threat to democratic politics as citizens develop 
unrealistic single issue priorities.  
There remains an ongoing debate, despite a common consensus amongst most 
political scientists that the importance of structural factors and partisanship in 
determining political choice has declined, as to the extent of change since the 1970s. 
One of the central arguments of those who posit the decline in partisan identities is that 
any such decline will be have a strong generational element. As partisanship and social 
group identification are typically learnt during early socialisation they tend to be 
habitual meaning that older generations are likely to retain their psychological 
attachments. In contrast younger generations, socialised in the modern era of politics are 
more likely to display patterns of weak social group identity and partisanship. Whilst 
these group identities remain essentially independent variables during the course of my 
analysis of factors influencing turnout change, later chapters in the thesis will focus on 
the context young voters were socialised in and provide insights into generational 
change in social groups identities. Cross-national work compiled in an edited volume by 
Dalton and Wattenberg (2000) provides the most complete inventory of data on 
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partisanship compiled for the advanced industrial democracies. They confirm that there 
is a broad pattern across these nations of weakening partisanship. In seventeen of the 
nineteen countries surveyed, including Britain, the percentage of party identifiers has 
decreased and the strength of party ties decreased (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). They 
found this decrease to be as much as 26 per cent in Britain between 1960 and the 1990s.  
 Charting the key literature on social and political change has been an essential 
exercise in situating young voters’ participatory behaviour in the context of the key 
traditional explanations for voting in Britain. Critical to understanding today’s young 
voters is that they have grown up in an era when the influence of structural forces 
shaping voting behaviour, particularly social class, have declined. Whilst we know this 
to be the case there is very little in the way of research which looks in detail at long and 
short-term factors in explaining youth participation. Whilst structural factors 
traditionally tied voters to parties, their decline meant that the academic literature began 
to focus more on party’s policies, political events and issues and later on political 
leaders. We can describe the explanations for voting behaviour discussed so far as being 
sociological as they are based on the idea that social contexts and socialisation 
determine political behaviour. Issue voting on the other hand derives from rational 
choice accounts of political behaviour which involves voters making calculated 
decisions about how to vote or whether they vote at all. 
Butler and Stokes (1969: 236, 1974: 292) make an important distinction between 
two types of issue voting. ‘Position issues’ are ones where the electorate may well have 
different opinions or positions on issues such as taxation, tuition fees. Whereas ‘valence 
issues’ are those where their tends to be a broad agreement in what is best for the 
country, such as law and order, economic stability and improved health care. On these 
issues the electorate judges the competence or performance of political parties in 
achieving their goals. As we shall see this distinction is crucial in understanding modern 
politics. Butler and Stokes suggest there are four conditions for a position issue to affect 
a voter’s choice. Firstly, the voter must be aware (information) of the issue. Secondly, 
the voter must have a position on the issue in question. Third, the voter must perceive 
the parties to have distinct choices on the issue from which he or she can choose. Lastly, 
the voter must vote rationally according to the party whose position on the issue most 
closely reflects that of the voter. This distinction between valence and position issues 
will provide a useful framework through which to discuss and critique the youth 
literature.  
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Butler and Stokes had been sceptical of issue voting in the 1960s and seemed to 
indicate that the cognitive development of the electorate was too limited to take 
seriously the notion that citizens were increasingly rational in their political decisions 
(1974: 320). However in an influential article, James Alt, Bo Sarlvik and Ivor Crewe 
(1976: 284) argued: 
 
Most people appear to display a considerable grasp of the issues and where the 
parties stand on each….it appears that, the conventional wisdom 
notwithstanding, the great majority of the British electorate have both partisan 
preferences and realistic perceptions of the parties’ policies.  
 
Crewe (1981, 1985, 1992a, 1992b) followed this up with a distinctive account of issue 
voting which argued that the outcomes of elections from October 1974 to 1992 could 
largely be explained by a combination of changes in the salience of issues and changes 
in the electorates’ judgements about the party having the best policy on the issues 
together with voters’ assessments of the credibility of party policies.  
 Others such as Himmelweit et al (1981) proposed a ‘consumer’ model whereby 
individuals approached each election in search of the party with the best products to 
meet their preferences. This assumed that the voter was rational enough to understand 
the range of policy options provided by each political party. But whilst issue voting 
quickly became the orthodoxy of the 1970s and 1980s it was criticised on a number of 
grounds. Heath et al (1985: 91-6) argued that the Conservative party – the winner of the 
1987 general election, actually had no clear lead over the Labour party on any one of 
the five issues that electors felt were important during the election campaign. Similarly, 
Sanders (1993) argued that during the 1992 election campaign Labour was strongly 
favoured on three key issues (the NHS, unemployment and education), and that, had 
people voted purely on the basis of their issue preferences, Labour would have polled 
around 44 per cent of the vote. But perhaps most importantly for this research, Heath et 
al (1991) demonstrated that while rational issue assessments do make an impact, it is 
doubtful that their importance has grown over time. Heath et al attributed the 
statistically significant stronger connection between voting and issue attitudes in the 
1980s as more to do with the changing political and social circumstances of the period 
than as a result of the changing psychology of voters (Heath et al 1991). It appears then, 
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that the rationality of the British electorate was seriously underestimated in some of the 
earlier studies.  
 
2.6 The 1992 general election and after: from ‘position’ to ‘valence’ issues 
 
Butler and Stokes had pointed to the difference between ‘position issues’ and ‘valence 
issues’ which was later elaborated by Stokes (1992). In the most important work on 
political participation or on voting in Britain to be published in recent years, Clarke et al 
(2004) defined a full model of valence politics and applied it not only to recent elections 
but to British elections since the 1960s. For Clarke et al:   
 
..the most important factor underlying electoral choice is valence—people’s judgements 
of the overall competence of the rival political parties. These judgements, in turn, are 
arrived at through two principal and related shortcuts: leadership evaluations and party 
identification (Clarke et al 2004: 9) 
 
The model always has been as, or more, compelling statistically as either models in the 
sociological framework or the issue proximity model (Ibid: 63). 
 
Two particularly controversial claims result from Clarke et al’s work. Firstly, they 
dispute the sociological explanations of voting based on the ‘twin notions’ of stable 
long-term class-linked partisan identities and class-based voting. They argue that BES 
data shows that since the 1960s approximately one half of the electorate do not think of 
themselves in class terms. They also argue that ‘partisanship is not as deeply embedded 
and highly stable as the sociological approach claims’ (Ibid: 316). Instead, following 
Fiorina (1981), they suggest that party identification is ‘a storehouse of accumulated 
party and party leader performance evaluations’ (Ibid: 211). Moreover, ‘they are 
potentially mutable, being influenced by assessments of economic conditions and by 
perceptions of the competence of rival parties and their leaders’ (Ibid: 316). At first this 
seems at odds with what is a long tradition of electoral analysis in Britain, going back to 
Butler and Stokes that has generally downplayed the influence of party leaders on 
voting choices. This tradition is upheld in a recent piece by John Bartle and Ivor Crewe 
(2002: 93), who conclude that ‘leaders have not had much of an impact on election 
outcomes net of prior variables’. But Clarke et al provide a perfectly plausible 
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explanation for this in that politics in Britain has become more leader-centred and party 
leaders are increasingly the focus of the media. This is reflected in the growing body of 
research examining the ‘presidentialisation’ of politics (see, for example Poguntke and 
Webb (eds.) (2005). Perhaps more contentious is their argument that class has had less 
of a role in electoral politics than we previously thought.  
 Clarke et al arrive at their conclusions through a systematic and statistically 
advanced testing of competing model of electoral turnout from sociological and rational 
choice frameworks. The civic voluntarism model focuses on the utility of social 
contexts in acquiring individuals their politically relevant resources (Clarke et al 2004). 
The social capital model emphasises social trust and voluntary participation, whereas 
the equity-fairness model focuses on individual judgements of relative deprivation. 
Three variants of the rational choice model are tested. The cognitive mobilisation model 
argues that individuals are likely to become more dissatisfied with government as they 
become more educated, media reliant and knowledgeable about politics. The minimal 
rational choice model focuses on the costs and benefits of voting whilst the general 
incentives model adds to this by specifying a range of incentives to participation that 
individuals need in order to vote. Each theory is rigorously tested, first by itself and then 
with the others in a ‘tournament’. Variables from the cognitive mobilisation and general 
incentives model dominate. Clarke et al argue that ‘turnout is basically about incentives 
and mobilisation, with demographics – apart from age – playing only a modest role’ (p. 
261). Variables associated with rational choice, that is, costs and benefits are important, 
but the most important incentive is a sense of obligation to the political community at 
large. The most important mobilisation variables were related to political information: 
those who pay attention to the political campaign, who were informed and who evaluate 
government performance are most likely to vote.   
The fact that young people have tended to be less likely to vote at elections has 
usually been attributed to a ‘life-cycle’ effect. This effect simply stipulates that young 
voters are less likely to participate in politics because of the stage in the life-cycle they 
occupy. Commentators have pointed out that young people suffer from early life-cycle 
start-up problems and are less likely to participate in conventional politics than their 
elders (Verba and Nie 1972; Nie et al 1974; Crewe et al 1974; Swaddle and Heath 1989; 
Parry et al 1992; Denver 1997; Norris 2003). The life-cycle approach emphasises that 
young people have more pressing ‘life-tasks’ associated with the transition from youth 
to adulthood (Nie et al 1974). As recently as 1997 commentators still argued that these 
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life-cycle interpretations remain key to low youth participation:    
           
Young people today are certainly less active and involved citizens than their elders and, 
as far as I can tell, they always have been. For the average 18 year old, politics trails 
well behind keeping up with the latest fads in music, dancing, fashion, playing and 
watching sport and chasing members of the opposite sex (Denver 1997: 31).  
 
However, there are good reasons, both short-term and longer term to suspect that life-
cycle factors alone do not adequately account for young people’s politics. The decline in 
young people’s party political involvement is one example of a generational change. 
Both Labour and Conservative parties have seen a dramatic decline in their respective 
youth sections since the 1950s. In 1949 the Conservative youth section, the junior 
Imperial and Constitutional League, boasted 160,000 members. By 1997 this figure has 
fallen to around 7,500 and the young Conservatives have since been officially wound up 
and reconstituted. A detailed analysis of life-cycle, period and generational effects on 
voter turnout will be conducted in Chapter three as it relates to the examination of 
trends in turnout. 
Clarke et al explore age effects which they find to be statistically significant in 
all of their models outlined above. Their analysis shows that there are clear indications 
in the data that generational effects may be taking place. After defining a series of 
‘political generations’ Clarke et al argue that: 
 
…the available evidence is quite consistent with the idea that the Thatcher era- a period 
characterised by insistent advocacy of market rather than government solutions to 
societal problems, and a more general emphasis on individual rather than collective 
goods-had important negative effects on public attitudes towards electoral participation. 
It also appears these effects have not abated since New Labour came to power in 1997. 
This suggests that turnout in future elections may continue to be relatively low. It is 
likely that there will be closer contests and the parties’ policies may become more 
distinct but, especially if there is no life-cycle effect, it is not easy to see how the post-
1979 generation could develop an increased sense of civic duty (Clarke et al: 270). 
 
Clarke et al found significant generational effects with ‘the decline in turnout across 
political generations starting with people who entered the electorate during the Thatcher 
era. This pattern continued in the ‘Blair years’. Whilst being cautious to note that only 
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with panel data can conclusive evidence be supplied, they argue that their evidence is 
consistent with the idea that the Thatcher era produced distinctive negative effects on its 
citizens. The advanced statistical techniques used enables the authors to draw reliable 
general conclusions about generational effects but they do not provide detailed 
information about the variables specific to young people’s political choice in 2001. This 
is perhaps somewhat surprising given that turnout fell most dramatically more amongst 
this group in 2001. Other scholars have pointed to the impact of the Thatcher era on 
young people’s formative socialisation (e.g., Russell 1992).  
Clarke et al (2004) consider the notion that ‘the Thatcher and Blair generations 
are less civic minded than their predecessors by considering the relationship between 
age and civic duty’ (Clarke et al 2004: 271). Their findings confirm their earlier 
conclusions that the Thatcher and Blair cohorts constitute a distinct generation and 
argue that their low levels of civic mindedness help explain their reluctance to go to the 
polls. The net contribution Clarke et al make to the debate over age effects is to provide 
additional and probably the most statistically advanced evidence to date of a 
generational effect in electoral turnout. But aside from a brief discussion of the period 
as one characterised by ‘market rather than government solutions to societal problems’, 
and a more general emphasis on ‘individual rather than collective goods’ (Ibid: 270), 
they provide little evidence or discussion as to why these important generational 
differences might be occurring. One of the aims of this research will to build on Clarke 
et al’s findings to provide more detail on young people’s voting behaviour which I 
argue is missing from their work. By using a similar set of models to Clarke et al it will 
be possible to elucidate further their findings and measure in a different way the 
dynamics of youth turnout.  
 
2.7 Declining electoral turnout: 1992-2001 
 
After the 1992 general election there was growing evidence that young people were 
beginning to abstain in greater numbers than had previously been witnessed. Given that 
both reported turnout and actual turnout rose slightly for the whole population at the 
1992 election; from 86.1 per cent to 87 per cent and from 75.3 per cent to 77.7 per cent 
respectively (Phelps 2004, Rallings and Thrasher 2007), the decline in the youth vote in 
the same period from 76.2 per cent to 75.4 per cent (Rallings and Thrasher 2007)) and 
from 66 per cent to 61 per cent (Butler and Kavanagh 1997) respectively, represented 
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the beginning of a worrying trend for some who saw this as constituting ‘the largest 
number of dormant voters awaiting political reawakening since the suffragettes’ (British 
Youth Council 1993: 3). These concerns were heightened by research showing the 
widespread non-registration of young adults. In 1995 M-Power estimated that four 
times as many young people were not registered to vote than amongst the adult 
population (British Youth Council 1995). Despite high profile media campaigns by M-
Power and ‘Rock the Vote’ aimed at encouraging young peoples’ registration before 
election day, registration levels fell further between 1992 and 1997 (Leonard and 
Katwala 1997).  
Interest in falling turnout and concern and comment on youth apathy increased 
markedly after the 1997 and 2001 general elections where turnout fell dramatically. For 
the youngest age groups, the 18-24 year olds and 25-34 year olds, reported turnout fell 
from 59.7 per cent to 49.4 per cent and 68.6 per cent to 55.1 per cent, respectively, 
between 1997 and 2001. The election marked the lowest turnout at a British general 
election since the ‘Khaki election’ of 1918. The obvious question in the aftermath of the 
election was why had so few people turned out to vote in 1997 and 2001? Many 
commentators argued that the results of the 1997 and 2001 elections could be 
understood by looking at the closeness of electoral competition between the two main 
rival parties and the amount of perceived policy difference between them in the run up 
to the election (e.g., Pattie and Johnston 2001). Clarke et al (2004) argue that, ‘the 
precipitous decline in voting in Britain between 1997 and 2001 serves to undermine 
purely sociological account of turnout, since the variables at the centre of such accounts 
like social class, education, ethnicity and gender do not change enough in four years to 
provide an adequate explanation of what occurred’(2004: 87). Whilst we would not 
expect these types of changes on their own to explain a decline in turnout such as 
occurred amongst the youngest age groups after 1992, when combined with the impact 
of short-term factors, the likelihood of an effect is more plausible. It is my contention 
that gradually changing sociological factors, such as changes in partisan identification 
may have affected young people’s socialisation, but only became apparent at their first 
opportunity to vote. If those who became eligible to vote for the first time in 1997 were 
relatively devoid of traditional ties to social and political participation they are likely to 
have been more susceptible to and affected by the impact of short-term period factors.  
Others began to question whether a whole generation of young people were 
becoming disconnected from politics: 
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For young people in Britain today politics has become a dirty word…..The 
overwhelming story to emerge from our research, both qualitative and 
quantitative, is of an historic disconnection. In effect, an entire generation has 
opted out of party politics (Wilkinson and Mulgan 1995: 98-99).  
 
Plainly this is a generation which does not look to the political parties to solve 
problems and improve their lives. With well over two out of every three young 
voters sceptical of political activity, we could be witnessing the emergence of an 
apolitical generation (Pirie and Worcester 1998: 11).  
 
Concern with the apparent disaffection of a generation was evident in the media’s 
portrayal of young people as politically alienated, apathetic and self-interested (Harrison 
2002, Russell 2004). It was common to hear media commentators arguing that young 
people who choose not to vote ‘should be treated with contempt’ (Lawson 1997); that 
they are ‘political know-nothings’ and ‘airheads’ (Toynbee 1997). Others suspecting the 
possibility of a generational change argued that young people in Britain have often been 
regarded as a ‘social barometer’ whose behaviours and beliefs are used as a measure of 
social change (Jones and Wallace 1992). In the following years there emerged some 
debate and tentative evidence as to whether young people’s apparent lack of interest in 
politics represents a generational shift (Park 2000, Blais 2003), but the debate tended to 
revolve around an unclear distinction as to exactly what was meant by apathy. 
Others began to argue that to infer political apathy solely on the basis of the non-
participation in conventional politics was to oversimplify the equation (Bhavnani 1994). 
Marsh (1990) drawing on the work of Easton (1975) observed that, more important than 
regular mass participation in formal politics is a level of ‘diffuse support’ for the 
political system which is the mainstay of conventional politics. Marsh thus raises the 
question as to whether disengagement with conventional politics represents a deep 
rooted negative view of the value of formal politics. This leaves us with an interesting 
paradox: participation in formal politics, from party membership to electoral turnout has 
declined but citizens still widely support democracy and elections.  
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2.8  The consolidation of a new politics cleavage? 
 
As discussed above, Inglehart and others differentiated between an old politics, based 
on material needs and a new politics based on citizens post-materialist needs. Recently 
the literature on youth participation has taken a new focus. Whilst, traditionally, the 
focus was on young people’s non-participation in formal politics, there has been the 
recognition amongst the academic community of a qualitative shift in political 
participation (e.g., Marsh 2007; Norris 2002, 2003, 2005; Pattie et al 2004; Russell et al 
2002, 2007) and that this is most evident in young people’s politics (Dalton 2008). 
Whilst the idea that there is a difference between conventional and unconventional 
politics is not a new one (see for example Barnes and Kaase 1979), the general elections 
of 1997 and 2001 and the ensuing debate about electoral turnout and political apathy, 
crystallized the conceptual distinction between conventional or formal politics on the 
one hand and unconventional/ informal politics on the other.  
 It has often been argued that young people do care about matters that are 
essentially political in nature but tend to be outside the boundaries of traditional 
conventional politics (Banks 1992: Parry et al 1992: Bennie and Rudig 1993: Mulgan 
and Wilkinson 1997). But since the 1997 and 2001 elections, what I term the ‘anti-
apathy’ school have produced a significant body of research focusing specifically on 
what different types of political participation people are involved in as well as attitudes 
to different types of political activity. For example, Bentley et al (1999) found that 
despite negative and cynical views about politicians many young people are motivated 
by and knowledgeable about the forms of political engagement that do not fit into the 
formal systems of electoral politics. White et al (2000) also found that young people had 
negative views of politicians but that they had engaged with a wide range of activities 
related to politics.  
Two groups of authors typify the anti-apathy school. Henn et al (1999, 2002) are 
broadly critical of the traditional understandings of youth political participation arguing 
that they ‘have tended to contribute an understanding of politics that is tied far too 
narrowly to the domain of elections and parliamentary activity’ (2002: 168). Henn et al 
used a longitudinal research design, conducting a regional panel survey of 1,597 
‘attainers’ over two years (1998-1999), drawn from Nottinghamshire with the intention 
of providing an indicative picture of youth orientations to politics. Their focus group 
research found a level of apathy amongst certain groups of young people, who 
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considered politicians to blame for this (Ibid: 175). Political parties were also cited by 
many in focus groups as failing to encourage young people to participate. Data from 
both the panel survey and the focus groups indicated a specific lack of confidence in 
politicians and scepticism of the idea that political parties genuinely seek to further the 
interest of young people (Ibid: 176-8). Henn et al argue that ‘if young people appear to 
exhibit a lack of engagement with politics, it is because they perceive the world of 
formal politics to be distant from their lives and broadly irrelevant-that politics has little 
meaning to them’ (Ibid).  
Henn et al provide a range of positive information about young people’s 
political orientations and attitudes. Their research found young people to have a 
considerable interest in political matters with seven in ten respondents claiming to have 
‘some’ or more interest in national politics. They found young people to have a clear 
understanding and awareness of events and affairs occurring in their local communities 
as well as of particular issues such as Europe, education, war, militarism and the 
environment (Ibid: 176). Interestingly, their focus groups also showed a high degree of 
support for elections. In other work, Henn et al (2005) conducts a postal questionnaire 
of 705 young people with a mixture of closed and open-ended questions. They draw 
similar conclusions to their earlier work with regard to young people’s eschewal of 
formal politics and continue to argue that their evidence dispels the myth of youth 
apathy. But their findings here seem to contradict the implications of their earlier 
findings that young people, although disengaged from formal politics, are involved in a 
variety of other activities that constitute political activity. They find limited evidence  
for the ‘alternative value’ position and conclude that ‘young people’s apparent 
disengagement with formal politics and the established parties’ does not appear to be ‘a 
consequence of a uniform shift towards a ‘new politics’ value systems and orientation’ 
(Henn et al 2005: 573). This indicates that whilst young people have become 
increasingly critical of politics and the political process in the UK, there is still not 
enough evidence to conclude that they are as engaged as ever, but simply in new forms 
of activity.  
 The second group of authors that I characterise as epitomising the anti-apathy 
school have consistently argued that in order to understand why young people are 
relatively disengaged from conventional politics, we need a fuller understanding of how 
young people themselves conceptualise politics (O’Toole et al 2003a, 2003b; Marsh et 
al 2007). In the most comprehensive exposition of this argument Marsh et al (2007) 
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provide a detailed critique of the existing literature, arguing that a key problem with 
much of the literature to date is its restricted conception of the ‘political’; ‘where the 
focus has been on an arena definition of politics and political participation….equated 
with a narrow range of activities, centred on contacting public officials, voting and 
membership of political parties (Marsh et al 2007: 59). They argue that the failure of the 
existing literature to understand the way young people conceive political activity has 
meant that it has tended to exaggerate youth apathy. The problem with this assertion is 
that whilst Marsh et al rightly identify, on the basis of strong empirical evidence, that 
young people today do appear to be involved in a range of activities outside the realms 
of formal political activity we cannot be clear from their work the extent to which these 
kinds of activity replace voting and formal political participation. The point made by the 
political science research, that Marsh et al (2007) critique, is that young people are 
increasingly uninterested and apathetic towards conventional political activity such as 
voting and party membership. This change is of interest because we can accurately 
quantify how electoral turnout changes over time. Whilst Marsh et al criticise this kind 
of research on the basis of its narrow conception of the political, it tends to imply that 
an understanding of the way in which young people conceptualise politics today and 
their political ‘repertoires’ are adequate on their own as a means of understanding the 
decline in electoral participation.  
 Marsh et al’s methodology seeks to ‘establish a much clearer idea of how young 
people understand and relate to politics’ (Ibid: 59). By using focus groups and a 
‘respondent-led’ methodology the aim was to provide a purposive, rather than a 
representative sample. The results of their focus groups tend to confirm what previous 
studies have shown, that their respondents were not active in formal politics and saw 
politicians as remote and uninterested in them. They also felt that they had no chance of 
influencing politics whilst recognising that it affected them. Few of Marsh et al’s 
respondents perceived there to be any opportunity for their involvement and felt they 
were seen as political ‘apprentices’ rather than agents. Interestingly, the contextual 
approach of their study revealed that whilst class was rarely talked about by young 
people, it was ‘lived’. Those groups with limited access to economic capital knew they 
had little and understood that it impacted on their life chances (Ibid: 213).  
Following Bang (2003), Marsh et al agree that the decline in formal political 
participation is not a ‘free rider’ problem, but rather a problem of political exclusion. 
They argue that ‘although some young people may be politically apathetic, in our view, 
38 
 
the more serious problem is that many are alienated from the existing political system’ 
(Marsh et al 2007: 211).  Marsh et al provide useful insights into how young people 
conceptualise politics. These insights tend to reflect much of their earlier work and work 
by other anti-apathy scholars (Henn et al 2002, 2005, 2007; O’Toole et al 2003a, 
2003b), but further bolster the case that young people are interested in politics as 
broadly conceived, but are simply apathetic and uninvolved when it comes to formal 
politics. They argue the case for a variety of participatory initiatives, particularly at the 
local level, whilst noting that many existing initiatives have not received sufficient 
investment.  
Marsh et al (2007) devote almost half of their book to a critique of quantitative 
methods and the argument that young people are ‘apathetic’. But their methodology is 
unable to answer the substantive questions relating to political change. To what extent 
do their findings represent a shift away from conventional politics to other types of 
political activity? If this group are alienated from formal political activity and from 
political parties, is this a new phenomenon, and, if so, what explains this? Even if we 
accept the proposition that interest and involvement in broader forms of political 
participation are the result of a disenchantment with traditional political activity, Marsh 
et al provide no evidence that politics itself has changed in such a way as to account for 
these qualitative shifts. Whilst the book provides useful insights into youth conceptions 
of politics today, it is largely descriptive. To address change over time it is necessary to 
have data over time, whether quantitative or qualitative. Unfortunately no such 
qualitative data exists which allows a comparison of the explanatory factors for electoral 
turnout decline. The following chapter outlines the methodological challenges faced by 
this research project and detail how the subsequent chapters will address these using the 
appropriate quantitative methods and data.  
Whilst these studies have made an invaluable contribution to the literature and 
our wider understanding of the ways in which today’s young people are becoming 
‘political’, one which I will return to shortly; there remains a significant gap in our 
understanding as to the extent of change in youth voting behaviour and why it has 
occurred? It may be misleading to argue from the fact that young people are disengaged 
from elections and political parties that they are equally disengaged with the democratic 
process and other social and political activity. But it is equally misleading to suggest 
that new forms of social and political activity are the result of politics, political 
processes and politicians failing to engage young people. In fact, one thing would 
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appear to be self evident, although difficult to prove; that politicians and political 
processes have not changed in such a fundamental way to adequately account on their 
own for changing patterns of political behaviour. This is not to argue that there is 
nothing that politicians can do to boost political engagement or that there is little that 
they have done to reduce it.  
 In general the literature on young people’s politics has tended to be rather 
divorced from the mainstream political science literature. Until recently, as many recent 
studies have highlighted (e.g. Fahmy 2005: Henn et al 2002: Marsh et al 2007), life-
cycle interpretations have dominated the political science understanding of youth and it 
has received relatively little attention. The sociological literature has tended to provide 
more depth to the study of youth, but tends to be descriptive, showing what kinds of 
political activity young people are involved in. The question whether recent generations 
of young people are different in their political participation has seldom been adequately 
addressed. Where it has been addressed, the emphasis has tended to be on how politics 
has changed rather than on changes in the electorate in the last 30-40 (see, for example, 
The Power Report). The argument underpinning this thesis is that changes in young 
people’s political behaviour are rooted in long-term social and political changes, 
possibly triggered, reinforced and consolidated by short-term factors. 
The general picture to emerge from what I characterize as the ‘anti-apathy’ 
qualitative school of thought is that whilst young people or young adults have relatively 
low levels of participation in politics; low levels of trust in politicians and are generally 
disengaged from conventional politics; this only paints a fragment of the picture of 
young people’s politics. Many have high levels of interest and are engaged in a variety 
of activities which lie outside the traditional sphere of politics but which have clear 
political motivations (Bentley 1999; Bhavnani 1994; Eden and Roker 2000; Furlong and 
Cartmell 1997, 2007; Henn et al 1999, 2002, 2005, 2007; Marsh et al 2007; O’Toole et 
al 2003a, 2003b; Roker 1999; White et al 2000). But whilst providing much in the way 
of contextual understanding of attitudes and behavior the central question; why the 
change in electoral participation, remains? This thesis will be concerned purely with 
voter turnout, examining in detail trends in turnout and explanations for these trends. It 
concludes by analysing some of the broader issues around youth participation.  
Whilst Clarke et al’s (2004) focus is primarily on voting behaviour and party 
support since the 1960s, others have sought to examine the dimensions of a wider range 
of political activity. Norris’ (2002) important comparative work on political activism 
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utilises data from countries across the globe. Norris confirms the evidence that there has 
been a widespread erosion of the conventional channels of political engagement, 
including electoral turnout, party membership and civic activism. Secondly, Norris 
argues, following Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997), that long-term processes of 
modernisation and the cognitive development of citizens have been the primary drivers 
in shaping these changes. Norris argues convincingly that ‘rather than eroding, political 
activism has been reinvented in recent decades by a diversification in the agencies (the 
collective organisations structuring political activity), the repertoires (the actions 
commonly used for political expression), and the targets (the political actors that 
participants seek to influence)’ (2002: 216). Whilst this trend in notable across age 
groups, younger generations have become particularly likely to disengage from 
‘traditional agencies’ in favour of ‘ad hoc, contextual, and specific activities of choice, 
increasingly via new social movements, internet activism and transnational policy 
networks’ (Ibid: 222).  
 
Contrary to popular assumptions, the traditional electoral agencies linking citizens and 
the state are far from dead. And, like a phoenix, the reinvention of civic activism allows 
political energies to flow through diverse alternative avenues as well as conventional 
channels (Norris 2002: 223).  
 
But critical questions remain from the idea that new forms of political activity are 
replacing traditional forms. Firstly, to what extent can these new types of political 
activity compensate for the decline of traditional forms of participation? There is little 
research to show how or whether these new types of participation have firm social roots 
that the party identification showed that formal political participation did/does, 
according to Butler and Stokes (1969) and The Michigan School. We might suspect that 
as they age, because these new political repertoires are not rooted in firm social 
psychological ground, young people will shed these types of activity.  
 Norris (2003) addresses the question of life-cycle, period and generational 
effects in a variety of different types of political participation. Using comparative panel 
data from the European Social Survey (ESS), the findings of her analysis reveal that 
there are differences of age: ‘even after including all relevant controls….age remained 
one of the strongest predictors of citizen’s action’ (Norris 2003: 12). In relation to 
citizen-oriented activism, she find a life-cycle rather than a generational effect: 
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‘although there is a large age gap in turnout, nevertheless this can be attributed more to 
life-cycle patterns, so that the younger groups can be gradually expected to vote more 
often as they enter middle age’ (Ibid:13). However, in relation to cause-oriented 
repertoires, Norris (2003) found that young people are significantly more likely to take 
part than their parents were. Whilst this suggests a generational change, in the same way 
that declining electoral turnout does, some caution needs to be exercised as to whether 
these characteristics will adhere to young people as they age. Norris (2003, 2005) 
provides strong evidence that young people are not in fact apathetic and are involved in 
a wide range of new forms of political activity.  However, it also seems clear that if 
declines in turnout may simply be the result of life-cycle or period effects, this may also 
be the case for the rise in new forms of political activity. A prudent judgment, on the 
basis of the available evidence is that recent declines in turnout may not be as serious as 
they appear and that some recovery will occur as cohorts age. But at the same time, 
these cohorts are likely to shed some of the new types of political activity they are 
engaged in as they age. Clearly more evidence is needed to show the extent of turnout 
decline amongst recent cohorts of young people.  
 The literature on youth engagement details participation in the new types of 
informal political behavior such as environmental movements, anti-war marches and 
demonstrations - but very rarely asks whether these types of participation have 
previously existed side by side with formal types, or whether they are new and specific 
to a generation. It therefore doesn’t question whether these new forms of political 
participation are simply more visible in the absence of formal participation. Secondly, 
the majority of the literature on new forms of youth engagement tends not to ask 
whether the new types of participation are undertaken by the same demographic groups 
as formal participation and are as class based as formal participation was. Whilst Norris’ 
(2002, 2003, 2005) comparative studies are broadly supportive of the argument of the 
‘anti-apathy’ school there remains a need to understand why today’s youth participation 
is different to previous generation? If it is because of a general discontent with modern 
politics, can we identify specific factors to do with the particular period in which this 
generation were socialized which help explain this?  
 Pattie et al’s (2004), research, conducted under the auspices of the ESRC’s  
Democracy and Participation programme had a wider remit than voter turnout and 
conventional participation. It represented a significant advance on the previous 
equivalent work on the UK published by Parry et al (1992). It also represented a 
42 
 
confirmation of the above recognition that political participation is changing and the 
need to provide some detail on exactly what kinds of political activity citizens are now 
involved in. 
Pattie et al (2004) contend that citizenship has become a central concern not 
only of academics but also of politicians and policymakers. First, citizenship has always 
raised basic questions about the relationship between the individual and the state, 
leading normative theorists to re-examine it whenever there are transformations in that 
relationship, as are now occurring. Second, real or perceived changes in the values, 
attitudes, and forms of participation that underpin civil society provoke interest because 
democracy cannot function effectively without participation. The paradoxical decline in 
electoral participation accompanying the spread of democracy around the world implies 
that ‘there is something happening to contemporary citizenship’ that causes declining 
voter turnout (Pattie et al 2004: 3). The authors look at a wide range of political 
activities, focusing on seventeen elements of ‘macro politics’ which are attempts to 
‘influence rules, laws or policies’, such as: attending a political meeting or rally; signing 
a petition; or taking part in a strike, and ‘micro politics’ such as influencing their 
children’s education; their or their families medical treatment; or their working 
conditions. In relation to ‘macro-politics’ the authors found that citizens are ‘engaged in 
a multiplicity of political activities beyond the traditional’ (Ibid: 107). The most 
common of these being individualistic actions such as giving money or signing a 
petition. Pattie et al also found that British citizens have an ‘extensive network of 
associational life. In terms of ‘micro-politics’ they find that many are engaged in ways 
that we might not traditional recognise. Participating in ‘micro-politics’ people often 
feel a greater sense of efficacy and are generally satisfied with the outcomes.  
 However, Pattie et al also reveal important differences between demographic 
groups. Firstly, much of the ‘diverse and rich associational activity’ they find is 
‘dominated by the rich, the well-educated, and those from professional and managerial 
background’ and this is echoed in informal networks (Ibid: 109). The same is found in 
relation to ‘micro’ political activity with only ‘one in four of those who abstain from 
macro engagement become (ing) involved in micro politics’ (Ibid: 126). The authors 
also find that good citizenship matters: the more active local people are in politics and 
in associational life, the more trusting they feel, and the more affluent they are, the 
better their lives are. The authors conclude that citizenship is not stable but rather is 
‘malleable as individuals make choices about their participation and their perceptions of 
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rights and obligations’ (Ibid: 184). Pattie et al continue to examine the consequences of 
these findings, but if political participation is changing, as Pattie et al confirm, we might 
ask whether inequalities in participation have simply transferred from the ‘old’ politics 
to the ‘new’ politics or whether there is a new set of dynamics?  
 Pattie et al confirm the established knowledge that youth inhibits participation 
(Ibid: 173), that younger people, together with the poor and the working class, are the 
least political knowledgeable and interested (Ibid: 90, 92). They also found that the 
sense that voting is a duty is lowest among young people (Ibid: 70). Young people are 
more likely to be involved in informal and friendship networks. The picture to emerge is 
that even when a wider conception of politics is used, young people are still relatively 
disengaged compared to their older counterparts. But we would expect this given what 
we know about the impact of the life-cycle on political participation.  
 Given the insights provided by Campbell at al (1960) and Butler and Stokes 
(1974) on the importance of partisan attachments as informational shortcuts to political 
activity, we might suspect that the low levels of knowledge found by Pattie et al are 
generational in nature. If young people are amongst the least knowledgeable in society 
this raises the question: are today’s young citizens less knowledgeable than their 
predecessors? How does this impact on their likelihood of voting?  
 There is a growing literature on the importance of political knowledge to young 
participation. Russell et al (2002: 37) suggest that “a case is beginning to emerge that 
young people were less resourced in terms of political information and less able to make 
informed decisions about politics due to a lack of knowledge about politics in general.” 
The relationship between age and political knowledge is confirmed by The Electoral 
Commission’s Audits of Political Engagement carried out yearly since 2004 (The 
Electoral Commission 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). There is also some evidence that these 
levels of knowledge may adhere to them as they age (Park 2000). At least as far back as 
1996 scholars have provided evidence to the contrary of the central argument of the 
cognitive mobilsation model – that a better educated citizenry should be a more 
knowledgeable and active one (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). It is becoming clearer 
that whilst: “young people tend to be the most sophisticated consumers of media, being 
more likely to use new forms of media, especially the most technologically advanced 
media of all electors…they are not especially disposed to using these new media for the 
digestions of politics.” (Russell et al 2002: 24). Wattenberg (2002), identifies the 
possibility that media consumption habits are playing a role in disengagement and in his 
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later book makes the case that young people have become insulated from politics in a 
post-print environment (Wattenberg 2007). Others such as Prior (2007) reveal strong 
evidence surrounding the political consequences of changing communication 
technologies on citizen knowledge, voter turnout and other features of American 
politics.  
 Milner (2002) argues that it is ‘civic literacy’ rather than social capital as 
Putnam (e.g., 2000) suggested that makes democracy work. For Milner it is the 
knowledge and skills necessary for citizenship in the local community that are 
important rather than interpersonal trust and associative activity. This is an important 
insight for this research as it is plausible to suggest as a reason for declining voter 
turnout that as voters have become less psychologically attached to political parties and 
their affiliations have loosened, these kinds of skills have also diminished. However, we 
might argue that it is intuitive to suspect that if this is the case political knowledge 
derives in part from associative activity as Putnam suggests. Clearly it may well be the 
case that these factors are closely related in the causal chain to explaining declining 
turnout. I will return to discuss these factors in more detail in Chapter seven.  
So far we have seen that the literature on youth politics in Britain has tended to 
be somewhat divorced from the mainstream literature on electoral change. There have 
been few comprehensive studies of youth voter engagement. This has meant that few 
studies have investigated how recent generations of young people have experienced the 
formative political experiences in a political environment devoid of the traditional social 
psychological anchors to voting. This is despite a wider literature on generation change 
and the importance of formative influences on the young (e.g., Mannheim 1928).  
The most comprehensive study of youth engagement in Britain was carried out 
by Russell et al (2002) for The Electoral Commission. The report provides a broad, but 
detailed review of the most important literature on youth engagement examining 
reasons for not voting such as disillusion and alienation, inconvenience and impact, 
noting that the factors the identify all affect disproportionately young people. The 
context of youth engagement is set by Russell et al in their introduction where they 
argue that young people are particularly lacking in social capital. They make the 
important point, which I will return to in Chapter seven and my conclusions, that the 
‘connection between young people and the democratic state is more fragile than in the 
rest of the electorate’ (Russell et al 2002:11). As I argue above, for this reason which 
may be due at least in part to the decline in traditional attachments to politics and 
45 
 
political parties, ‘a person’s very first electoral experience might colour their career as a 
vote (or indeed a non-voter) (Ibid:11). Pointing to the importance of understanding both 
long and short-term effects, Russell at al note that longer-term effects are difficult to 
measure, particularly because it is difficult to ‘determine whether the attitudes of the 
young are age related or specific to some form socialisation that will ‘stick’ through the 
ageing process’ (Ibid:11). These difficulties are related to the problems of separating 
what Russell et al call ‘generational’ and ‘cohort’ effects, the former being those type of 
effect that dissipate with time, the latter being a more enduring type that can affect 
attitudinal outlook permanently. They continue to make the point that scholars have 
examined the experiences of particular periods in time on people – such as growing up 
after the Second World War and experiencing rationing and the new health service. 
Importantly for the underlying argument I advance in this thesis, they also point out that 
the impact of the Thatcher period on young voters, which gave them a ‘distinctly neo-
liberal economic outlook compared to the usual age-related attitudinal structure’ 
(Russell et al 2002: 11). More recently Fieldhouse et al’s (2007) research examining 
trends across Europe using national election results and evidence from the 2002-3 
European Social Survey, concurs with the broad arguments outlined in this chapter of 
the importance of short-term factors such as election context as well as partisanship on 
turnout rates of young people across Europe.  
 Clearly there is a need for research that examines in more detail the 
extent to which recent trends in youth turnout may represent a generational decline. In 
Chapter four I examine in detail the turnout characteristics of different cohorts of young 
people who came of age between 1960 and 2001. But there is also a need to examine the 
reasons why young voters are different when compared to their predecessors from 
previous generations. If it is possible to identify turnout characteristics specific to this 
generation, what reasons might we advance to explain this? 
 To date generational explanations have tended to be somewhat tentative 
in their conclusions, largely due to it being impossible until young people age to know 
if they will shed their attitudinal and participatory characteristics. Park (2000), using 
British Social Attitudes data argues that there does appear to be a qualitative shift in 
young people’s attitudes. She shows that whilst in 1986, over one-fifth of 18-24 year 
olds claimed that they were ‘quite’ or ‘very’ interested in politics; by 1999 this figure 
had halved to one tenth (Park 2000: 9). Park also shows that the gap between the 
generations has also grown in this period from a 10-point to a 25-point gap (Ibid: 11). 
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She concludes that ‘generational replacement may have a role in explaining overall 
societal change because the average change within each of our cohorts is smaller than 
the overall societal change (Ibid: 11).  
Russell et al (2002) alluding to the possibility of these types of generational 
changes argue that if young people are lacking in social capital – education should be a 
‘precondition for reinvigorating democracy.’ Any citizenship programme should 
involve the whole range of participatory democracy. Whilst citizenship education is no 
doubt an important piece of the jigsaw of re-engaging young people – we might 
question the extent to which these kinds of education can foster in young people, or 
replace, those early ties with politics associated with partisanship and social capital. I 
will return to these as explanatory factors of generational turnout decline in Chapter 
seven. Russell et al (2002: 51) point to the lack of longitudinal data through which to 
test the generational hypothesis. This consideration will be at the forefront of the 
quantitative research design detailed in Chapter three. Russell et al continue to point to 
the fact that young people did report a willingness to be better informed and research is 
required on the consequences of little election coverage in young people’s media. As 
discussed earlier, if Wattenberg’s (2007) diagnoses of youth disengagement that today’s 
young people have become insulated from politics from the types of media they are 
consuming holds true in the British case, we might ask what, if any, motivations do they 
now have to vote? We might also reasonably suspect, given what we know about the 
impact of class and other demographic factors such as ethnicity and race that there are 
significant differences in the types of engagement that young people are involved in and 
the types of information available to them dependent on their demographics. We know 
for example that levels of voter registration vary significantly between different ethnic 
groups. Saggar (2000) shows that those most likely to be un-registered are black 
Carribeans, with over a quarter of 18-24 year olds in this group not registered at the 
1997 election. This compares to only 6.8 per cent of young Indians. There are also 
important differences in the reasons reported for non-turnout at elections between 
groups. Saggar (2000) found that a much higher proportion of Black non-voters than 
Asians or White reported to have deliberately opted not to vote. This raises important 
questions about social exclusion and within groups of young people there is clearly a 
need for more information on differences in voter engagement in relation to ethnicity.  
In one of the most recent book length studies of youth participation: The Good 
Citizen: How a Younger Generation Is Reshaping American Politics, Dalton (2008) 
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argues that while it is both true and problematic that today’s youth do not vote in the 
same numbers as earlier birth cohorts, this does not, in and of itself, constitute the 
dissolution of our democracy. He insists that we must stop focusing only on negative 
changes and see that, in fact, our public and our politics are changing, and many of 
these changes are producing positive outcomes. Dalton also provides a comparative 
angle allowing him to make conclusions with regard to participation in other advanced 
industrial democracies. In a similar way to Marsh et al (2007) and other scholars of 
what I have earlier termed the ‘anti-apathy’ school, Dalton asks ‘What does it mean to 
be a good citizen’ and argues from the start that once we realise that what has changed 
are the norms of citizenship we will realise that “the good news is that the bad news is 
wrong”. The conclusion Dalton arrives at goes a step beyond that of the UK based work 
reviewed in the above in that it suggests we should not worry about the decline in 
voting and the types of political participation that we have become used to because 
young people are inventing their owns types of engagement and these are an indication 
of the health of participatory democracy. The question remains, however, given what 
we know about the political life-cycle, how will these types of participation adhere to 
young people as they age, have more at stake in society, have to pay taxes, work and 
have families. If the traditionally understood explanation for youth voting behavior, 
based on the political life-cycle; that is that young people don’t vote because they are 
young and will become more likely to do so as they age is true, we might equally 
suspect the reverse to be true for the new types of participation we see emerging. Here 
lies a separate research question. If we are to understand these new types of youth 
engagement it would be logical to first understand the extent to which young people 
from previous generations have been involved in informal political activity and whether 
as they have aged these have been shed in place of more formal activity such as voting. 
If these new types of engagement do reflect a set of changing norms around democratic 
participation we still might suspect that those involved come from the ‘usual suspects’ – 
those well educated, middle class sections of society. In a postscript to the second 
edition of his book Wattenberg (2007) addresses some of the points made by Dalton 
(2007) presenting data of the percentage of young people reporting activity in these 
other forms of participation, from volunteering to community problem solving. He 
argues that despite increases in these types of activity patterns of generational inequality 
still mirror those of voting behavior.  
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There is strong evidence to suggest that political participation is changing. But 
the changes we are witnessing are not, as yet, adequately explained. Young people 
particularly are involved in new forms of political activity and cannot be characterised 
as being simply apathetic. But, they are, it appears apathetic towards conventional 
political participation. As argued above, the anti-apathy school provide a useful picture 
of the types of social and political activity that young people are involved in, but whilst 
showing the young people now conceive of politics in broader terms than was once the 
case, there remains a relative dearth of information about what has changed to make 
young people today different to previous generations. The implication from these 
studies tends to be that it is politics that has changed rather than the electorate. This 
research in subsequent chapters will attempt to understand how young people 
themselves might have changed, with the intuitive suspicion that part of the reason for 
their changing attitudes and participation is because they are different from their 
predecessors.  
 
2.9 Summary and conclusions 
 
There are two important conclusions to come out of the review of the existing literature. 
Firstly, there is now a large body of work commenting and investigating declining 
electoral turnout in Britain and in Western Europe in recent years. There is also a 
growing number of studies looking specifically at youth participation, but, when this 
research was carried out there was a relative dearth of research investigating why 
turnout at recent British general elections declined to the extent it did among the 
youngest eligible to vote. There was also a lack of detail as to whether turnout decline 
should be attributed to period, generational, or, in the case of young people – life-cycle 
effects. Secondly, there is a relative dearth of information as to why recent cohorts may 
have quantitatively or qualitatively different participation characteristics. There are few 
examples of research which seeks to understand youth politics within the framework of 
long-term social and political change. The consensus amongst political scientists has 
tended to be that short-term factors such as a lack of electoral competition are the most 
accurate predictors of electoral turnout. Whilst this may be the case for most 
demographic groups, this research seeks to investigate the possibility that the Thatcher 
generation received a unique political socialisation which meant their participatory 
characteristics are distinct from previous cohorts.  
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In this chapter I have sought to critically review the key literature on youth 
political participation and argue that it is possible to identify clear gaps in the research 
that needs to be addressed. The argument I have developed and sustained through the 
chapter is that an understanding of young people’s political behaviour must be rooted in 
the well documented, broad structural changes that have occurred since the 1950s. 
These changes have had a huge impact on citizens in Britain; which have then in turn 
had similarly huge impacts on traditional alignments with political parties. There is no 
question that the generation of young people to have grown up in the Thatcher and post-
Thatcher eras have experienced a very different set of social circumstances to their 
predecessors. This thesis will examine in detail one aspect of this generation’s unique 
characteristics. Building on the critique of the existing literature – the thesis will seek to 
answer some key research questions that this review of the literature has revealed and 
highlighted. 
 
1. To what extent is the 2001 cohort of young people’s turnout at British General 
Election different from that of previous generations? 
2. Is the life-cycle explanation for youth turnout adequate when looking at this cohort? 
3. Is there any evidence of a generational effect in relation to the turnout of recent 
cohorts? 
4. If so, how can this best be explained? 
 
It would appear then that there is some justification for calling today’s young people 
‘apathetic’. They seem apathetic when it comes to conventional politics. Disinterested 
in politics and politicians as traditionally conceived and disengaged from the political 
process despite there being more opportunities to participate now than there ever has 
been. Instead they have opted to become involved in different types of political activity. 
What is missing is what lies between the two. The why. Young people socialised after 
1979 and who came to vote for the first time between 1992-2001 appear to have 
distinctive participatory characteristics and it is reasonable to suggest that these are 
related to the political period they were socialised in. One of the contributions of this 
thesis will be to test the predictive power of models developed in the recent works of 
political participation (Clarke et al 2004) and citizenship (Pattie et al 2004) on young 
people in Britain.   
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Chapter 3 
Research Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a detailed rationale for the methodology supporting the empirical 
research presented in this thesis. The first chapter introduced a framework through 
which the literature on political participation can be understood. The two broad 
positions equate to what can be viewed as different motivations for researching political 
participation based on the core assumptions of either participatory or realist 
understandings of democracy. The previous chapter situated a significant portion of the 
youth-specific research in the participationist mould – which takes on a somewhat 
defensive view of young citizens. One might argue that this defensive approach is 
ingrained in and reinforced by a methodological approach based on understanding the 
way in which young people themselves conceive of political activity. As noted in the 
previous chapter, this approach clearly has its merits given the need to identity politics 
as more broadly defined that voter turnout or formal political activity. However, it is 
equally the case that we need to understand what has happened to youth turnout and 
identify how we can best explain this.  
 
3.2 Methodological considerations 
 
The previous chapter identified some general research problems that arose from a 
critical review of the political participation and voter turnout literature. The most 
important general problem to emerge reflects the methodological approach of much of 
the literature on young people’s voting behaviour and the specific methods adopted in 
this thesis. The specific research questions the thesis will attempt to address are: 
 
• To what extent is the voting behaviour of the 2001 cohort of young citizens 
different to that of previous generations? 
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• Does the life-cycle explanation of youth turnout remain an adequate explanation 
for low turnout amongst this cohort? 
• Is there any evidence of a generational effect in relation to youth turnout and, if 
so, how can this be explained?  
 
As shown in the preceding chapters, there is a lack of previous research into young 
people’s electoral turnout that situates young people’s political participation within 
wider electoral change. The dearth of over-time information on young people’s 
participation thus dictated the use of large-scale time series data which enabled me to 
investigate trends in participation over time. In choosing this data, it was essential to 
reflect on a series of methodological considerations. These ranged from technical issues 
involving the reliability and validity of data, to logistical concerns over how much time 
and money was available for the research. This section provides a detailed account of 
the decision-making process that resulted in the chosen methodology.  
First of all, it was important that the methodology would focus on gauging the 
participatory and attitudinal characteristics of young voters over time. Secondly, once 
the crucial time period in which a change in political participation was identified, a 
strategy, bearing in mind the feasibility constraints imposed on this project would need 
to be ascertained. The methodology would need to capture data fulfilling the following 
criteria: 
 
• Representative of the general population of young people, including those of 
various demographic groups. 
• A detailed representation of individuals’ participatory, attitudinal and 
demographic characteristics. 
 
Various practical issues remained at the fore of the decision making process as to which 
methodology to choose. The following considerations were taken into account: 
 
• There was a six year time limit on this research, imposed by the conditions of 
the authors’ University registration’.1 
                                                 
1
 Whilst the author moved to part-time status due to financial considerations after year one, the affective 
time constraints remained the same. 
52 
 
• The author would be the sole researcher undertaking all tasks associated with the 
project. 
• The research was funded by an internal fee waiver and a McDougall Trust 
bursary of £3000 per academic year, rising to £3300 for the final two years. This 
meant the author working part-time to fund his living expenses. The financial 
and time constraints meant it was crucial to choose a feasible methodology for 
the research project.  
 
It was decided that the data requirements could most effectively be met by focusing on 
the re-analysis of existing survey data. This was justified by the fact that the data used is 
trusted, representative and freely available to the academic community and is therefore 
the most cost efficient way of obtaining reliable data. This approach would provide data 
amenable to the statistical analysis required to explore any relationships between voter 
turnout, as a key dependent variable, and various attitudinal and demographic variables. 
Another advantage of this approach is that it would not involve any ethical 
considerations as there was no direct contact with individuals. There were, however, 
some potential weaknesses in the data that would result from this approach. 
Whilst survey data may provide a wide coverage of the variables needed for 
statistical analysis of the factors related to electoral turnout and a key concern was the 
depth explored by that data. Assessing youth participation in politics is particularly 
challenging as there is growing evidence to suggest that young people are conceiving of 
politics in far broader terms than was traditionally thought (e.g. Russell et al 2002, 
Marsh et al 2007). Survey methods have been criticised for their inability to tap the in-
depth conceptualisations of politics that young people have (e.g. Henn et al 2002; 
Kimberlee 2002; O’Toole et al 2003a, 2003b). This concern opened up the possibility of 
including a qualitative element to the research to allow for deeper analysis of the key 
issues surrounding political participation which young people have. It was also 
recognised that a qualitative element may help pick out some of the contextual detail in 
the variations in individuals’ specific situations that would be present in the results of 
the data analysis.  
These technical considerations ultimately related to the reliability and validity 
problems that quantitative social research data presents. A major validity issue 
concerned the recognition that attitudinal factors are not directly ‘measureable’ in 
individuals, but usually inferred from the responses to certain stimuli (e.g. questions in a 
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questionnaire presented by a researcher. This leads to a problem that is especially 
transparent in quantitative research. Quantitative methods arguably produce a certain 
vagueness in trying to ‘measure’ attitudes according to the researcher’s (qualitative) 
construction of the variables, quantitatively analysing them, and then presenting them as 
(again, qualitative) interpretations of what people are believing or thinking. Conversely, 
while qualitative methods may draw the researcher into a more methodologically valid 
understanding of individuals’ motives for thought or action (in this case, voting), they 
would not allow the necessary statistical analysis of attitudinal differences or 
relationships. This is principally due to the length of time it would take to gather enough 
data from enough individuals to produce statistically significant results. But also 
because the thesis is concerned with over-time change and qualitative data of this nature 
is not available.  
As the first stage of the research aimed to investigate differences in voter turnout 
over time, a quantitative survey-based strategy was employed because turnout is a 
numerical variable and no additional contextual information is needed to measure it. 
Moreover, there is, to the author’s knowledge, no existing qualitative data that examines 
political participation over time. Once the findings of the first stage were examined, it 
became clear that the crucial question for the remainder of the thesis was why had voter 
turnout fallen so markedly among young people between 1992 and 2001? It was 
decided, give the time and financial constraints outlined above, that a continuation of 
quantitative methods was appropriate. As discussed in the previous chapter this decision 
was made after reflecting on the existing research on youth participation and the dearth 
of quantitative information specific to young people and electoral change. However, at 
the final conclusions of this research it became apparent that further investigation based 
on qualitative methods would be valuable. This is further elaborated in the concluding 
chapter.  
 
3.3 Methodological problems and how they were overcome 
 
A number of distinct methodological issues were identified at an early stage of the 
project. These problems and how they were overcome are detailed below. I return to 
these in the concluding chapter to discuss how these impacted in the research findings 
and the implications for future research. 
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Issue 1 
 
The difference between reported and actual electoral turnout is a problem for survey 
based research since respondents tend to report doing something, in this case voting, 
which they have not actually done. However, as explained in Chapter four, this is not 
perceived to be a major problem for this research design as at an early stage an 
investigation of the actual and reported turnout over time, revealed that the trajectories 
of both are very similar. As this research is primarily concerned with change rather than 
actual turnout at one period in time this renders the over-reporting of turnout at 
elections un-problematic.  
 
Issue 2 
 
A considerable difficulty faced by this research was the absence of sufficient panel data 
through which to trace cohorts of voters as they age. The British Election Panel surveys 
provide this kind of data, but this does not enable the analysis of cohorts of voters 
entering the electorate at different times, in different contexts which would offer the 
opportunity to compare fully their participatory and attitudinal characteristics. A panel 
is a group of people who are surveyed periodically over time. Panel data, also 
sometimes known as longitudinal data or cross-sectional time series data, provide 
multiple observations on each individual in the panel over time. Two fundamental types 
of information can be derived from panel data: cross-sectional information that inform 
us about the differences between subjects or groups of subjects at a particular moment 
in time, and time series information that inform us about changes within subjects or 
groups of subjects over time. Longitudinal studies enable the study of the dynamics of 
change across the life course and the effects of earlier characteristics on later outcomes. 
Recognising this major limitation, it was necessary to weigh up whether a 
research design based on quantitative data was appropriate given that this limitation 
would affect both the analysis of trends in voter turnout over time, as discussed below, 
but also restrict the investigation of the adequacy of the competing explanations of 
turnout change. Due to the absence of panel data sufficient for the purposes of this 
thesis, at the first stage of the research investigating trends in turnout over time, the 
decision was made to create a series of pseudo cohorts using cross-sectional data. By 
identifying an age group at one election and calculating how old this group would be at 
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the next election it was possible to follow electoral generations as they aged, although 
these cohorts were not comprised of the same individuals, as in a panel survey. The 
advantage of this approach is that it enabled the author to illustrate for the first time the 
uniqueness of the generation of young people who voted for their first time in 2001, 
when compared to their predecessors from previous cohorts. One of the first pieces of 
research to use this design to highlight this generational uniqueness was published in a 
peer reviewed journal in 2004 (Phelps 2004).  
 
Issue 3  
 
How does one differentiate between life-cycle, period and generational effects? Chapter 
four establishes that separating these effects reliably is likely to be impossible and 
conclusions as to the extent of any ‘generational effect’ found are limited. But this is 
compounded by the fact that regardless of the type of data available, the subject of this 
research, ‘young people’, have only reached the early stages of their political life-
cycles. Therefore it is perfectly possible that the characteristics of the generation may 
dissolve as they age. This would indicate that what we have witnessed is in fact a period 
effect. What is possible is to show whether or not a generation is unique in its 
participatory and attitudinal characteristics and that as no cohort has ever experienced 
such a decline in turnout, nor has one recovered from anywhere near such a decline to 
participate at normal levels later in the life-cycle, it is reasonable to conclude that cohort 
replacement is likely to decrease turnout.  
 
Issue 4 
 
Attempting to investigate turnout at British general elections prior to 2001 is 
problematic. Until relatively recently electoral turnout was not a major area of concern 
for political science and many of the explanatory variables required to test explanations 
for variations in turnout were not included in the 1997 or in early BES surveys. This 
presents the obvious problem that data from surveys prior to 2001 cannot be used in 
conjunction with those gathered in 2001 to measure over-time changes in the values of 
the most significant predictor variables (Clarke et al 2004). This means it is not strictly 
possible to compare the strength of different explanations/models at different points in 
time. This presented the methodology with a significant limitation as the explanatory 
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models were restricted to one moment in time which rendered conclusions about change 
somewhat speculative. The thesis attempts to investigate turnout change between 1992 
and 2001. The most significant change in this period occurred at the 2001 election. We 
would expect therefore that a multivariate analysis of the variables in the 2001 data 
would reveal differences in the sample that reflect this particularly low level of turnout. 
It is impossible to be sure that these differences are those that explain why the turnout 
of this cohort is so different to previous cohorts, but by looking at the result of the data 
analysis in the context of electoral change, as outlined in Chapter two, it is possible to 
make a strong prima-facia case and point to the need for further research in the area.  
A number of options were identified to overcome this barrier. Firstly, the models 
of participation could be specified to include only those variables available in each of 
the election year data sets. This method was discounted because of the lack of 
comparable variables in most of the data sets and because given the issues of validity 
surrounding the use and interpretations of quantitative data mentioned above, it was 
decided that it would further reduce the validity to attempt to change the specified 
models. A second option was to revert to a consideration of a qualitative explanatory 
methodology. This could have involved the use of interviews of focus groups to elicit 
information. However, this would not generate statistically representative findings. 
Ultimately, it was decided to conduct an in-depth quantitative analysis of the most 
critical data set for turnout decline, BES 2001, with the aim of using contemporaneous 
and recall data in order to generate a plausible explanation of the change in turnout at 
this time. While it is accepted that such analysis cannot offer an irrefutable 
interpretation, I believe that it can propose a convincing model that it consistent with the 
data available. To that extent, it pushes forward our knowledge and understanding of the 
subject of inquiry.  
 
3.4 The Data 
 
British Election Survey data 
 
It was decided to use of The British Election Studies (BES) that have been conducted at 
every General Election since 1964. The main aims of these studies are (1) to collect data 
with a view to describing and explaining the outcome of general elections, (2) to 
analyse long-term changes in political attitudes and behaviour from the early 1960s to 
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the present, and (3) to organise and make available these data in a form suitable for a 
wide range of research. For this reason the data was clearly ideal for the purposes of the 
thesis – to understand electoral change amongst young people. It is the main data on 
which this thesis draws.  
 
Young People’s Social Attitudes data 
 
The Young People’s Social Attitudes (YPSA) survey is conducted by the National 
Centre for Social Research as part of the British Social Attitudes Survey. The YPSA 
survey began in 1994 and was conceived and designed in collaboration with Barnardos. 
Around 600 twelve to nineteen year olds who lived in the households of British Social 
Attitudes (BSA) respondents were interviewed. The study was carried out for the 
second time on the 1998 British Social Attitudes survey as a multi-funded project, 
independent of Barnardos.  About half of the questions asked in the YPSA are identical 
to those asked of adults, allowing comparisons not only across generations but also 
between parents and children in the same household.  
 
Television: The Public’s View  
 
The Independent Television Commission (ITC) audience research provides a systematic 
measurement of public opinion based on statistically representative samples of the 
viewing population and complements the feedback which the ITC receives from 
advisers and correspondents. Since 1970 a major annual survey, currently entitled 
Television: the public’s view, has been carried out to track public attitudes. In addition 
to core questions, repeated annually, thus providing valuable opinion trends, the survey 
is also adapted each year to cover topical issues. The survey relates mainly to the ITC’s 
responsibilities under the Broadcasting Act 1990 for consumer protection (e.g. taste, 
decency, offence and impartiality) and programme standards. At the end of 1998, the 
ITC published Television Across the Years: the British Public’s View, the findings over 
27 years. 
 
3.5 Methods of data analysis and data considerations 
 
Cross-sectional data and the creation of pseudo panels 
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As discussed above and detailed in Chapter four, in the absence of adequate panel data 
stretching over the period of the BES which would have facilitated the accurate tracing 
of each age cohort as they aged, a number of pseudo cohorts were identified making the 
data amenable to logistic regression.  
 
Logistic regression 
 
Logistic regression was employed instead of Ordinary Least Squares or regression as 
this is the recognised procedure for analysing the relative importance of predictor 
variables on a dichotomous variable, in this case voter turnout. With dichotomous 
variables there are only two categories such as male / female or ‘vote’/ ‘non vote’ in this 
case. These are usually thought of as nominal data as they are categories and cannot be 
ordered qualitatively in any meaningful way. However as with the case of turnout / 
verified vote there is an inherent ordering in the dichotomy: one has either not voted or 
one has voted and there is a sense that the characteristics of an ordinal variable are 
present as to have voted is positive whereas not to have voted is often seen as negative – 
hence an order. The logistic regression procedure is detailed in Chapter six along with a 
consideration of multicollinearity, residual diagnostics and others issues relating to its 
correct application and interpretation of the results.  
 
Recoding 
 
In order to conduct the logistic regression analysis it was necessary to check that all of 
the measured statements ran in the same direction. In its raw form some of the data was 
coded so that 1 equalled strong agreement on a statement, and on others it indicated 
strong disagreement. This is a deliberate aspect of the original questionnaire design, as 
it is essential when using attitude questions to vary them so that respondents are not 
influenced by a presumption on the part of the interviewer. Each variable used in the 
analysis was recoded to ensure that the ‘lowest’ number denotes the lowest answer to a 
question such as least agreement, lowest social class, lowest educational attainment or 
lowest amount of electoral turnout.  
 
Weighting  
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There are a various weighting variables included in the main BES datasets. These 
variables offer the possibilities of weighting by region, by gender or by age within 
gender. The recommended option is to use the overall weighting variables, thereby 
weighting by region, gender and age within gender simultaneously. The labels given to 
these weighting variable alternatives differ according to different waves of the survey; 
specific labels are set out below. To ensure the correct weighting techniques were used, 
the author contacted the BES team and had correspondence with Harold Clarke, Paul 
Whiteley and David Sanders.  
 
3.6 Summary and conclusion 
 
This chapter has set out the rationale for using a quantitative research design to examine 
changing electoral turnout over time. Employing a quantitative methodology will enable 
identification of a series of electoral cohorts through which to conduct the cohort 
analysis in Chapter four. The findings of the analysis will provide the justification for 
using the BES 2001 to examine the predictive power of a variety of existing models of 
voter turnout, outlined in Chapter five and operationlised and tested in Chapter six. The 
findings of this explanatory analysis will lead to the building of a detailed model of 
turnout amongst young voters in Chapter seven.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Youth turnout in decline? 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter two set out the detailed rationale for the need to investigate declining electoral 
turnout among young people. This was based on a review of the existing literature, 
where I argue that to understand young citizens’ participatory characteristics it is 
necessary to consider how their behaviour fits with widely accepted accounts of social, 
political and specifically electoral change. A literature has emerged on young people’s 
politics in defence of this age group which argues that young people, far from being 
apathetic and disinterested, have high levels of social and political engagement when 
politics is more broadly conceived than when the focus of their engagement is on a 
narrower definition of formal politics. 
 Whilst the existing literature provides a growing wealth of information on the 
results of change; the contextual and descriptive evidence of the types of activities 
young people are involved in and the extent of this activity, as well as of their attitudes 
to politics, there remains a large gap in our understanding. Crucial questions remain to 
be answered: what exact changes have there been in youth participation? How do this 
generation differ from previous ones? What is the relationship between declining formal 
participation and informal participation? These are just some of the questions that need 
to be addressed before being satisfied that the evidence of informal political activity 
provides an answer to declining levels of formal participation. It is well beyond the 
scope of this thesis to address all of these questions, but it will aim to provide a valuable 
contribution to our understanding of how and why electoral participation has changed 
for this group which should provide insights into the wider research in the area.  
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 The first section of this chapter details one of the methodological problems 
associated with using survey data to examine electoral turnout; the difference between 
reported and actual turnout. I argue that this problem is largely overcome as the analysis 
is focused on changing turnout, rather than actual turnout. The second section 
introduces a series of age groups in the BES data sets between 1964 and 2001 and 
examines differences in turnout between them. This is followed by an important 
discussion and illustration of another central methodological problem associated with 
looking at over-time changes in the life-cycle; differentiating between life-cycle, period 
and generational effects. It is argued that with these considerations taken into account 
there is a strong prima-facie case to suspect a generational change is taking place in 
political participation. I go on to argue that using the age group data alone restricts the 
analysis to making points about difference between cohorts at stages in the life-cycle 
and does not make possible any conclusions about what the political life-cycle looks 
like and how recent cohorts have deviated from the norm. After tracing a series of 
electoral cohorts using the BES data, I conclude that the cohort analysis strengthens the 
case that there is a generational change taking place in electoral turnout in Britain. The 
chapter concludes by making the case for a detailed multivariate investigation of the 
reasons for generational change.  
 
4.2 Changing electoral turnout in Britain 1964-2001 
 
As Table 1 shows, electoral turnout in Britain has tended to be reasonably high and 
stable. Some commentators have argued that a more pertinent question than why does 
turnout decline, is why do voters vote at all? (e.g., Denver 2007). This raises the well 
known paradox of voting which I will return to in subsequent chapters. The paradox 
which stems from rational choice understandings of voting, argues that if voters view 
political activity rationally, we would expect fewer to vote, as the chances of any one 
individual vote being pivotal to an election outcome are minimal. In subsequent 
chapters it is argued that one explanation for this paradox is revealed in the voting 
characteristics of modern young people. It seems plausible to suggest that if young 
voters are abstaining in growing numbers, it may be because recent generations are no 
longer anchored, or are less anchored, by social cleavages and partisan identification, to 
political parties and have less reason to vote habitually. The logical extension and 
answer to the paradox being that previous generations of voters, even if rational enough 
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to understand that their individual vote was/is unlikely to effect the election outcome at 
any given election, vote/voted because of a deep rooted identification with a political 
party.  
 Table 4.1 details reported turnout at general elections between 1964 and 2001. 
Perhaps the most striking feature of the table is the stability of reported turnout between 
1964 and 1992, with the percentage of those voting never falling below 80 per cent in 
this period. The table also reveals, as has been widely reported, that turnout declined 
markedly after 1992, falling by almost 10 per cent between 1992 and 1997 and by a 
further 5 per cent between 1997 and 2001.  
 
Table 4.1 Reported turnout at British General Elections 1964–2001 
 
1964 88.6 
1966 83.4 
1970 81 
1974 87.8 
1979 84.8 
1983 83.1 
1987 86.1 
1992 87 
1997 78.7 
2001 72.6 
 
Source: BES data 1964-2001 
 
A criticism levelled at the use of British Election Survey data is that it under-estimates 
the number of abstainers at elections as there is always a discrepancy between reported 
turnout in surveys and actual turnout figures (see, for example, Kimberlee 2002). In 
order to ascertain whether this criticism will be one pertinent to this research 
methodology, it is possible to compare actual and reported turnout at British general 
elections. Table 4.2 shows that the difference between reported and actual turnout is 
around ten percent at elections since 1960, but in 2001 the difference rose slightly to 
just over 13 per cent. We might expect the difference to increase with such a decline in 
actual turnout as the number of those who decline to report abstinence grows with 
actual abstinence.  
64 
 
Table 4.2 Reported and official turnout at British general elections 1964-2001 
 
Year Reported Actual Difference 
    
1964 88.6 77.1 11.5 
1966 83.4 75.8 7.6 
1970 81 72 9 
1974 87.8 78.8 9 
1979 84.8 76 8.8 
1983 83.1 72.7 10.4 
1987 86.1 75.3 10.8 
1992 87 77.7 9.3 
1997 78.7 71.4 7.3 
2001 72.6 59.4 13.2 
 
Source: BES data 1964-2001; Rallings and Thrasher 2007 
 
With the above criticism of BES data in mind it is important to ensure the difference 
between reported and actual turnout do not impact on the reliability of the results of the 
data analysis in the subsequent sections. Figure 4.1, illustrates the trajectories of actual 
and reported turnout between 1964 and 2001.  
 
Figure 4.1 Actual and reported turnout at British General Elections 1964-2001 
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The figure shows that whilst there is a considerable difference between reported and 
actual turnout at every general election since 1960, the trajectories are very similar. 
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Therefore the problem of discrepancy between reported and actual turnout is largely 
overcome and it is possible to make reliable conclusions about levels of turnout over 
time, as it is not actual turnout this research is interested in but change over time. 
 
4.3 Age groups and changing turnout 
 
As discussed in previous chapters, there is a growing body of work on young people’s 
politics (eg. Henn et al 2002, 2005, 2007; Marsh et al 2007). There have been some 
attempts to look at how different generations of young people vote (Park 1999, 2005, 
Russell et al 2002), but there is a relative dearth of detailed information as to exactly 
how young people’s electoral participation has changed; how their levels of 
participation compare to older age groups; and the extent to which any differences 
between cohorts represent life-cycle, period or generational differences. As discussed in 
Chapter two, Clarke et al (2004) demonstrate a cohort effect with regard to electoral 
turnout, showing that the Thatcher and Blair generations are distinct from older 
generations. But they do not provide any detailed information on their turnout 
characteristics or why this might be the case. The following analysis looks in detail at 
how the turnout characteristics of today’s young people compare to previous 
generations.  
The age variable in each BES data set 1964-2001 was identified and recoded to 
produce the six age categories in Table 4.3. One of the difficulties of opting for 6 age 
categories is that this inevitably leads to a relatively small number of respondents in 
each age category. But, whilst the multivariate analysis in the next chapter will seek to 
address this problem; it is crucial here to be able to detect differences in turnout 
between age groups. One way of dealing with the relatively small number of 
respondents would be to combine two or more age groups. However, doing so would 
prevent the thesis from examining in detail the group of people most commonly 
identified as being disengaged – 18-24 year olds. In addition, it would mask any 
differences between the youngest two age groups and limit conclusions about age 
effects on the life-cycle. Lastly, it would prevent the analysis from focusing on how the 
effects of youth on the turnout life-cycle have changed, if at all, over time. Given that 
we would expect the 25-34 year old group to represent a key period in the life-cycle – 
one of transition from youth to political maturity - these groups are kept separate with 
the appropriate caveat made about the number of respondents.  
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Table 4.3 Reported turnout at British General Elections 1964-2001 by Age 
Grouping  
 
Year <25 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 >64 Highest - lowest age groups 
        
1964 88.6 81 91.7 90.5 89.9 88.2 -0.4 
1966 67.1 78.5 88.4 88 86 83.8 16.7 
1970 73.6 75.4 82.5 84.9 84 87.5 13.9 
1974 78.2 86 87.7 91.4 91.6 88.3 10.1 
1979 70.1 81.2 85.5 91 91.3 87.1 17 
1983 73.1 77.5 87.4 88.8 88.6 83.8 10.7 
1987 76.2 84.7 85.6 91.6 90.2 86.9 10.7 
1992 75.4 86.6 87.7 91.6 87.4 89.4 14 
1997 59.7 68.6 77.5 84.3 88.2 85.4 25.7 
2001 49.4 55.1 68.2 77.4 78.3 85.8 36.4 
        
Mean 1964-1992 75.3 81.3 87 89.7 88.6 86.8 
Change 1992-2001 26 31.5 19.5 14.2 9.1 3.6 
 
        
  
Table 4.3 details reported turnout at British general elections between 1964 and 2001 
for the six age groups. The table is not a cohort table so does not allow the analysis of 
the turnout characteristics of difference cohorts over time. However, it provides 
evidence of the relative stability of turnout across the life cycle until 1997. It shows 
clearly that something occurred between 1992 and 1997 that affected people’s 
inclination to vote and this increased between 1997 and 2001. Whilst Table 4.2 shows 
that reported turnout fell by 15 per cent amongst all age groups between 1992 and 2001, 
it is clear that this masks important differences between age groups.  
The first indication of a generational change in turnout is the significant 
difference between the mean turnout for the youngest age group, the 18-24 year olds, 
between 1964 and 1992 and the figure for 2001. The figure dropped by around 26 per 
cent from the mean. The next section will discuss in detail difference between life-
cycle, period and generation effects, but these figures at least show that young people 
from this generation are different from young people in earlier generations in their 
youth. What is crucial is whether these turnout characteristics, once the impact of the 
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life-cycle is taken into account, adhere to this group it ages. Table 4.3 also shows that 
the most pronounced decline in turnout between 1992 and 2001 was among the 25-34 
year old group. Mean reported turnout amongst this age group was 81 per cent between 
1964 and 1992, but among those who fell into this age bracket in 2001, turnout fell by a 
substantial 31.5 per cent, almost 5 per cent more than for the 18-24 year olds.  
Given that life-cycle explanations of political participation posit that older 
people have higher turnout rates because they have more at stake in society (Jowell and 
Park 1998; Denver 1998), we might reasonably expect that turnout would begin to rise 
as individuals reach their mid 20s to mid 30s. Table 4.3 confirms this, showing that at 
every election since 1966 turnout has been higher among 25-34 year olds than 18-24 
year olds. Whilst this was also the case in 1997 and 2001, the size of the drop in turnout 
among 25-34 year olds between 1992 and 2001 strongly suggest that something is 
happening that is not only affecting the youngest voters. But interpreting these figures is 
problematic because we cannot reliably infer from one stage of the life-cycle something 
about a later stage. It is impossible to conclude whether these differences are ‘age-
effects;’ that is, the result of the stage in the life-cycle that these groups occupy, or 
‘period effects;’ that is, the result of a particular political period. But if these figures do 
simply represent age effects, the 1997-2001 cohort will be the first to have turned out at 
such a low level in the forty years and eleven election studies conducted between 1964 
and 2001.1 A turnout recovery of the kind needed for these figures to represent merely 
age effects is entirely possible, but it would be unprecedented. These young citizens are 
at least unique in their youth – that is they are very different in their turnout 
characteristics to previous generations. If the data represent ‘period effects’ we might 
expect that the effects of the period would be relatively uniform across age groups. I 
will show below there is little evidence that low turnout elections affect young people 
disproportionately. Lastly, and perhaps most pertinent is the fact that the 25-34 year old 
age group was most affected in this period. After an examination of differences between 
life-cycle, period and generational effects, I will return to this point, examining in detail 
the political life-cycle by identifying a series of age cohorts through which it is possible 
to trace the political life-cycle more accurately.  
  
                                                          
1
 The analysis includes only one of the two elections held in 1974. There was no major recovery 
experienced by these cohorts in 2005. See Phelps (2005).  
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4.4 Defining and differentiating between life cycle, period and generational 
effects 
 
One of the key difficulties in understanding the political behaviour of young voters is 
that separating the effects of life-cycle, period and generation in virtually impossible. 
The definitions I use are based on the commonly understood definitions as discussed by 
Jowell and Park (1998) and which are detailed below. 
Life-cycle differences are those that may distinguish one generation from 
another at a particular point in their lives. For example, one might argue that young 
people spend more of their time on activities such as watching television, and playing 
computer games, compared to other age groups and are less interested in gardening and 
DIY. But this is making a point about a particular age group or stage of life rather than 
comparing the same age groups at different moments in time. The point is that as people 
age, they tend to change their leisure activities to reflect new positions they occupy in 
the life-cycle. These are chronological differences rather than generational ones, and tell 
us something about the way in which age changes one’s leisure activities or political 
activities, but tell us nothing about whether and how these differences have changed 
over time (Jowell and Park 1998). 
A period effect is the effect of a particular period of time; this may be the result 
of significant political or social contexts such as the effect of war on the electorate, or 
the impact of a political administration. The essential point is that the effect of a period 
is one which all age groups experience. Political periods may not affect the young and 
old in the same way, but the impact of a period across age groups is significant. The 
essential difference between generational and period effects as far as declining turnout 
is concerned is that the impact of a particular period will fade as a cohort ages. If the 
turnout characteristics of young people, detailed above, are the result of period effects 
they will eventually return to follow a similar trajectory of turnout to that had the period 
not affected them and one which reflects their position in the political life-cycle. 
A generational effect refers to a more profound change or changes. These 
changes may be caused by a political period – but the essential point is that the 
behaviour or attitudes developed as a result, rather than fading over time, adhere and 
follow an age group or cohort as it ages. In the context of this research some kinds of 
societal or political change may foster a temporary set of attitudes or behaviour, 
whereas other more profound changes create a permanent set of values and behaviours 
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amongst voters. As I will argue in subsequent chapters, gradual, but profound social 
changes such as the structural changes that have fundamentally altered the social basis 
of political support since the 1950s, but particularly since the 1970s, may have a more 
sudden impact on voting behaviour than we might expect as a generation of young 
people, socialised in this era, but previously ineligible to vote, reach voting age.  
Figure 4.2 illustrates the key differences that the thesis is concerned with 
between life-cycle, period and generational effects. The life-cycle curve illustrates what 
we might term a standard political life-cycle with a cohort beginning its electoral 
activity at a low level, but rising steadily as it ages in line with a typical ‘life-cycle’ 
explanation of voter turnout. The period curve illustrates the effect of a particular 
political period. It represents a cohort commencing its political life, deviating away 
from the life-cycle curve, during the first few stages of the life-cycle, as it is affected by 
the political period, returning to follow the standard trajectory as it ages. The gap 
between the life-cycle and period curves in Figure 4.2 is the ‘period’ effect. The 
generational curve represents a cohort which enters the political life cycle at a lower 
point but in contrast to the period curve cohort, its low levels of turnout adhere as it 
ages and the trajectory of the curve shows little sign of recovery.  
 
Figure 4.2 Differentiating between life-cycle, period and generational effects 
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 The life-cycle, period, generational conundrum is a special case of the 
‘identification problem’. This simply means that it is not possible to identify the three 
processes simultaneously. The problem occurs whenever there are three or more 
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independent variables that may affect a dependent variable and when each of these 
variables is a perfect linear function of the other ones (Blalock 1967). The 
‘identification problem’ is essentially the most extreme form of collinearity. It is not 
possible to simultaneously estimate the effects of all the variables by any standard 
method such as in a regression model.  
 Until the later decades of the twentieth century the majority of studies 
examining the effects on people of growing older utilised cross-sectional data. Whilst 
some scholars were aware of the hazards of inferring age effects from cross-sectional 
data many neglected the problem that cross-sectional age differences in a variable may 
reflect generational effects, that is, being born at a different time, rather than, or in 
addition to the effects of ageing alone (Glenn 2003). This point is illustrated in Table 
4.3. If we were to assume that the youngest age group in 2001 (the 18-24 year olds) 
turned out to vote at 49.4 per cent (reported turnout) due to age effects alone, we would 
be neglecting the influence of period effects as we can see clearly that previous 
generations of 18-24 year olds had higher rates of turnout. So any future conclusion 
about the 2001 cohort’s political life-cycle would be confounded by possible period 
effects. 
 The limitations of cross-sectional data led later scholars to advocate the use of 
panel surveys in order to provide data on specific individuals over time. But panel 
surveys are not necessarily better than cross-sectional data for inferring the effects of 
ageing as individuals age in changing dynamic societies rather than stable, static ones. 
So, even with a set of panel surveys the conclusions we could make about the political 
life-cycle would be limited to a certain extent by period effects. For example, if we find 
that turnout rises amongst those who were aged 18-24 in 2001 at the next general 
election, this increase may be the result of a general change, that is, a period effect, 
rather than simply a result of them ageing.  
 Looking again at Table 4.3 it is possible to illustrate these difficulties. We can 
identify trends within cohorts by starting with any but the oldest age category and 
tracing the cohort through the table, reading diagonally down and to the right. For 
example, looking at the cohort aged between 18 and 24 in 1979, reported turnout rose 
from 70.1 per cent in 1979, to 77.5 per cent in 1983, to 85.6 per cent in 1987. This 
change could be the result of a life-cycle effect, a period effect, or a combination of the 
two. The two effects can be confounded in any of the trends shown in any of the 
diagonal cohorts. Period and generational effects may be confounded in each column of 
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Table 4.3 and life-cycle and generational effects in each row. An additional problem 
with this method of tracing cohorts is that due the fact that British elections takes place 
at irregular intervals, it is not possible to trace exactly the same age groups over time. 
The cohort analysis in the subsequent sections will attempt to address this second 
problem. 
 Various statistical modelling techniques have been used to separate life-cycle, 
period and generational effects. The dummy variable method makes simplifying 
assumptions by entering age, period and cohort as dummy variables (e.g. Mason et al 
1973). Another method, which requires no extra information, based on Bayesian 
statistics, uses a simplifying assumption – selecting the simplest combination of age, 
period and cohort effects that could explain the data (Sasaki and Suzuki 1987). More 
recently APCC modelling has involved dropping the cohort variable for a set of cohort 
characteristic variables. This method enables the controlling of age and period whilst a 
set of cohort characteristics vary. However, all of these techniques are not true age – 
period – generation models and the results are easily misinterpreted (Glenn 2003). 
Whilst advanced statistical methods are useful in estimating cohort characteristics, it is 
argued that they do not adequately solve the life-cycle, period, generation effect 
identification problem (Glenn 1977, 2003).  
 Clarke et al (2004) utilise advanced statistical methods to demonstrate a cohort 
effect in voter turnout, but this research will seek to utilise alternative methods as 
described in detail in the methodology.2 Other studies looking at the differences 
between political generations, noting the difficulties associated with separating life-
cycle, period and generational effects have argued in favour of using external theory and 
evidence (Heath et al 1997) and it has been shown that informal methods such as these, 
with their recognised limitations can lead to at least as reliable conclusions as accepting 
the results of advanced statistical models (Glenn 2003).  
 This chapter takes a closer look at the simple cross-tabulations of age and 
turnout, adding to Clarke et al’s findings. The following chapters then assess the impact 
of a range of predictors of the youth vote in 2001. In Chapter six the analysis uses these 
predictor variables to develop, in the context of ‘side information’ an account of 
changing youth political behaviour. With these critical issues discussed it is useful to 
reflect on exactly on what the age group data can tell us. We can say two things reliably 
                                                          
2
 My cohort analysis below, published in 2004 (Phelps 2004) is similar to Clarke et al’s (2004) more 
sophisticated techniques.  
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from Table 4.3, illustrated in Figure 4.3 below. The 18-24 years olds in the sample are 
unique in their youth turnout characteristics when compared to previous generations. 
Secondly, the cohort who reached 25-34 in 2001 is also unique. 
 
Figure 4.3 Age and turnout over time 1964-2001 
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There are then three distinct, although difficult to separate, ways of looking at 
the age group data presented above. One way of viewing this is that the effect of youth 
on the life-cycle is now extended. There are several reasons we might expect this. 
Firstly, the number of young people who now remain in education during their twenties 
has increased substantially in the recent years. We would expect that this may increase 
the period of low turnout associated with youth as it is likely to defer the taking up of 
responsibilities associated with adulthood such as home ownership and parenthood. 
Secondly, as Table 4.4 illustrates, we also know that the proportion of people getting 
married has declined dramatically in the past thirty years.  
 
Table 4.4 Marriage rates in the UK 1978-2007 
   
Number per 1,000 
population aged 16+ 
  
All 
marriages   Men Women 
1978 368,258  59.7 47.6 
1979 368,853  58.0 46.6 
1980 370,022  60.4 48.1 
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1981 351,973  55.7 44.7 
1982 342,166  52.5 42.5 
1983 344,334  51.2 41.8 
1984 349,186  50.5 41.6 
1985 346,389  48.7 40.5 
1986 347,924  47.7 39.9 
1987 351,761  47.1 39.6 
1988 348,492  45.8 38.8 
1989 346,697  44.8 38.1 
1990 331,150  42.1 36.1 
1991 306,756  39.3 33.2 
1992 311,564  39.6 33.4 
1993 299,197  37.7 31.8 
1994 291,069  36.3 30.6 
1995 283,012  34.7 29.3 
1996 278,975  33.6 28.5 
1997 272,536  32.3 27.5 
1998 267,303  31.1 26.6 
1999 263,515  30.1 25.8 
2000 267,961  30.1 25.9 
2001 249,227  27.4 23.7 
2002 255,596  27.3 23.9 
2003 270,109  28.2 24.8 
2004 273,069  27.7 24.6 
2005 247,805  24.5 21.9 
2006 239,450  23.0 20.7 
2007 231,450  21.6 19.7 
          
Source: Office for National Statistics, 2008 
 
We would expect marriage to be one aspect of the transition from youth to adulthood 
and there is robust evidence to show that married people vote more than single or 
cohabiting people (Denver 2008).  
One retort to these arguments might be that whilst the above are undoubtedly 
true, they are long-term changes, rather than short-term ones and therefore they are 
unable to account for changing electoral turnout over a period of one or two elections. 
But as I have discussed above, one of the central veins of argument to run through this 
thesis is that long-term factors can play a role in relatively sudden changes in turnout, 
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when they interact with medium and short-term factors. It is quite plausible that the 
effects of the results of long-term changes could be masked by the mitigating effect of 
short- and medium-term factors on them, and the effects only manifested once the short-
term factors involved have dissipated.  
Whilst we might expect these characteristics to be revealed over a longer period 
of time amongst older voters, the situation is different for those entering the electorate at 
any given election. A social or political period may affect younger people differently to 
older people. Younger people, because they have not experienced as many earlier 
periods or formed habits, attitudes or values associated with these earlier periods, are 
more susceptible to the prevailing social circumstances. These young people, not yet 
eligible to vote, could be forming habits at a crucial stage of their life – in their 
formative years, that are not revealed until they first come to vote. When these 
attitudinal habits are revealed, they may present themselves in quite different patterns of 
electoral behaviour to the norms of previous cohorts. This argument is significantly 
strengthened by recent research carried out by Mark Franklin. Franklin’s (2004) 
comparative research found that voting is to a large extent habitual. Voters socialised 
during high turnout political periods are likely to acquire the habit of voting, whereas 
those socialised during low turnout periods are equally likely to acquire the habit of 
non-voting. Crucially, Franklin provides evidence of relative immobility in turnout after 
the third election experienced. This is critical for our understanding of the turnout 
figures presented above, as many of those who experienced their first election in 1997 
have subsequently experienced two further low turnout elections in 2001 and 2005, are 
likely to have established a habit of abstention as a result. We can explain the electoral 
turnout of the 25-34 year olds in 2001 in this way. Whilst Franklin focuses on the 
character of elections themselves, in the later chapters of the thesis I put forward a case 
for the influence or character of the political period as a whole, not just the character of 
elections, on the voting behaviour of recent young people.  In practice it is impossible to 
say from the turnout figures alone whether this is the case. But, in subsequent chapters, 
the thesis will seek to investigate what factors influenced the decision not to vote of so 
many of this generation and to examine the plausibility of a generational explanation by 
looking at their socialisation experiences.  
It may be that the problems associated with separating life-cycle, period and 
generational difference, as well as the dominance of the life-cycle explanations have 
disinclined social scientists to investigate whether young people are different today than 
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they were, say, twenty or thirty years ago. In practice it may be impossible to say we 
have definitively disentangled life cycle, generational and period effects. However, it is 
evident we can go some way towards understanding these phenomenon using survey 
data to test to see how a range of variables are associated with them.  
 
4.5 Cohort analysis of turnout decline 
 
So far this chapter has established that there has been a significant decline in turnout 
between 1992 and 2001. The difference in change between the youngest two sections of 
the population and the other age groups, particularly the older ones, suggests that there 
is something about the period 1992-2001 that is affecting young people more than the 
rest of the population. We can detect from this strong evidence of a period effect across 
age groups, but most significantly some evidence that a generational effect may be in 
progress. But using age group data the chapter has only been able to compare different 
age groupings at elections. 
           To facilitate a wider understanding of how turnout is changing over time and to 
overcome the difficulty of tracing age groups over time; ten age cohorts have been 
identified according to when they reach the age of 18 between the elections of 1964 – 
2001.3 By calculating their age at their first opportunity to vote and then at each 
subsequent general election, it is possible to trace their turnout characteristics as they 
age. This enables the analyses to look in some detail at the political life-cycles of 
individual cohorts and to establish what the political life cycle of British voters looks 
like. It will also allow some tentative observations to be made about the life-cycle to 
date of the most recent generations of young voters and some conclusions made about 
the dissipation of youth effects on the life-cycle. 
             Table 4.5 details eleven age cohorts. The oldest of these cohorts was aged 21-25 
in 1964 and the youngest, 18-22 in 1997 and 22-26 in 2001. It is not possible to chart 
the early life course of the youngest age cohort as it has only experienced one general 
election in 2001. By reading across the rows we can see the ages of the cohorts at each 
general election since 1964. Using the cross-tabulation procedure in SPSS it is possible 
to produce turnout figures for each cohort and trace its electoral activity through the 
political life-cycle. 
                                                          
3
 We are able to first detect the activities of age cohorts 1, 2 and 3 at age 21, as prior to 1970, when the 
franchise was extended, the minimum voting age was 21. 
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Table 4.5 Age cohorts in election years 1964-2001 
           
          
2001
         
1997
 
Cohort 11 >>       1992 18-21 
Cohort 10 >>      1987 18-22 22-26 
Cohort 9 >>     1983 18-22 23-27 27-31 
Cohort 8 >>    1979 18-21 23-26 28-31 32-35 
Cohort 7 >>   1974 18-21 22-25 27-30 32-35 36-39 
Cohort 6 >>  1970 18-22 22-26 26-30 31-35 36-40 40-44 
Cohort 5 >> 1966 18-21 23-26 27-30 31-34 36-39 41-44 45-48 
Cohort 4 1964 18-20 22-24 27- 29 31-33 35-37 40-42 45-47 49-51 
Cohort 3   21-24 25-28 30-33 34-37 38-41 43-46 48-51 52-55 
Cohort 2 
 21-22 25-26 29-31 34-36 38-40 42-44 47-49 52-54 56-58 
Cohort 1 21-25 23-27 27-31 32-35 37-40 41-44 45-48 50-53 55-58 59-62 
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For each of the above age groups a cross-tabulation of age and turnout was performed. 
The results of the cross-tabulations for each of the eleven age cohorts are shown in 
Table 4.6 below. For each cohort, the table shows; from left to right: age group and 
election year, per cent turnout and number of respondents in each age category. Figure 
4.4 also illustrates the turnout life-cycles of ten of the cohorts on standard line graphs.  
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Table 4.6 Turnout at British general elections amongst ten age cohorts  
Cohort 1    Cohort 2    Cohort 3   
Age/year % N  Age/year % N  Age/year % N 
21-25 (1964) 83.6 146  21-22 (1966) 65.7 87  21-24 (1970) 77.2 145 
23-27 (1966) 73.9 188  25-26 (1970) 75.4 98  25-28 (1974) 84.4 199 
27-31 (1970) 72.8 183  29-31 (1974) 88.6 140  30-33 (1979) 81 195 
32-35 (1974) 84 156  34-36 (1979) 83.2 123  34-37 (1983) 85.9 334 
37-40 (1979) 83.6 134  38-40 (1983) 91.7 216  38-41 (1987) 85.9 340 
41-44 (1983) 85 247  42-44 (1987) 86.6 179  43-46 (1992) 90 311 
45-48 (1987) 90 229  47-49 (1992) 92.1 177  48-51 (1997) 81.4 237 
50-53 (1992) 90.2 214  52-54 (1997) 83 159  52-55 (2001) 79.8 208 
55-58 (1997) 87.7 197  56-58 (2001) 80.1 141     
59-62 (2001) 77.3 186         
           
Cohort 4    Cohort 5    Cohort 6   
Age/year % N  Age/year % N  Age/year % N 
18-20 (1970) 69.4 124  18-21 (1974) 79.7 128  18-22 (1979) 72.5 69 
22-24 (1974) 76.7 120  23-26 (1979) 78.2 110  22-26 (1983) 72.9 391 
27-29 (1979) 77.7 121  27-30 (1983) 77.7 273  26-30 (1987) 83.4 355 
31-33 (1983) 77.4 248  31-34 (1987) 87.5 255  31-35 (1992) 85.9 361 
35-37 (1987) 84.5 238  36-39 (1992) 86.9 222  36-40 (1997) 74.3 350 
40-42 (1992) 89 200  41-44 (1997) 82.7 254  40-44 (2001) 71.7 269 
45-47 (1997) 88.7 203  45-48 (2001) 74.3 206     
49-51 (2001) 78.2 142         
           
Cohort 7    Cohort 8    Cohort 9   
Age/year % N  Age/year % N  Age/year % N 
18-21 (1983) 74.1 309  18-21 (1987) 72.8 272  18-22 (1992) 75.3 263 
22-25 (1987) 80.7 290  23-26 (1992) 79.7 226  23-27 (1997) 63.2 261 
27-30 (1992) 87.4 278  28-31 (1997) 70 307  27-31 (2001) 54.3 230 
32-35 (1997) 70.6 313  32-35 (2001) 62.9 248     
36-39 (2001) 65.5 252         
Cohort 10    Cohort 11       
 
   
 
      
Age/year % N  Age/year % N     
18-22 (1997) 59.4 197  18-21 52.2 115     
22-26 (2001) 42 143         
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Figure 4.4 Turnout life-cycles of ten age cohorts 1964-2001 
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Cohort 4 turnout life cycle
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Cohort 5 turnout life cycle
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Cohort 7 turnout life cycle
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Cohort 8 turnout life cycle
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Cohort 9 turnout life cycle
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Cohort 10 turnout life cycle
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Table 4.6 and Figure 4.4 enable some initial observations about the political life-cycles 
of each cohort. As discussed at various stages, the research on political participation has 
consistently argued that young people vote less than older people. As a result on the 
central tasks of any analysis of youth turnout is to attempt to differentiate between life-
cycle effects, period effects and generational effects. Looking at Figure 4.4 above it is 
clear that the life-cycle model of political participation holds as a general rule for most 
of the cohorts. Looking at cohorts 1 through 8; each of these cohorts had become 
electorally active at a fairly low level but a higher proportion vote as they age, as we 
might expect. However, there are considerable differences: Cohort 4 for example 
follows what we may think of as a fairly predictable life-cycle pattern, first casting their 
ballot in 1970 aged 18-20 at a rate of 69.4 per cent and then turning out in greater 
numbers as they age: at 22-24 in 1974 turning out at 76.7 per cent; at 27-29 in 1979 at 
77.7, rising to 89 per cent as they reach their forties. In contrast to this: cohort 5  enters 
the electorate in 1974 aged 18-21 turning out to vote at 79.7 per cent, but this declines 
slightly to 78.2 per cent in 1979 as the cohort reaches age 23-26, and again to 77.7 per 
cent in 1983 as they reach age 27-30. It is only at the next general election in 1987 when 
the cohort reaches the age of between 31 and 34 that it ‘comes of age’ turning out at a 
rate of 87.5 per cent. But these are fairly minor differences and given that period effects 
are always likely to intervene we might expect some variation in the life-cycle.  
One way of calculating an age of political maturity would be to plot a standard 
political life-cycle curve based on data from all the cohorts. From this it would be 
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possible to measure the individual cohorts to see how their life-cycles deviate from the 
standard curve. But this is problematic as we cannot reliably calculate an average figure 
for the different ages because the age groups of the ten cohorts differ as a result of 
irregular elections years in Britain. As far as we are concerned here, the essential point 
about a life-cycle effect is whether it can explain low levels of turnout among young 
voters. The difficulty is that there is considerable evidence of a period effect at work on 
all age cohorts between 1992 and 2001 as we can see the declines amongst all cohorts.  
With Franklin’s theory of habitual voting in mind, we might suspect the 
information provided by the cohort data is indicative of a generational change for a 
number of reasons. We can see from Figure 4.4 that, of the older cohorts, those who are 
likely to have developed the habit of voting prior to 1997, cohorts 6 and 7 experienced 
particularly sharp declines in 1997 and 2001. We might expect their rates of turnout to 
recover consistent with the habitual voting thesis.  
Cohort 7 is particularly interesting because it came of voting age at the last low 
turnout election prior to 1997, in 1983. Whilst it is impossible to separate age, period 
and cohort effects, this cohort’s life-cycle trajectory recovered from the low of 1983 at 
the 1987 and 1992 elections before being affected by the 1992-1997 period. This is 
illustrative of the problems discussed above as it is impossible to tell with certainty 
whether age or period factors were prominent.  
Young people have nearly always voted at lower levels than older people. We 
might therefore expect this to continue at low turnout elections and for declines in 
turnout amongst these age groups to be more pronounced than amongst older age 
groups. This explanation might be used to understand the disproportionate decline in the 
youth vote in 1997 and 2001. However, there are two reasons to suspect that age alone 
cannot account on its own for these lows in youth turnout. Again, Cohort 7 is 
particularly interesting. This group came of voting age at the last low turnout general 
election before 1997, in 1983. Whilst overall turnout fell considerably less between 
1979 and 1983 (3 per cent) than between 1992 and 1997 (6 per cent) or between 1997 
and 2001 (12 per cent), we can see from Table 3 that reported turnout rose for 18-24 
year olds between 1979 and 1983, compared to the declines between 1992 and 1997 and 
1997 and 2001. Whilst this is only evidence from one election it is indicative of the 
general picture starting to emerge.  
To provide additional information on the political life-cycle of these cohorts, 
Table 4.7 and Figure 4.5 show how the effects of youth on the political life-cycle 
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dissipate as the cohorts’ age. We might expect that turnout levels will increase through 
each stage of the life cycle. As expected, for most cohorts turnout increases through 
these early stages; or when this is not the case, it rises by the time each cohort reaches 
its fourth election (around the mid-thirties), illustrated by the blue/green final bar for 
each cohort in Figure 5.  
 
Table 4.7 Dissipation of youth effects on the turnout life-cycle 
 
 
1st 
election 
2nd 
election 
3rd 
election 
4th 
election 
     
Cohort 1 (1964) 83.8 73.9 72.8 84 
Cohort 2 (1966) 65.7 75.4 88.6 83.2 
Cohort 3 (1970) 77.2 84.4 81 85.9 
Cohort 4 (1970) 69.4 76.7 77.7 77.4 
Cohort 5 (1974) 79.7 78.2 77.7 87.5 
Cohort 6 (1979) 72.5 72.9 83.4 85.9 
Cohort 7 (1983) 74.1 80.7 87.4 70.6 
Cohort 8 (1987) 72.8 79.7 70 62.9 
Cohort 9 (1992) 75.3 63.2 54.3  
Cohort 10 (1997) 59.4 42   
Cohort 11 (2001) 52.2    
 
However, starting with cohort 7 we can see that things start to change. Cohorts 7 and 8 
are the last two cohorts we can calculate the same four stages of the turnout life-cycle 
for. At first glance it appears that levels of turnout for cohorts 1 to 6 are similarly high 
at the fourth stage of the life-cycle, when cohorts are aged in their mid thirties. This 
would tend to support the idea that the effect of youth on the life-cycle dissipates at 
around this age. But looking at cohort 7 and 8 the rate of turnout at this stage of the life-
cycle is considerably lower. Here it is impossible to separate period and generational 
differences although there is evidence of both. Figure 4.5 shows that cohort 7 followed 
a typical life-cycle course, with its rate of turnout increasing at stage 2 and stage 3 of the 
life-cycle, but then falling at stage 4, in 1997. For cohort 8, the same picture: turnout 
rose as it reached the second stage of the life-cycle in 1992, but then fell as it reached its 
third stage, in 1997 and fourth stage in 2001. This would suggest a period effect at work 
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where voters were less inclined to vote at the 1997 election at which New Labour was 
widely anticipated to win.  
 
Figure 4.5 Dissipation of youth effects on the turnout life-cycle 
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Looking at cohort 9, we can see that this cohort has now experienced its second low 
turnout election in succession. Table 4.7 and Figure 4.5 show that as this cohort enters 
the third stage of its life-cycle it has the lowest level of turnout of any previous cohort at 
this stage. It is quite possible that its turnout will be boosted to a new high as it reaches 
its fourth stage, either as a result of ageing, or period effects or a combination of both. 
But it is equally possible, given that it has now experienced two low turnout elections, 
that, especially if the next election is also a low turnout election, these habits will 
become consolidated, even if moderated by the effects of ageing.  
 Figure 4.4 and Table 4.6 show that cohort 10, the youngest cohort to have 
experienced two elections shows the most pronounced decline. If we factor out the 
impact of the political period, we can see that only two out of the remaining eight 
cohorts in Table 4.7 experience a decline in turnout between stage one and two of the 
life-cycle. It appears that we can identify a distinct set of turnout characteristics amongst 
those who received their political socialisation during the Thatcher-Major and Blair 
years. This suggests that life-cycle explanations alone are unable to adequately account 
for the declines in turnout discusses as their characteristics are so distinct from previous 
generations.  
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It is evident from Table 4.2 that turnout in Britain had never before dropped to 
the lows of 1997 and 2001. We can see from Table 4.3, consistent with Franklin’s 
‘habitual voting’ thesis, that the effects of these two elections fell with age. It appears 
that the older age groups may have been less affected, having acquired the habit of 
voting at earlier higher turnout elections. In subsequent chapters I argue that just as high 
turnout and competitive elections induce certain habits in people, so it is plausible to 
suggest that other aspects of political periods also shape their participatory 
characteristics. The habitual voting thesis strongly suggests that those who came of 
voting age since 1992 are less likely to complete a recovery from the effects of youth on 
the turnout life-cycle. The fact that they have experienced one or two low turnout 
elections and that these elections were unique in terms of turnout makes them more 
likely to have picked up non-voting habit than previous cohorts.   
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
Although the life-cycles of the youngest cohorts do not enable us to draw solid 
conclusions as to whether we are witnessing a generational effect or not, the level of the 
decline in turnout is unprecedented when compared to the other cohorts. It is difficult to 
imagine, looking at the trajectories of the 10 age cohorts that these recent cohorts, 
whose turnout at the last two elections has been far lower than that of their predecessors 
at comparable stages of the electoral life-cycle could entirely recover from such a 
downturn in electoral participation (see also Park 2000). We can see from Figure 4.4 
that cohorts have recovered from downturns in turnout in the past, but never has a 
cohort turned out at such a low rate as the recent cohorts in this analysis show. 
We simply cannot yet tell definitively whether generational or period effects have 
occurred (as per Figure. 2) because not enough time has passed. But, whatever the 
limitations of the conclusions we can make here, one thing we can say with confidence 
is that these young people are unique in their turnout characteristics. There patterns of 
electoral turnout have never been witnessed before.  
In order to probe further into the experiences of these cohorts it is necessary to 
discover what it was about the period 1992-2001 that affected young voters so 
dramatically. This will shed light on the importance of periods. It seems likely that the 
particularly low levels of turnout amongst the youngest age cohorts are likely to 
partially recover as they age and become politically mature, but if periods do affect 
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voters then it may take a particularly positive political period for these voters’ levels of 
turnout to recover. There is some fairly strong indicative evidence to suggest that a 
generational effect may be occurring. In subsequent chapters we will test a set of 
alternative explanatory hypotheses to see whether or not these support a generational 
change explanation. Firstly it is necessary to discover how certain social characteristics 
are related to turnout change. Previous research has shown that young citizens should 
not be treated as a homogenous group as is often the case; they are divided as are other 
sections of the population on various social lines. It is necessary to provide a fuller 
picture of this issue to understand how these social differences impact on young voters. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Theories and Models of Voter Turnout  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
With some conclusions made on how turnout at British general elections appears to be 
changing, the next stage is to introduce theories of change from the recent literature and 
to discuss how these might help explain the trends revealed in the previous chapter. In 
the subsequent chapter these theories are operationalised to facilitate their testing in the 
empirical analysis of BES data.  
 
5.2 The sociological framework1 
 
We saw in chapter two that the early studies of voting behaviour, prior to the existence 
of large scale survey data were dominated by what we might term sociological 
explanations. In Chapter two I made the case that today’s young people are distinct 
from their counterparts from previous generations. Whilst the decline in cleavage based 
politics and in partisanship also led to the relative decline in focus on sociological 
variables in explaining political behaviour, it is clear that social environments, 
characteristics and socialisation are still likely to play a role in individual’s behaviour. 
Sociological explanations of voting behaviour are based on the idea that social 
characteristics such as class, ethnicity, gender and race condition political preferences. 
But is it possible that these types of characteristics could explain turnout decline over a 
short period? We might expect the answer to this to be no given that these things are 
                                                 
1
 The models discussed here are based on those used by Clarke et al (2004) and Pattie et al (2004). Clarke 
et al provide an additional model in the rational voter framework, but as its variables are ‘nested’ in the 
general incentives model it is omitted here. 
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unlikely to change enough in a short period to be able to explain a significant change in 
voting behaviour. But it is plausible that one or more of these factors make up at least a 
small part of the explanation for change. As I discussed previously, long-term changes 
may have a sudden impact on voting behaviour where a cohort of young voters with 
distinctive attitudinal and behavioural characteristics emerge out of their political 
socialisation to vote for the first time. In addition to social characteristics, social 
contexts influence these characteristics and the experiences, environments and interests 
of members of the same social group become matched to policies and programmes 
advanced by a particular political party (Clarke et al 2004). In the sociological 
framework this social characteristics-contexts approach is supplemented by the social 
psychology explanation. These types of explanations posit that formative socialisation 
experiences imprint political psychological attachments, most notably party 
identifications. Identifications once formed tend to serve as starting point which 
continually influence individual’s political beliefs, attitudes and behaviour. In the 
sociological framework then, social characteristics and environments are important 
aspects of socialisation which play a crucial part in the development of skills and 
resources which in turn impact on political interest and involvement. Whilst the 
importance of sociological variables in explaining voting behaviour in recent years has 
been relatively low as rational choice account have developed sophisticated 
explanations of how modern citizens are coming to make choices, evidence of the 
emergence of a qualitatively distinct cohort of citizens suggests the need to re-engage 
with sociological models of participation. We might suspect that the emphasis placed on 
political socialisation, in particular, is likely to be of critical importance given that the 
interpretation of the literature in Chapter two and the argument that the socialisation of 
recent cohorts was unique  - specifically the unique context of the 1997 and 2001 and 
elections.  
 
The civic voluntarism model 
 
The first model in the sociological framework and perhaps the most well-known and 
widely applied model in political science is the civic voluntarism model. The model has 
its origins in the work of Sidney Verba and Norman Nie (1972) in America but the 
model has also been used to explain participation in a number of other countries 
including Britain (Parry et al 1992). The idea at the centre of the civic voluntarism 
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model is that resources facilitate participation. But psychological engagement and 
recruitment are also important. Essentially the model states that ‘people may be inactive 
because they lack resources, because they lack psychological engagement with politics, 
or because they are outside of the recruitment networks that bring people into politics’ 
(Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995: 269). People with educational resources are more 
likely to vote as education increases access to and inability to process information. 
Social class correlates with skills which are useful political resources. Recruitment by 
political parties or by other agents will also increase the likelihood of voting. Political 
interest, strength of partisanship and political efficacy are seen as aspect of 
psychological engagement in politics (Clarke et al 2004). 
 How would we expect this model to fare given that we know that the British 
electorate has, as a whole, become considerably more affluent since the 1950s and that 
there has been a huge increase in the number of those in higher education? It would 
seem that if this theory of participation is correct, participation should have increased, 
rather than decreased. If we first consider physical resources – it seems unlikely that 
these types of resources could have changed enough in the period in question to account 
for the changes in electoral participation witnessed since 1992. Even when we consider 
the idea that sudden changes in electoral behaviour are possible as a cohort with 
distinctive attitudes and behavioural characteristics enters the electorate for the first 
time; it seems totally implausible that a downturn in physical resources in this period – 
one of economic growth - could have played a part. However, the model also 
emphasises the importance of psychological engagement with politics and sees these as 
crucial resources to participation. Consistent with the literature reviewed in Chapter 
two, it would seem more plausible to suggest that these types of resources have declined 
amongst recent cohorts of young people. As discussed in Chapter two, we know that 
partisanship – one crucial measure of psychological engagement with politics has 
declined since the 1970s. The empirical analysis and subsequent chapters will reveal 
whether this impacted on today’s youth and Chapter seven will discuss the findings in 
detail. We also know that another psychological resource emphasised in the civic 
voluntarism model, political efficacy, has featured prominently in the youth literature. It 
is evident that the first of the sociological models, whilst dated, has some important 
features which alone justify its inclusion in the empirical analysis in the next chapter. 
A key criticism of the civic voluntarism model is that it does not take into 
account incentives to political participation. The equity-fairness model or relative 
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deprivation model provides an alternative perspective on participation but one which is 
still centred in the sociological tradition of analysis. At its centre is the idea of 
incentives. According to this model individuals react to and are motivated by a sense of 
disadvantage. Here resources inhibit rather than promote participation. The core idea in 
this model is that peer group comparison influences political participation. Individuals 
compare themselves with different types of peer groups and where these comparisons 
reflect negatively on themselves this can produce frustration or aggression which may 
manifest as various types of political participation (Dalton 2003). Relative deprivation 
is based on individuals’ comparisons of their real life situations with their life 
expectations which are commonly defined in reference to their peer groups. If a 
significant gap exists between the two relative deprivation is likely to result, which will 
in turn have political consequences (Clarke et al 2004). 
The core ideas in the perceived equity-fairness model are a sense of general 
deprivation which is an individual’s sense that he or she has not received a fair share in 
life, or that political or social arrangements are unfair. Economic deprivation refers to a 
person’s judgement as to his or her prospective or retrospective household financial 
situation, and attribution of government responsibility for this. Emotional responses are 
negative reactions to personal economic conditions. Policy dissatisfaction refers to 
negative evaluations of the government’s policy performance. We might expect this 
model to fare well when tested and the model would appear to be highly relevant to the 
context of modern youth politics. There is considerable evidence of an increase in 
involvement in unconventional activity, including protest activity (e.g. Henn et al 2002, 
2005; Norris 2003; O’Toole 2003a, 2003b; Marsh et al 2007), although there is also 
evidence that this kind of activity represents a replacement for conventional politics 
rather than representing anti-state disaffection (Norris 2005).  
 
The Social Capital model 
 
Another model which has become popular in recent years as researchers have realised 
the significance of social bonds to civic life is the social capital model. The model has 
instant intuitive appeal considering the social, political and economic changes that took 
place in Britain since 1979 associated with the Thatcher governments. The period was 
one marked by the decline of the ‘social’ and the rise of the ‘individual’ and for this 
reason alone we might suspect that changing social relationships may have impacted on 
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the young people socialised in the period since 1979. Chapter seven will elaborate an 
argument for the prominence of social capital explanations of youth disengagement with 
conventional politics.  
The social capital model is based on the idea of social trust. They key idea in the 
socio-cultural variant is that ‘people who trust their fellow citizens volunteer more 
often…participate more often in politics and community organisations, serve more 
readily on juries, give blood more frequently, comply more fully with their tax 
obligations, are more tolerant of minority views, and display many other forms of civic 
virtue’ (Putnam 2000: 137). In its rational cost-benefit variant social trust is generated 
by institutions and groups producing desired outcomes (Becker 1975; Coleman 1988). 
The core concepts in the social capital model are social trust; a persons’ sense that other 
people are trustworthy and fair, and voluntary participation; whether individuals offer to 
become active in community or public matters or were asked to do so. 
 
5.3 The rational voter framework 
 
Rational choice explanations derived from economic theory have sought to explain 
political behaviour by viewing individuals as rational decision makers who are capable 
of weighing up the options available to them and making political decisions in 
accordance with their judgements. Individuals assess the costs associated with voting 
and if they outweigh the perceived benefits of voting they do not vote. The decision to 
vote according to rational choice accounts has three key elements. Pivotality is the 
calculated probability of casting a deciding vote that enables a preferred party to win 
and prevent a less preferred party or parties from doing so (Clarke et al 2004). With 
regard to turnout this can be simplified as the calculation of whether casting his or her 
vote will make a difference. If voting is unlikely to achieve anything or result in any 
benefits to the voter, why should he or she vote? The voter is interested, according to 
rational choice theory, in making a decision based on ‘utility’ and therefore seeks to 
determine which party has implemented or proposed policies that will be of perceived 
benefit to him or her. Pivotality interacts with benefits as any benefits are discounted by 
the probability that that an individual can exert a crucial or pivotal effect on the 
outcome. The voter must also assess the costs associated with voting; the time needed to 
vote and to acquire the information to make an informed choice (Clarke et al 2004).  
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 Various options are available to the prospective voter when making these 
assessments. If the voter feels that parties differ in the benefits they offer, he or she will 
opt for the party that offers the most utility. But pivotality and costs are taken into 
account and the individual may decide not to vote. The voter may think that all parties 
are equal in the benefits they offer. As the benefits derived from voting are equal he or 
she may decide not to vote. Secondly, if the individual thinks that the probability of 
casting a vote that makes a difference, a pivotal vote, is small, even if the benefits are 
large, then the cost associated with voting may prevent the individual from voting. This 
is crucial for rational choice models of turnout as the probability of casting a pivotal 
ballot at an election will usually be very small (Clarke et al 2004). This raises the 
interesting paradox; if the expected utility of abstaining is greater than the expected 
utility of voting, why do so many people vote? 
 Developments in rational choice accounts of voter turnout have attempted to 
address its critics who argue for example that the typical voter is not a ‘supercitizen’ 
(Dalton 2003). Not all citizens are interested in and knowledgeable about politics and 
public affairs. Neither are they capable of processing large amounts of information or 
making calculated unbiased decisions. Two models derived from the rational voter 
framework are particularly useful for our understanding of the modern voter.  
 
The cognitive mobilisation model 
 
The first of these is based on a wide improvement in the political skills and resources of 
western citizens in the second half of the twentieth century. Education, media exposure 
and political awareness have vastly expanded since the 1950s contributing to a ‘growth 
in the public’s overall level of political sophistication through a process of cognitive 
mobilisation (Dalton 2003: 19). Firstly citizens are now capable of processing large 
amounts of politically relevant information due to enhanced access to higher education 
resources. Secondly, it is now easier and less costly for citizens to find information 
through print and electronic forms. These developments have meant that people are now 
more interested and knowledgeable about social and political issues and are more aware 
and concerned about politics and a functioning democracy. As a result of these 
developments citizens are more likely to be critical of governments and their policies 
and are more likely to be dissatisfied. Crucially, dissatisfaction may lead to abstention 
from electoral politics. The core ideas of the cognitive mobilisation model are 
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education, media use, political interest, political knowledge and policy (dis)satisfaction 
(Clarke et al 2004). These variables overlap considerably with those in the civic 
voluntarism model, but they key difference is that the latter implies that more resources 
will be associated with a greater propensity to vote, whereas the cognitive mobilisation 
model implies the opposite.  
 
The general incentives model 
 
The general incentives model addresses the paradox discussed above by incorporating 
ideas about why rational actors might engage in collective action. The theory is a 
synthesis of rational choice and psychological accounts of voter turnout. The core idea 
is that individuals need incentives and cues in order to vote. It supplements rational 
choice accounts of political behaviour by arguing that individuals take into account a 
wide range of incentives when they are considering when to vote and who to vote for 
rather than simply considering the individual incentives discussed above.  
 The incentives in this decision are individual, group, system and expressive 
benefits. Group benefits are not just those that flow to one’s family but to people who 
are viewed as similar to oneself of those in need of help. System benefits are benefits 
that accrue to a political system when citizens vote. The recognition that a healthy 
democracy requires citizen involvement makes people vote. Expressive benefits are the 
sense of satisfaction that people receive when they demonstrate their support for 
political actors, institutions or processes. Social norms are also included in the model. 
The model suggests that social norms are parts of the socio-political context in which 
people make choices about whether to vote, or not to vote (Clarke et al 2004). If other 
people in one’s social environment think that voting is important then you are also more 
likely to. 
 
5.4 Summary and conclusions 
 
This chapter has set out four commonly used models of voter turnout with the broad 
frameworks of political participation identified in Chapter one. These have recently be 
used to explain voting behaviour and citizenship in Britain in two of the most prominent 
work in the field (Clarke et al 2004; Pattie et al 2004). Chapter six will operationalise 
these models in a similar way to Clarke et al (2004), testing how each model fares 
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among different age groups. The preliminary conclusions of Chapter six will form the 
basis of the building of a theory of generational change to be tested in more detail in 
Chapter seven.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Why abstain? Explaining declining youth turnout in 
Britain between 1992 and 2001 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
In Chapter four of the thesis I used two approaches to investigating whether recent 
cohorts of young citizens are displaying distinctly different voting patterns to previous 
generations. I argued that there is a strong indication that a marked decline in the typical 
first and second stages of the electoral turnout life-cycle is indicative of a generational 
change in voting behaviour. I detail the central methodological problem that life-cycle 
effects, period effects and generational effects are so difficult to separate that it is 
impossible to conclude the patterns of turnout amongst recent cohorts of young people 
represent anything more than a change in the characteristics of young people at that 
given stage in the life-cycle. This is the key problem – not enough time has passed to 
know definitively whether period or generational forces are at play. However, I also 
argue that it is possible to say for sure that those who came of age in 1997 and 2001 are 
unique. Their levels of participation have never been witnessed before. The case for 
their uniqueness is strengthened by the secondary literature relating to changes in the 
social basis of political supports and the way in which young people conceive political 
activity.  
 In the Chapter three I detail the rationale for the use of BES data to look at 
change over time. I discuss one of the limitations of this methodological approach. 
Using BES data to compare behaviour and attitudinal changes of different generations is 
made problematic due to the fact that the explanatory variables included in the 2001 
data set are not available in previous data sets. This means that it is in practice 
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impossible to accurately trace most of the variables which operationalise the models 
introduced in the previous chapter, before 1997 and in many cases before 2001. This 
posed an important methodological decision for this research. The first option was to 
attempt to operationalise the models through a reconsideration of their theoretical 
frameworks, by omitting a number of the variables, or by replacing them with others. 
Whilst this approach would have provided some evidence on the factors specific to the 
turnout decision amongst previous cohorts, comparison between it and the 2001 cohorts 
would have been problematic. The approach taken in the remainder of the thesis is to 
focus on the variables and models which most accurately predict voter turnout in the 
year 2001 when changes in turnout were the most evident.  This is done by, focusing on 
the analysis of BES 2001 data. It is acknowledged that the results will not provide a 
conclusive explanation of change, but if we are to understand which model best predicts 
young voters turnout in the key period of 1997-2001, we are in a good position to infer 
what factors might lie behind the collapse in voting among young citizens at this time.  
 Chapter four shows that between 1992 and 2001 something happened which 
affected turnout among the youngest age groups in a way not witnessed among any 
other cohort since the first BES survey in 1964. I also detailed that this change was far 
more pronounced amongst 18-34 year olds. This could be the result of a period effect, 
but we might suspect that this is not the case simply because the period has clearly 
affected age groups differently. But clearly this could be down to a combination of age 
and period effects. Whilst a period effect can affect age groups differently, there must 
be a point, where if the effect of the period endures beyond a certain stage in the life-
cycle, it becomes generational, in the sense that it shows a significantly different 
trajectory of turnout over the whole life-cycle; one that couldn’t simply be characterised 
as a minor deviation from the standard life-cycle curve of low turnout at youth, rising 
with age, peaking at mid-age and declining thereafter.  It is reasonable to suspect that 
the reasons for such markedly different electoral behaviour will be evident in the 
attitudinal characteristics of the cohorts measurable at one period of time. Whilst this 
information on its own is not enough to tell us much about change, adding this cohort 
specific information to what we already know about change and to the emerging 
literature on contemporary social and political change provides additional knowledge. 
Again, whilst adding sets of evidence to one another doesn’t provide quantitatively 
reliable conclusions, the prima facie conclusions reached have a strong intuitive and 
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common sense appeal and point to the need for further research in the area, outside the 
scope of the thesis. 
  
6.2  Model Specification 
 
6.2.1 The Social Capital Model 
 
As discussed in Chapter five, the social capital model emphasises the role of trust 
between and among individuals in collective decision making. The model has some 
intuitive appeal given that we might suspect individuals having grown up in the 
Thatcher era to have experienced a more individualised youth. Whilst social capital is 
not a new concept and was evident in the works of de Tocqueville (2001), Bourdeau 
(1976), Coleman (1988) and others – its most contemporary application has been the 
result of the work of Putnam (1993, 1995a, 1995b, 2000). The central feature of the 
model is that trust derives directly from interactions among individuals participating in 
voluntary activities. The relationship is circular as trust fosters cooperation and 
cooperation in turn fosters trust. One important point to mention vis-à-vis young 
people’s trust is that we might expect, given that much of the research shows that young 
people are involved in many voluntary and informal kinds of political activity (e.g. 
Henn et al 2002; Marsh et al 2007) that their levels of trust are high. But, in the 
following analysis I operationalise and run the model to ascertain if social capital is an 
influential predictor of voting – a formal political activity – not just informal types of 
activity. So one of the key questions might be whether social capital engendered by 
informal political activity or voluntary activity has any effect on a propensity to engage 
in formal types of activity. It may be the two are so divorced from one another that 
participants in the former simply do not link the two and for this reason simply remain 
in the informal sphere of action. I specify the model as follows1: 
 
Voting = a function of (TRUST + FAIRNESS + VOLUNTEERING + 
RECRUITMENT) 
 
Voting is turnout at the 2001 British general election 
                                                 
1
 As mentioned above, the opertionalisations are based on those of Clarke et al (2004).  
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TRUST=the extent to which individuals think that other people are trust-worthy. 
FAIRNESS=the extent to which individuals think that other people will treat them 
fairly. 
VOLUNTEERING=whether individuals have volunteered to participate in politics or 
community affairs. 
RECRUITMENT=whether an individual has been asked to become active in a 
voluntary organisation 
 
It is recognised that this operationalisation may be restrictive. Recent studies have 
identified the limitations of imposing a narrow definition of social capital on young 
people (Harper 2001; Morrow 2002). However, given time and resource limitations, this 
is justified by the need to test quantitatively how this standard model fares as an 
explanation of change. But it is recognised that the results of the data analysis are likely 
to indicate the need to probe the findings in more depth using qualitative methods to 
elicit further insights.  
 
Social trust and perceived fairness of others are measured using responses to two 
questions in the BES: 
 
1. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you 
can’t be too careful dealing with people? Please use a 0-10 scale to indicate 
your view, where 0 means ‘cant be too careful’ and 10 means ‘most people can 
be trusted’. 
2. Do you think that most people you come into contact with would try to take 
advantage of you if they had the chance or would they try to be fair? Please use 
the 0-10 scale again where 0 means ‘would try to take advantage’ and 10 means 
‘would try to be fair’. 
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Figure 6.1 Social trust: perceived trustworthiness of those aged 18-34 and 35+ 
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Note: Mean 18-34: 4.2; 35+: 4.6 , Standard deviation 18-34: 2.6; 35+: 2.8.  
 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate responses to the two questions on social trust in the BES. 
Whilst the majority of responses for both age groups appear on the middle of the 11 
point scales; the average figure for the 18-34 year olds on both scales is lower than for 
the 35+ age group. Considerably more of those over 35 appear to feel most people can 
be trusted than the 18-34 group. In Figure 6.2 considerably larger numbers of 18-34 
year olds appear at the negative end of the scale; whilst the opposite is true of the over 
35 year old group, with considerably larger minorities appearing on the positive side of 
the scale. Whilst it is important not to read too much into these figures, it would appear 
that there are differences in social trust between the two age groups that need to be 
considered further.  
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Figure 6.2 Social Trust: perceived fairness of those aged 18-34 and 35+ 
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Note: Mean 18-34: 5; 35+: 5.8, Standard deviation 18-34: 2.5; 35+: 2.6.  
 
The social capital model also includes two indicators of civic engagement. Volunteering 
and having been asked to participate in politics or community affairs are measured 
using the following two questions: 
 
1. Over the past few years, have you volunteered to get involved in politics 
or community affairs? Affirmative answers are scored 1 and other 
answers are scored 0. 
2. Over the past few years has anyone asked you to get involved in politics 
or community affairs? Affirmative answers are scored 1 and other 
answers are scored 0.  
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Figure 6.3 Volunteering to participate in politics or community affairs  
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Figure 6.4 Recruitment to participation in politics or community affairs 
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As we might expect Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show that the younger group were less likely to 
have volunteered or to have been asked to participate than the older group. Given that 
the BES is a representative sample of the British population these findings are 
significant in light of recent research on young people. Clarke et al (2004) report that 
much of the voluntary activity reported ‘does not take place in parties or other political 
organizations, but, rather occurs in sports clubs, charities and various other groups’ 
(Clarke et al 2004: 242). These types of activities appear to be very similar to those that 
some recent studies, keen to dispel the myth of youth apathy, report that young people 
are very active in (e.g. Henn et al 2002; Marsh et al 2007; O’Toole et al 2003a, 2003b). 
But, ninety per cent of those aged between 18-34 reported not having volunteered to 
participate in politics or community affairs as broadly defined. This clearly suggests that 
there is a significant majority of the 2001 cohort who are not engaged in these types of 
activities.  
 Clearly this is only saying something about the propensity of today’s youth to 
engage in voluntary and community activity and not about change, but given the BES 
sample is representative it is an indication that the majority of young people do not 
appear to be active in this way. This contrasts with the impression given by the anti-
apathy school that once politics is more broadly conceived young people are more 
involved. But, given that this conclusion is based on one question and it is perfectly 
possible that if the question had been framed differently or if a broader set of questions 
had been asked and considered then a different conclusion would have been reached.  
 
6.2.2 The Civic voluntarism model 
 
The second model is the widely used civic voluntarism model. The model emphasises 
the importance of different types of resources to political participation not simply 
physical ones. It includes a set of psychological resources: partisanship; interest in the 
election and efficacy; that is the perception that one is influential in the political 
process. Whilst rational choice models of political behaviour have become more popular 
in recent years to explain voting behaviour, there is a need to test whether crucial 
variables such as education and social class have an effect on voting and whether there 
is a differential effect with regard to age groups. It is also important, given the literature 
reviewed in Chapter two, to assess the impact of declining partisanship on the British 
electorate since the 1970s. The model is specified as follows: 
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Voting=a function of 
RESOURCES+RECRUITMENT+VOLACT+EFFICACY+INTEREST+STRENGTH 
OF PARTISANSHIP 
 
RESOURCES=educational attainment, social class and the amount of time available to 
individuals. 
RECRUITMENT=a set of measures of recruitment by others and party mobilisation 
VOLACT=the extent of voluntary activity 
EFFICACY=the sense of being able to influence politics or community affairs 
INTEREST=interest in the 2001 election campaign 
STRENGTH OF PARTISANSHIP 
 
The resources mentioned above are measured using three variables in the BES. 
Education measures whether or not respondents have any post-secondary school 
qualifications; social class measures whether individuals come from working or middle 
class backgrounds. The standard Market Research scale is recoded for this measure to 
give two categories, middle and working class. Available time is measured by asking 
respondents how much time they have remaining after work and family commitments 
are taken into account. Table 6.1 shows that more of the younger age group have post 
16 education qualifications, than the older age group, as we might expect given the 
expansion of education in recent years. There is little difference between the two groups 
in terms of their social class; the younger group reports having less available time than 
the older group. Given that the older group will include those who have reached 
retirement we might have expected this to be the case.  
 
Table 6.1 Indicators in the civic voluntarism model by age group 
 
 18-34 35+ 
Resources   
 
  
Educational qualifications   
   
Yes 86 62 
   
Social class   
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Middle 57 59 
Working 42 48 
   
Available time   
   
A great deal 11 19 
A fair amount 20 25 
Some 53 45 
None 16 12 
Political Mobilisation   
   
Over the past few years has anyone asked you to   
get involved in politics or community affairs? 14 20 
   
Did anyone, for example, a friend or family try to   
convince you how to vote in the recent election? 12 6 
   
Did a canvasser from any political party call at    
your home during the election campaign? 20 22 
   
Did anyone from a political party telephone you   
during the election campaign? 5 10 
Psychological engagement with politics   
   
Interest in the 2001 election    
   
Very interested 15 24 
Somewhat interested 40 38 
Not very interested 26 25 
Not at all interested 19 12 
   
Strength of partisan identification   
   
Very strong 7 17 
Fairly strong 42 48 
Not very strong 50 35 
 
 
 A second set of resource variables measure psychological resources to political 
participation and their impact on participation through an individual’s sense of political 
efficacy and interest in politics. Efficacy and interest are suggested to have direct effects 
on participation, but this is encouraged by an individual’s psychological engagement 
with politics; the strength of their partisan identification, as well as the efforts of others 
to influence an individual.  
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Figure 6.5 Psychological resources to participation: interest in the 2001 election 
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Figure 6.5 shows that just under a quarter of those aged over 35 reported being ‘very 
interested’ in the election, whilst only 15 per cent of those aged under 35 did. The 
figures for those ‘somewhat’ and those ‘not very interested’ in the election were similar 
for both age groups; but a greater proportion  (19 per cent) of 18-34 year olds were 
‘uninterested’, when compared to the over 35 group (12 per cent). Figure 6.6 shows 
there is a significant difference between age groups with a ‘very strong’ sense of 
partisanship and those with ‘not very strong’ level of partisanship. As mentioned above, 
this is consistent with what we know about declining partisanship in Britain since the 
1970s (e.g., Dalton and Wattenberg 2000).  
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Figure 6.6 Strength of partisan identification by age group 
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The third variable measuring the sense of psychogical engagement an individual has 
with politics is political efficacy – that is the extent to which he or she feels that they 
can make a difference in the political world. This has consistently appeared as one of 
the common explanations for youth disinterest in conventional politics as many feel that 
they have no say (White et al 2000; Bentley et al 2002; Henn et al 2002; Russell et al 
2002; Marsh et al 2007).  
 
Figure 6.7 Perceived political efficacy (influence on politics) by age 
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Somewhat contrary to what we might have expected, given the research mentioned 
above, the difference between the age groups is relatively small and the over 35 age 
group are more likely to have reported having ‘no influence’.  
The second set of variables in the model measure political recruitment or 
mobilisation. Recruitment measures two types of effects in Table 6.1. First whether 
anyone has attempted to either involve an individual in community affairs of politics, or 
whether a member of their family has tried to convince them how to vote. The second 
set of variables relate to recruitment by political parties. On most of the measures the 
younger age group experience less political mobilisation. They experience less contact 
from political parties than the older age group. This is likely to be, at least in part, the 
result of a rational calculation by political parties to concentrate their efforts on those 
most likely to vote and therefore put fewer resources into mobilising younger people. 
Multivariate analysis will be able to assess whether party mobilisation is an effective 
method of enticing young people to the polls. Table 6.1 also reveals that younger people 
are considerably more likely to have a friend or family member try to convince them 
how to vote. 
 According to Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) voluntary activity is 
important because it aids the acquisition of the skills necessary for political 
participation. 
 
Figure 6.8 Extent of voluntary activity by age group 
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Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) use the example of the ‘church youth group’ or the 
chair of a committee organisation, or a ‘rummage’ sale. These types of activities serve 
to develop skills relevant to politics and ‘skill endowing opportunities can serve a 
compensatory function, enhancing political resources’ amongst those whose 
‘educational and occupational levels might otherwise predispose them to quiescence’ 
(Ibid: 4). Figure 6.8 shows that whilst more people in the younger age group report 
being ‘somewhat active’ and ‘a little active’, the general picture to emerge is that few 
are ‘very active’ and most ‘not active’ at all. Whether this general lack of voluntary 
activity amongst younger people revealed both here and in Figure 6.3 (the social capital 
model) has been an important factor in their voting abstention or not is something that is 
returned to the next section of this chapter.  
 
6.2.3 The equity fairness / relative deprivation model  
 
The last of the models in the sociological framework is the equity fairness or relative 
deprivation model. The central idea in the model is that people from particular socio-
demographic groups compare themselves to other people in other social groups as an 
idealised standard. Where they see a significant discrepancy between their 
circumstances and the comparison group they react negatively to this. The gap between 
expectations and what these people actually get has two consequences, as far as political 
participation is concerned. Firstly, these individuals are more likely to protest, showing 
their frustration at their circumstances. Clarke et al (2004) also specify that we might 
also expect the impact on electoral participation ‘to take the form of voting against the 
incumbent government if it is seen as the source of the deprivation’ (Clarke et al 2004: 
237). But, it also seems likely, especially in the case of younger age groups who we 
know are less likely to vote anyway, that they will abstain from voting in protest, 
especially if they see the cause of their frustration not coming from one party but from 
the political system itself. The model is specified below: 
 
Voting=a function of: a generalised sense of relative deprivation+retrospective and 
prospective deprivation attributed to government+negative emotional reactions to 
personal economic circumstances+extent of dissatisfaction with the government’s 
policy performance+being a member of a deprived group.  
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Relative deprivation is measured using two likert scale statements in the BES designed 
to tap people’s feelings of how their expectations and experiences match, and whether 
the government treats them fairly or not. Figure 6.9 shows that a large proportion of 
both age groups feel that the government treats them fairly, with the next largest group 
in the ‘neither’ category.  
 
Figure 6.9 Perceptions of relative deprivation: government fairness 
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A similar picture occurs from the likert scale measuring differences between 
expectations and what individuals actually receive (Table 6.2). A second set of 
measures look at individual’s sense of economic deprivation. The first of these looks at 
an individual’s retrospective judgement of the financial situation in their household and 
the second looks at a prospective judgement of the year to come. Figures 6.10 and 6.11, 
respectively, illustrate the responses shown in Table 6.2.  
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Figure 6.10 Retrospective evaluations of financial situation of respondents 
households by age group 
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Figure 6.11 Prospective evaluations of financial situation of respondents 
households by age group 
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As we can see, for both measures most responses fall in the middle of the scale, but it 
appears that the younger age group perceives their financial situation to be improving 
since the previous year and likely to improve in the following year. This may be the 
result of the fact that many in this group are likely to be emerging from full-time 
education with the associated debts, to find employment and a salary.  
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Table 6.2 Indicators in the equity-fairness model by age group 
 
 18-34 35+ 
Perceptions of relative deprivation   
   
The government generally treats people like   
me fairly   
 
  
Strongly agree 2 4 
Agree 43 47 
Neither 31 24 
Disagree 19 20 
Strongly disagree 5 4 
   
There is often big gap between what people   
expect out of life and what they get   
 
  
Strongly agree 11 11 
Agree 41 42 
Neither 27 22 
Disagree 18 22 
Strongly disagree 2 2 
   
Perceptions of economic deprivation   
   
How does the financial situation in your   
household compare to 12 months ago?   
   
Lot worse 6 5 
Little worse 12 19 
Same 44 46 
Little better 32 24 
Lot better 7 6 
   
How do you think the financial situation of your   
household will change over the next 12 months?   
   
Lot worse 2 3 
Little worse 13 18 
Same 41 53 
Little better 36 23 
Lot better 7 3 
 
  
Emotional reactions to personal economic   
conditions   
   
Which, if any, of the following words describe your feelings   
about the financial situation of your household?   
   
Angry 17 15 
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Disgusted 11 11 
Uneasy 32 30 
Afraid 82 85 
   
 18-34 35+ 
Policy satisfaction   
   
How well do you think the present government   
has handled each of the following issues?   
Crime   
Very well 2 3 
Fairly well 27 26 
Neither 35 29 
Fairly badly 22 24 
Very badly 8 15 
Education   
Very well 3 5 
Fairly well 42 37 
Neither 22 26 
Fairly badly 20 20 
Very badly 6 7 
The NHS   
Very well 2 3 
Fairly well 26 27 
Neither 22 23 
Fairly badly 31 27 
Very badly 16 18 
Transport   
Very well 2 2 
Fairly well 14 18 
Neither 25 24 
Fairly badly 37 31 
Very badly 18 21 
 
Another indicator of economic (dis) satisfaction included in the equity-fairness model 
attempts to elicit from individuals their positive and negative emotional responses to 
their personal economic circumstances. The idea behind this measure is that emotional 
reactions to personal circumstances might outweigh any more rational calculations of an 
individual’s economic circumstances and encourage them to vote or to abstain as a 
result. As we can see from Table 6.2, however, the results are very similar for both age 
groups. Interestingly, a substantial proportion (over 80 per cent) of both age groups 
reported being afraid of their economic circumstances.  
 Another way of measuring (dis) satisfaction was to include some indicators of 
satisfaction with government performance in key policy areas such as health, education, 
crime and transport. Again, there is no significant differences here between the two age 
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groups, although a significant number said that the government has performed ‘fairly 
badly’ or ‘very badly’ on transport and on the NHS.  
 
6.2.4 The cognitive mobilisation model 
 
The cognitive mobilisation model hypothesises that individuals endowed with the 
knowledge of politics derived from a modern high quality education and from an 
information environment that provides them with copious amounts of political 
information are less likely to need to rely on social-group and partisan cues as a basis 
for voting (Dalton 2003). Whilst this model overlaps with the civic voluntarism model 
the key difference is that the civic voluntarism model implies that more resources will 
be associated with a greater propensity to vote, whereas the cognitive mobilisation 
model implies the opposite. 
 
Voting=a function of  
EDUCATION+MEDIA 
COVERAGE+INTEREST+KNOWLEDGE+DISSATISFACTION 
 
EDUCATATION is measured as above in the civic voluntarism model 
MEDIA COVERAGE is measured by asking respondents whether the regularly read a 
daily morning newspaper and how much attention they paid to the television coverage 
of the election.2  
 
KNOWLEDGE is measured using respondent’s answers to a series of political 
knowledge questions. 
INTEREST is measured as in the civic voluntarism model 
DISSATISFACTION is measured as in the equity fairness model above.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 The variable asking whether a respondent reads a daily newspaper was omitted from the multivariate 
model because it was found to significantly reduce the number of cases included in the analysis. Media 
consumption is addressed in more detail in Chapter Seven. 
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Table 6.3 Indicators in the cognitive mobilisation model by age group 
 
 18-34 35+ 
Educational qualifications post GCSE   
 
  
Yes 86 62 
 
  
Political knowledge   
   
Polling stations close at 10pm on election day   
Correct 78 87 
Incorrect 22 14 
   
It is official Conservative party policy that Britain   
should never join the single European currency   
Correct 41 45 
Incorrect 59 54 
   
The Liberal Democrats favour a system of proportional   
representation for Westminster elections   
Correct 46 62 
Incorrect 55 38 
   
The Minimum voting age is 16   
Correct 80 86 
Incorrect 20 14 
   
Unemployment has fallen since Labour was elected   
in 1997   
Correct 75 76 
Incorrect 25 24 
   
Only taxpayers are allowed to vote in a general election   
Correct 91 95 
Incorrect 9 5 
   
Exposure to political information    
   
Does the respondent regularly read a daily morning   
newspaper?   
Yes 58 64 
   
Amount of attention respondent paid to television    
coverage of the 2001 general election   
A great deal 8 10 
A fair amount 19 23 
Some attention 42 41 
No attention 32 27 
 
Table 6.3 shows that unsurprisingly the older age group did better on all the political 
knowledge questions than the younger people. The final two variables in the cognitive 
116 
 
mobilisation model tap respondent’s information. Interest in the election and 
dissatisfaction with government performance measure these. 
 In terms of the amount of political information consumed, unsurprisingly – older 
people were more likely to read a daily morning newspaper and were also more likely to 
report watching television coverage of the election. It would have been interesting to 
measure television viewing more generally rather than just focusing on the election 
campaign as young people are less likely to be engaged with the campaign itself, but, 
receive most of their information about politics from television (e.g., Russell 2002; 
Hyland 2007). As I will argue in the concluding section of the thesis this 
operationslisation maybe adequate in terms of the model specified, but there is an 
important and growing literature showing the effects of the type and content of media 
exposure on voters (e.g., Prior 2007). As discussed in Chapter two, Wattenberg (2007) 
focuses specifically on the impact of a new media environment on young people’s 
inclination to participate.  
 
6.2.5 The General Incentives model 
 
The final model I specify here is the general incentives model which combines aspects 
of individual rationality: political efficacy, collective benefits and costs of participation 
with four incentives variables that constitute alternative benefits as well as specific 
norms. ‘These benefits and norms reflect the idea that an individual’s sense of ‘being 
implicated’ in the political system is fundamental to the determination of the costs and 
benefits of participation’ (Clarke et al 2004: 232). The general incentives model also 
employs predictor variables taken from social-psychological accounts of political 
participation.  
 
Voting is a function of: 
EFFICACY+BENEFITS+COSTS+INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS+GROUP 
BENEFITS+SYSTEM BENEFITS+SOCIAL NORMS+SATISFACTION 
 
Table 6.4 details responses to the variables included in the general incentives model. 
We can see that roughly the same proportion of 18-34 year olds felt it was too much 
time and effort to get involved in politics or community affairs; whereas, a substantially 
larger proportion of this group said that they were too busy to vote. The wording of the 
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first question as compared to the second might indicate that younger people feel they 
have less time for voting than for other forms of political or community activity when 
compared to the older group. This would be consistent with what we know about 
younger people’s participation in diverse forms of activity not always recognised as 
‘political’. Regarding the benefits of voting that accrue to the individual: we can see that 
young people are considerably less likely to feel a sense of satisfaction when they vote, 
or to feel guilty if they don’t vote, when compared to the older age group. They are also 
less likely to feel it is their duty to vote than the older group. We can see that there is 
less difference between the two groups in terms of the perception of group benefits 
accrued for voting – with over 60 per cent of both groups agreeing with that voting is a 
good way of getting benefits for vulnerable groups in society.  
 Regarding social norms, it appears that whilst young people do not necessarily 
see the benefits that accrue from voting, or feel that they should vote, the people around 
them tend to have generally positive attitudes towards voting, although, if these were 
the same people, the perception is that not all of them voted.  
 
Table 6.4 Indicators in the general incentives model by age group 
 
 18-34 35+ 
Costs of political participation   
   
It takes too much time and effort to be active   
in politics and public affairs   
   
Strongly agree 7 8 
Agree 42 47 
Neither 25 21 
Disagree 22 19 
Strongly disagree 1 2 
   
People are so busy that they do not have time   
to vote   
   
Strongly agree 5 3 
Agree 35 23 
Neither 15 10 
Disagree 37 45 
Strongly disagree 9 18 
   
Benefits of political participation   
   
Individual benefits   
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I feel a sense of satisfaction when I vote   
   
Strongly agree 9 19 
Agree 35 47 
Neither 23 15 
Disagree 20 15 
Strongly disagree 6 2 
   
I would feel guilty if I did note vote in a general   
election   
   
Strongly agree 10 29 
Agree 30 40 
Neither 12 8 
Disagree 32 18 
Strongly disagree 15 6 
   
Group benefits   
   
Being active in politics is a good way to get benefits   
for groups that people care about like pensioners or   
the disabled   
   
Strongly agree 7 11 
Agree 55 59 
Neither 19 15 
Disagree 15 10 
Strongly disagree 2 1 
   
System benefits   
   
It is every citizens duty to vote in an election   
   
Strongly agree 12 31 
Agree 32 43 
Neither 16 7 
Disagree 29 14 
Strongly disagree 10 5 
   
Democracy only works properly when people vote   
   
Strongly agree 17 26 
Agree 60 60 
Neither 12 5 
Disagree 8 6 
Strongly disagree 0 0 
   
Social norms   
   
Most of my family and friends think voting is a waste    
of time   
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Strongly agree 5 3 
Agree 22 17 
Neither 13 10 
Disagree 45 49 
Strongly disagree 14 19 
   
Most people around here voted in the general election   
   
Strongly agree 5 3 
Agree 35 23 
Neither 15 10 
Disagree 37 45 
Strongly disagree 9 18 
 
6.3 Logistic Regression 
 
In the next section of the chapter the aim is to use multivariate analysis, specifically 
logistic regression to test the relative impact of a number of variables on young people’s 
decision to vote. Logistic regression is used here instead of linear regression as the 
dependent variable, turnout, is dichotomous. The main advantage of regression 
techniques over bivariate contingency tables and correlation is that it enables us to 
examine the combined impact of a large number of variables on the decision to vote (or 
not), and to assess the effect of specific variables while controlling for a large number of 
others. This will give us a reliable indication of the key factors that affected the 
pronounced declines among the youngest two age groups revealed in previous chapters. 
 
6.3.1 Data and methodological considerations 
  
a. Missing data 
 
The analysis began by using BES cross section data for 2001 which aims to provide a 
representative cross-section of the British population. One of the difficulties of using 
this data that this research has to address was the number of missing cases in the logistic 
regression procedure. The 2001 survey consisted of a pre-election and a post-election 
wave which together form the cross section data set. Unfortunately some questions were 
not asked in the post-election wave. This meant that detailed questions on educational 
attainment were missing for all post-election wave respondents in the cross-section data 
set. There is no procedure in logistic regression for dealing with missing cases as in 
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linear regression whereby it is possible to continue the analysis of the remaining 
variables whilst ignoring those with missing cases. In logistic regression it is only 
possible to analyse cases where codes for all variables are present. Table 6.5 below 
shows the number of cases included in the models and the number of missing cases in 
brackets. 
 
Table 6.5 Missing cases in logistic regression models  
 
  18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ 
 
28 (150) 85 (409) 82 (503) 55 (454) 42 (419) 32 (775) The civic voluntarism model 
The social capital model 173 (5) 477 (17) 558 (27) 498 (11) 433 (28) 719 (88) 
The equity fairness model 151 (27) 414 (80) 503 (82) 439 (70) 366 (95) 588 (219) 
The cognitive mobilisation 
model 10 (168) 49 (445) 46 (539) 28 (481) 29 (432) 12 (795) 
The general Incentives model 91 (87) 223 (271) 249 (336) 233 (276) 182 (279) 284 (523) 
 
Note: figures in brackets indicate missing cases 
 
Looking at the cognitive mobilisation model we can see that for the 18-24 year olds 
only 10 cases were included in the analysis with 168 missing. This problem was 
addressed, after discussion with the BES team by using the combined pre and post 
election data file which includes a summary variable for educational attainment. This 
meant that the number of missing cases dropped significantly. The disadvantage of 
using this summary variable to measure education is that it provides a more limited 
definition of educational attainment, restricted to a dichotomous yes/no answer: whether 
respondents had GCSE qualifications yes/no. But this concern was largely justified by 
the significant increase in the number of cases included in the analysis, as included in 
the tables below.  
 
b. Multicollinearity 
 
As in linear regression it is important in logistic regression to check for high-inter-
correlations among the predictor variables in each model. Unfortunately the current 
version of SPSS (Version 11) does not have a procedure for obtaining collinearity 
diagnostics in logistic regression, but by using linear regression it is possible to obtain 
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diagnostics for each set of variables to check for inter-correlation. Menard (1995) 
suggests that a tolerance value of less than 0.1 indicates that there is a serious 
collinearity problem with the variables and that any VIF values of over 10 may also be 
cause for concern. I will return to detail an example of how this issue was addressed 
when examining the first model – the social capital model.  
 
c. Residual diagnostics 
 
Another issue this method of data analysis faced was the problem of outlying cases in 
the data. Outlying cases are those cases for which the model fits particularly badly and 
which can exert an undue influence on the model. One option is to remove outlying 
cases from the analysis at risk of biasing the sample. Another way of considering 
outliers is that they provide useful information since they may point to the need to 
incorporate additional variables in a model or to change its specification in some way. 
SPSS produces a case-wise listing of residuals which enables us to see if there are any 
outlying cases that we should be concerned with. The case-wise list gives information 
about all cases for which the model does not fit well. Cases with Zresid values of above 
2.5 or below –2.5 are considered to be a problem and should be examined more 
carefully (Menard 1995). Case-wise lists were examined carefully and where Zresid 
values of over 2.5 or under –2.5 were discovered a close examination of the data was 
undertaken to ascertain if there were any additional factors that should be considered in 
each model specification. No common characteristics were found in these cases and as 
the number of these cases was small we can reasonably conclude that these cases are 
simply those that deviate from the majority in a random way.  
 
6.3.2 Results 
 
Below I run the social capital model for 18-24 year olds, detailing the logistic regression 
procedure. SPSS output from the procedure is detailed here in order to show the basis 
on which subsequent analysis and conclusions are made. The subsequent discussion will 
use summary tables for the remaining models. 
The first section of the logistic regression output is the case processing summary 
which shows that of a total of 178 cases falling into this age group, 163 are included in 
the analysis, 91.6 per cent. The table also shows that there are 15 missing cases.  
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Case Processing Summary
163 91.6
15 8.4
178 100.0
0 .0
178 100.0
Unweighted Casesa
Included in Analysis
Missing Cases
Total
Selected Cases
Unselected Cases
Total
N Percent
If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total
number of cases.
a. 
 
Note: data is weighted by region, gender and age within gender 
 
Below SPSS tells us that the dependent variable has been coded: 0= Did not vote and 
1=Voted. 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding
0
1
Original Value
Didnt vote
Voted
Internal Value
 
 
 
Logistic regression produces a section of the output headed ‘Block 0’ which reports the 
results of the most basic attempt to predict the outcome – one in which all cases are 
predicted to result in the most common outcome. 
 
Classification Tablea,b
223 0 100.0
174 0 .0
56.2
Observed
Didnt vote
Voted
VerifiedVote
Overall Percentage
Step 0
Didnt vote Voted
VerifiedVote Percentage
Correct
Predicted
Constant is included in the model.a. 
The cut value is .500b. 
 
 
The classification table above simply shows that as most respondents in this age group 
did not vote in 2001, the predicted outcome for all has been set to ‘not voted’. This 
results in an accurate prediction for 56.2 per cent of cases. This initial prediction 
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becomes useful later once the predictor (independent) variables are included in the 
analysis. It enables us to see whether the logistic regression with predictor variables 
included is able to predict the outcome variable more accurately than this basic model.  
 The next section of the output is entitled ‘Block 1’. The first section of this 
output is the iteration history. Logistic regression employs an iterative process 
attempting to arrive at the best answer to the problem through a series of 
approximations. Each iteration results in a slightly more accurate approximation. The 
following table reports this iterative process. 
 
Iteration Historya,b,c,d
449.912 -1.521 .235 -.015 1.619 .997
443.137 -1.839 .286 -.012 2.591 1.182
441.984 -1.874 .292 -.011 3.340 1.194
441.827 -1.876 .293 -.011 3.749 1.193
441.821 -1.876 .293 -.011 3.851 1.193
Iteration
1
2
3
4
5
Step
1
-2 Log
likelihood Constant BQ48 BQ49 BQ43 BQ42
Coefficients
Method: Entera. 
Constant is included in the model.b. 
Initial -2 Log Likelihood: 544.715c. 
Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because log-likelihood decreased by less
than .010 percent.
d. 
 
 
The statistic –2 log likelihood is used in logistic regression to measure the success of the 
model. A high value indicates that the model poorly predicts the outcome. With each 
iteration we can see the value falling; however, the benefit derived at each iteration 
decreases until after four iterations SPSS terminates the process. We can also see how 
the coefficients of each of the predictor variables are adjusted at each iteration.  
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
102.894 4 .000
102.894 4 .000
102.894 4 .000
Step
Block
Model
Step 1
Chi-square df Sig.
 
 
Omnibus tests are general tests of how well the model performs. Using the Enter 
method there is only one step and so the Step, Block and Model rows in this table are 
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identical. The test shows that the full model was statistically significant (chi-square = 
102.894, df = 4, p<0.001). The Hosmer and Lemeshow test below is a measure of the 
observed outcomes and the predicted outcomes. It is a test of the null hypothesis that the 
model is good, Unlike the Omnibus test a p value of higher than 0.05 indicates how well 
the model fits the data. This test is amongst the least reliable where the number of cases 
is relatively small and for this reason will not be used as the primary test for assessing 
the goodness of fit of the models, below. This is because the sample was split into age 
groups giving a relatively small number of cases for each group, although not too small 
to conduct logistic regression.  
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
53.267 8 .000
Step
1
Chi-square df Sig.
 
 
In this case the p value is 0.000 indicating that the model does not adequately fit the 
data. 
 
Model Summary
441.821 .228 .306
Step
1
-2 Log
likelihood
Cox & Snell
R Square
Nagelkerke
R Square
 
 
In logistic regression it is not possible to compute an exact R squared value as in linear 
regression, but Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke are useful approximations. We can see 
here that for the 18-24 age group, the variables in the social capital model accounts for 
between 22.8 and 30.6 per cent of the variance in the dependent variable.  
 
Classification Tablea
207 16 92.7
74 100 57.4
77.2
Observed
Didnt vote
Voted
VerifiedVote
Overall Percentage
Step 1
Didnt vote Voted
VerifiedVote Percentage
Correct
Predicted
The cut value is .500a. 
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The classification table above summarises the results of the prediction. Comparing this 
to the equivalent table in block 0 above, the model with the predictor variables added 
correctly predicts 77.2 per cent of cases, compared to 56.2 per cent without the 
predictors, an increase of 21 per cent. We can see from the classification table that the 
predictors in the model will be useful to our understanding of why 18-24 year olds 
choose not to vote, with 92.7 per cent of non-voters and 57.4 per cent of voters 
successfully predicted.  
The variables in the equation table gives us information about the importance of 
individual variables in the model. The first column gives the coefficients for each 
predictor. A negative coefficient indicates that the odds of voting in 2001 amongst this 
age group declines with a unit change in the predictor variable. A positive coefficient 
indicates that these odds increase with a unit change in the predictor variable. 
 
Variables in the Equation
.293 .058 25.088 1 .000 1.340 1.195 1.502
-.011 .055 .040 1 .842 .989 .889 1.101
3.851 1.397 7.603 1 .006 47.029 3.045 726.339
1.193 .362 10.857 1 .001 3.298 1.622 6.706
-1.876 .336 31.104 1 .000 .153
BQ48
BQ49
BQ43
BQ42
Constant
Step
1
a
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper
95.0% C.I.for EXP(B)
Variable(s) entered on step 1: BQ48, BQ49, BQ43, BQ42.a. 
 
 
The Wald statistic indicates how useful each predictor variable is. The Sig column 
provides the key to interpreting this. Values of less than 0.05 indicate a significant 
effect (p=<0.05).3 We can see that three of the four variables in the social capital model 
have a significant effect in predicting turnout for 18-24 year olds in 2001. Trust in 
others (bq48), volunteering in politics or community affairs (bq43) and being asked to 
participate in politics or community affairs (bq42) all have positive beta coefficients 
indicating that higher levels of trust in others, having volunteered and having been 
asked to participate all increased the likelihood of 18-24 year olds in this sample 
deciding to vote. Trust and being asked to participate are both highly significant here 
(p=<0.001***), whilst having volunteered is significant at the 0.01 level (p=<0.01**). 
                                                 
3
 The discussion will use the commonly used format for statistical significance with p=<0.05 given *,  
p=<0.01 given ** and p<0.001 given *** to indicate the degree of statistical significance. 
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The Wald test allows us to see which variables are statistically significant and tells us 
the direction of the relationship. It is also useful to know how an increase in the 
predictor value changes the likelihood of voting. The Exp (B) column in the output 
gives an indication of the change in the predicted odds of voting for each unit change in 
the predictor variable. Values of less than 1 indicate an increase in the value of the 
predictor variable is associated with a decrease in the odds of voting, whereas a value of 
more than 1 indicates an increase in the odds of voting. We can see that the odds of a 
person in the 18-24 age group having voted is 1.34 times higher for each increase in the 
trust scale (bq48). It is also 3.29 times higher for those reporting having been asked to 
participate in politics or community affairs (bq42). However, we need to be cautious in 
interpreting these odds. Each of the odds ratios displayed in the table has a 95 per cent 
confidence interval (95 per cent C.I. for Exp(B)) giving a lower and upper value. This is 
the range of values that we can be 95 per cent sure encompasses the true value of the 
odds ratio. The value of Exp (B) should fall within the lower and upper confidence 
intervals for us to be confident that it is a true representation of the population. As the 
confidence intervals for having volunteered in politics (bq43) are so wide we cannot be 
sure that the Exp(B) figure itself is particularly reliable.  
One of the difficulties with regression analysis is that predictor (independent) 
variables often have high inter-correlations among them. Table 6.6 below provides 
collinearity diagnostics for the social capital model. As no procedure for producing 
collinearity diagnostics exists in logistic regression, linear regression was used to 
produce these. Menard (1995) suggests that a tolerance value of less than 0.1 indicates 
that there is a serious collinearity problem with the variables and that any VIF values of 
over 10 may also be cause for concern. We can see from Table 6.6 that the values for 
the predictor variables in the social capital model fall comfortably within these figures. 
The same procedure was carried out for the remaining four models and no significant 
collinearity problems were found. 
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Table 6.6 Collinearity diagnostics for the social capital model 
Coefficientsa
.753 1.329
.987 1.013
.758 1.319
Volunteered-Politics
/Community Affairs
People-Take
Advantage/Be Fair
Recruited-Politics/C
ommunity Affairs
Model
1
Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics
Dependent Variable: VerifiedVotea. 
 
The final section of the output is the casewise list discussed above. It lists all cases with 
Zresid values of above 2 or below –2. Cases with values above 2.5 or below –2.5 are 
considered to be a problem (Menard 1995), that is to say they may be exerting an undue 
influence on the sample. Below we can see that three cases are listed but none have 
values above or below these figures. 
Casewise Listb
S D** .861 V -.861 -2.490
S D .279 D -.279 -.622
S D** .862 V -.862 -2.497
Case
1950
2355
3740
Selected
Statusa VerifiedVote
Observed
Predicted
Predicted
Group Resid ZResid
Temporary Variable
S = Selected, U = Unselected cases, and ** = Misclassified cases.a. 
Cases with studentized residuals greater than 2.000 are listed.b. 
 
 
We can see that three of the four variables in the social capital model have statistically 
significant effects. These findings indicate that trust in others, being asked to participate 
in politics and community affairs and having volunteered in politics and community 
affairs all had strong positive effects on 18-24 year olds in 2001. But how does the 
social capital model fare when predicting the voting behaviour of the other age groups? 
 Table 6.7 below shows that a total of 457 respondents aged between 25 and 34 
were included in the analysis. For this age group the model was also significantly better 
than the model with no predictor variables included (chi square = 24.611, df = 4, p < 
0.001). However, the model has a weaker fit for this age group than for the 18-24 group 
with only one statistically significant variable. Table 6.7 shows that 46.2 per cent of 
non-voters and 70.7 per cent of voters are correctly classified an overall figure of 58.7 
per cent, compared to 77.7 per cent for the 18-24 group. The model accounts for 
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between 3.4 and 5.6 per cent of the variance in the decision to vote for this second 
youngest age group with only perceived fairness of others statistically significant. The 
values of the coefficients reveal an increase in the perceived fairness scale (0-10) is 
associated with an increase in the probability of voting of .141. The remaining 3 
variables are shown not to be statistically significant for this group. 
 
Table 6.7 Comparison of the performance of the social capital model by age group 
 
Model fit  18-24 25-34 35-44 
45-
54 
55-
64 65+ 
       
Correctly classified % 77.7 58.7 65.5 74.5 75.4 80.9 
Non voters correctly 
classified 92.7 46.2 22.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 
Voters correctly classified  57.4 70.7 90.1 99.6 100.0 100.0 
Cox and Snell R square .228 .034 .069 .017 .016 .023 
Nagelkerke R square .306 .056 .094 .026 .023 .037 
              
Predictors 18-24 25-34 35-44 
45-
54 
55-
64 65+ 
       
Trust in others  .293*** -.001 .110** .053 -0.33 .051 
SE .058 .032 .036 .043 .051 .045 
       
Perceived fairness  -.011 .141*** .051 .060 .093 .049 
SE .055 .034 .040 .048 .056 .050 
       
Asked to participate  3.851** -.372 .475 -.561 .441 .335 
SE 1.397 .290 .333 .343 .467 .503 
       
Volunteering  1.193** .337 .667* .339 .190 .684 
SE .362 .235 .283 .310 .366 .423 
       
       
N 163 457 537 482 419 678 
 
Note: ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05.  
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For 35-44 year olds the model also has a weaker fit than for the youngest age group. 
Trust in others and volunteering are significant and the odds of voting associated with 
these two variables increase by a factor of .110 and .667 respectively for each increase 
in the predictor variable. None of the variables are significant for the remaining three 
age groups.  
The results show that social capital was an important indicator of whether the 
youngest group voted or not in 2001. The model provides a more accurate prediction of 
the 18-24 year olds decision to vote than it does for any of the other age groups. 
Involvement in social networks and trusting others had a positive impact on turnout for 
18-24 year olds in 2001. This suggests that today’s youth may have lower levels of 
trust, are less likely to have been mobilised to vote and are less likely to have been 
involved in politics and community affairs than their counterparts in previous 
generations, although we are unable to confirm this directly for lack of relevant 
comparable data in earlier datasets.  
  
The civic voluntarism model 
 
Table 6.8 shows that the civic voluntarism model performs less well than the social 
capital model for the two youngest age groups. The model only accounts for 18.8 per 
cent and 25.1 per cent of the variance in voting decision. Looking at Table 6.8, being 
asked to participate remains statistically significant, as in the social capital model, with 
the probability of voting increasing by 2.174 if the respondent reported that s/he had 
been asked to participate in politics. Only one additional variable in the model is 
significant for 18-24 year olds. Social class has a positive beta coefficient; the 
probability of voting increased by .635 for those respondents reporting to be ‘middle or 
upper class’ rather than ‘working class’.  
Among the 25-34 year olds, the model fares even less well. Only the amount of 
leisure time available to respondents and having been contacted by telephone by a 
political party during the campaign are significant predictors. For the remaining 4 age 
groups social class is highly significant for 35-44 year olds suggesting that an increase 
in social class from working to middle class increases the probability of voting by .979.  
Only one other variable in the civic voluntarism model is significant for the remaining 
age groups. For 25-34; 35-44; 45-54 and 55-64 year olds in 2001 interest in the election 
campaign was a significant predictor in whether they voted. 
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Table 6.8 Comparison of the performance of the civic voluntarism model by age 
group 
 
Model fit 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+  
        
Correctly classified 70.6 67.8 73.5 82.1 78.9 85.1  
Non voters correctly classified 79.2 41 18.1 0 0 0  
Voters correctly classified  62.2 84.4 94.6 100 100 100  
Cox and Snell R square .188 .101 .094 .061 .053 .072  
Nagelkerke R square .251 .137 .136 .10 .083 .127  
               
Predictors 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+  
 
       
Educational qualifications .672 -.441 -.696*** .261 -.369 .157  
SE .415 .345 .332 0.363 .351 .35  
        
Social class  .635* -.032 .979*** .979*** -.024 -.018  
SE .298 .212 0.266 0.342 .338 .32  
        
Leisure time  .286 .265* .047 -.323 -.669 -0.15  
SE .163 .129 0.154 .181 .174 .162  
        
Asked to participate 2.174*** -.253 .586 .158 .179 .166  
SE .528 0.26 0.353 .396 .406 .483  
        
Anyone convince to vote  .544 -.479 .128 .771 -.191 .308  
SE .376 .27 .382 .833 .564 .861  
        
Party mobilisation: home -.315 .359 -.028 .305 -.021 .058  
SE .343 .242 .27 .36 .352 .354  
        
Party mobilisation: telephone -.923 1.386 .5 -.276 .134 2.7  
SE .683 .676 .455 .485 0.562 1.522  
        
Voluntary activity  -.136 -.159 -.35 .217 .084 -.149  
SE .137 .095 .114 .131 .139 .166  
        
Political efficacy -.044 .2 .07*** .043*** .089*** .42***  
SE .076 .045 .06 .078 .087 .076  
        
Interest in campaign  .202 -.712 -.525*** -.568* -.568* -.292  
SE .246 .163 .196 .226 .225 .208  
        
Strength of partisanship  .403 .226 -.015 .311 -0.56 .446*  
SE .27 .172 .192 .246 .232 .22  
        
N 185 333 389 366 340 571  
131 
 
 
Note: ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05. 
 
Table 6.8 shows that the civic voluntarism model tells us little about the low turnout 
amongst the youngest two age groups. It suggests that this set of resources and 
psychological engagement in politics were not crucial factors, although social class 
played a role for the youngest group and interest in the election campaign for the 25-34 
year olds. However, controlling for these variables, the model confirms the importance 
of political mobilisation. Where young people were asked to participate in political 
activity they were more likely to vote. 
 
The equity fairness/relative deprivation model 
 
The equity fairness model fares less well than the civic voluntarism and social capital 
models. Table 6.9 shows that three of the twelve variables had a significant predictive 
ability for the 18-24 group. Overall the model accounts for between 12.1 per cent and 
16.3 per cent of the variance, although it correctly predicts 71.4 per cent of non-voters. 
A set of variables in the equity fairness model tap into feelings respondents have about 
the financial situation in their household. Table 6.9 shows that two of these variables 
indicate that those who are more positive about the financial situation in their household 
are more likely to vote. The first of these prospective perceptions of economic 
deprivation, that is the feeling respondents have about how the financial situation in 
their house will change over the next twelve months, has a positive beta coefficient 
indicating that each increase in respondents prospective economic situation is associated 
with an increased probability of voting of .373. The second, respondents who report 
being ‘angry’ about the financial situation of their household is also statistically 
significant. The negative coefficient indicating that those reporting themselves to be 
angry are less likely to vote and have a highly significant decreased probability of 
voting of 1.656. The significance of these two variables together suggests that younger 
citizens are more likely to vote if they feel their future is financially stable. Table 6.9 
shows that one other variable is significant for this age group. Satisfaction with 
transport policy is highly significant (p<0.001***). Each increase in positive feelings 
respondents have of how the government is handling transport policy is associated with 
an increased probability of .480.  
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Table 6.9 Comparison of the performance of the equity fairness model by age 
group 
Model fit 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ 
       
Percentage correctly classified 62.6 61.8 69.0 76.8 77.6 82.4 
% of non voters correctly classified 71.4 44.2 17.9 9.5 10.3 0.0 
% of voters correctly classified  51.7 76.5 94.9 98.7 99.0 99.0 
Omnibus test .000 .001 .001 .280 .070 .062 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test .000 .014 .134 .087 .091 .740 
Cox and Snell R square .121 .055 .064 .060 .070 .051 
Nagelkerke R square .163 .073 .089 .089 .105 .084 
       
Predictor variables 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ 
 
      
Government treats people like me fairly -.039 .429*** .129 .108 -.082 -.039 
SE .146 .108 .126 .164 .188 .175 
       
Gap between expectations and reality -.066 .090 -.261* -.011 .089 -.269 
SE .130 .090 .102 .129 .186 .142 
       
Perceptions of economic deprivation 
(retrospective) -.082 -.238* .001 -.207 .012 .021 
SE .159 .105 .113 .165 .201 .183 
       
Perceptions of economic deprivation 
(Prospective) .373* -.079 -.054 -.158 .059 -.129 
SE .156 .110 .130 .164 .236 .236 
Financial feelings (angry) 
-
1.656*** .029 -.184 -.929 -.165 .411 
SE .407 .353 .439 .482 .594 .533 
       
Financial feelings (disgusted) 1.038* -.045 .082 .562 -.731 -.216 
SE .512 .407 .431 .558 .719 .559 
       
Financial feelings (uneasy) .583 -.421 -.102 -.462 .654 -0.25 
SE .320 .221 .271 .300 .398 .377 
       
Financial feelings (afraid) .159 .167 -.262 .168 -.049 .136 
SE .332 .306 .316 .401 .350 .295 
       
Policy satisfaction (crime) .214 .047 -.048 .259 -.142 .462 
SE .136 .105 .119 .135 .171 .151 
       
Policy satisfaction (education) -.240 .008 -.081 -.290 .320 -.308 
SE .131 .107 .120 .145 .177 .163 
       
Policy satisfaction (NHS) -.079 .087 .349** .276 .462* .154 
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SE .147 .100 .117 .157 .189 .158 
       
Policy satisfaction (transport) .480 -.327** -.368 -.063 -.368* .002 
SE .141** .099 .115 .149 .181 .145 
       
N 140 391 472 418 344 533 
 
Note: ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05. 
 
Looking at the 25-34 age group only one variable in the equity fairness model, 
perceptions of fair treatment by the government, is statistically significant 
(p<0.000***). For each increase in perceived governmental fairness likelihood of 
voting increased by .429. The model is only able to predict between 5.5 per cent and 7.3 
per cent of the variance in the outcome and successfully classifies only 44.2 per cent of 
non-voters. Clearly this model tells us little about the reasons the two youngest groups 
stayed away from the polls in 2001 and also has a weak fit for the remaining age 
groups. It appears that feelings of economic deprivation have some impact on young 
people’s propensity to vote but this does not appear to be attributed to government by 
the youngest group. Overall the negative incentives in this model do not fit the data well 
and it appears that other incentives to participation need to be examined. 
We can see from Table 6.10 that the models in the sociological framework and 
their predictor variables have greater explanatory power for our youngest age group, the 
18-24 year olds than for the 25-34 year old group. Variables in the social capital model 
are important for the youngest group but less so for the 25-34 year olds. Three predictor 
variables in the social capital model suggest that, consistent with the literature on young 
people’s political participation, those who are involved in political or community affairs 
or have been asked to be involved are significantly more likely to vote. Trust in others is 
also important for this age group. The significance of these variables supports the idea 
that where younger people have higher levels of interpersonal trust in cooperation with 
others they are more likely to feel involved in politics and are more likely to vote. It 
also suggests that declining or lower levels of social capital among young and first time 
voters might be an important factor in explaining why fewer young people have turned 
out to vote since 1992. For the 25-34 year olds in 2001, the civic voluntarism model 
fares best and resources, psychological engagement and political mobilisation all impact 
on their decision, but far from conclusively. 
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Table 6.10 Summary of significant variables in the sociological framework for 18-
24 and 25-34 year olds 
 
18-24   
   
SC model Trust in others  *** 
SC model Asked to participate  ** 
SC model Volunteering  *** 
CV model Social class * 
CV model Asked to participate  ** 
EF model Perceptions of economic deprivation (Prospective) * 
EF model Financial feelings (angry) *** 
EF model Policy satisfaction (transport) *** 
   
25-34   
   
SC model Perceived fairness  *** 
CV model Leisure time * 
CV model Party mobilisation: telephone call * 
CV model Interest in campaign *** 
EF model Government treats people like me fairly *** 
 
Note: ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05. 
 
The rational voter framework  
The cognitive mobilisation model 
Table 6.11 Comparison of the performance of the cognitive mobilisation model by 
age group 
 
Model fit  18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ 
       
Correctly classified % 68.8 72.2 75.4 79.5 80.5 85.1 
Non voters correctly classified 60.8 47.1 21.5 5.6 14 0 
Voters correctly classified  75 86.7 96.1 98.5 97.7 100 
Cox and Snell R square .159 .174 .105 .078 .116 .055 
Nagelkerke R square .212 .238 .151 .122 .182 .096 
              
Predictors  18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ 
       
Education qualifications .209 -.082* -.740* .232 -.633 .237 
SE .572 .399 0.372 0.319 0.383 .334 
       
Political knowledge Q1 1.263** .736* .433 -.286 .245 .262 
SE .465 .373 .459 .669 .59 .52 
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Political Knowledge Q2 .946* -1.124* -.971* .642 -.116 .264 
SE .456 .327 .412 .753 .685 .557 
       
Political knowledge Q3 .823*** -.893 1.413 1.81 -.344 .007 
SE .683 .535 1.666 1.904 1.1 .805 
       
Television coverage -.227 .542*** .284 .083 -.012 .205 
SE .225 015 .167 .201 .21 .193 
       
Interest in election -1.144*** -.766*** -.641*** -.720** -.894 -.428 
SE .303 .19 .2 .225 .27 .22 
       
gvt handle crime -.26 -.038 .064 .044 -.329 .428 
SE .177 .142 .151 .157 .204 .167 
       
gvt handle education .133 .008 -.065 -.318 .23 -.352 
SE .159 .139 .159 .176 .202 .189 
       
gvt handle the NHS -.04 .247 .362*** .388* .444* .84 
SE 0.202 .132 .149 .176 .216 .173 
       
gvt handle transport .027 -.144 -.266 .098 -.127 .41 
SE .182 .132 .154 .172 .212 .165 
       
N 168 298 382 369 308 489 
 
Note: ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05. 
 
Table 6.11 shows that the cognitive mobilisation model does not fare substantially well 
for either of the two youngest groups. However, for both groups, consistent with the 
literature on youth turnout, political knowledge was a significant predictor with two of 
the three political knowledge quiz variables statistically significant. For the 18-24 year 
olds only one other variable, interest in the election was significant, but this was also 
significant for most of the other age groups. Education and the amount of television 
coverage of the election viewed were also significant for the 25-34 year olds. Those 
young people who are more interested and more knowledgeable about politics are more 
likely to vote.  In the case of the 25-34 year olds education and media use may also have 
had its theoretical impact on knowledge and interest. Whilst these factors overlap to a 
degree with those in the civic voluntarism model, the results do suggest that it would be 
wrong to argue that the cognitively mobilised are so frustrated with the political system 
that they return to vote as a sign of protest or disaffection.  
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The general incentives model 
 
Table 6.12 shows that nine of the fourteen variables in the model are statistically 
significant for 18-24 year olds and six for the 25-34 year olds. Five of these are also 
significant for the 35-44 year olds, but importantly the model has greater explanatory 
power for the youngest age groups than it does for any of the older groups. This 
indicates that many of the variables in the model are specific to our understanding of 
why the youngest groups decision to vote or not. 
 Table 6.12 shows that the model correctly classifies 86 per cent of non voters 
and 85 per cent of voters, an overall figure of 85.5 per cent of those in the 18-24 age 
group. Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke R square tests show that the model accounts for 
between 46.4 per cent and 62 per cent of the variance.  Political efficacy, the feeling that 
respondents can influence politics, is not significant. The two variables measuring 
perceived cost, the feeling that people are too busy to vote and the feeling that political 
activity is too much time and effort are both highly significant. The negative beta 
coefficient for the later indicates that as the perceived costs of voting increase the 
likelihood of voting decreased. The three party like/dislike scale variables show that 
feelings about the Liberal Democrats are significant. Both of the two variables testing 
the importance of individual benefits received from voting are statistically significant at 
the 0.000 level. Where individuals in this age group feel satisfaction when they vote or 
say they would feel guilty if they did not vote their likelihood of voting increases by 
1.259 and 1.249 for each increase on the respective scales. Where they perceive that 
voting can make a difference to the way Britain is governed the probability of their 
voting rises by .582 for each increase in the scale. The second group benefits variable, 
the idea that being active in politics equals group benefits, has a negative coefficient 
suggesting that each increase in agreement is associated with a decrease in the odds of 
voting. Two variables test the impact of the perceived benefits to democracy, or system 
benefits of voting. The notion that it is one’s duty to vote did not have a significant 
impact on this age group, but where they felt that democracy only works properly if 
people vote, the probability of voting rose by .920 for each increase in the scale. The 
final two variables in the model look at voting as a social norm. The positive beta 
coefficient for the statement that most of my family and friends think that voting is a 
waste of time indicates that where respondents agree with this statement they are more 
likely to vote than not to.  
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Table 6.12 Comparison of the performance of the general incentives model by age 
group 
 
Model fit  18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ 
       
Percentage correctly classified 85.5 72.7 78.8 80.1 78.6 85.3 
% of non voters correctly classified 86.0 63.6 38.9 35.3 38.3 12.6 
% of voters correctly classified  85.0 80.0 93.2 93.9 91.5 97.3 
Omnibus test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test .005 .042 .023 .609 .548 .380 
Cox and Snell R square .464 .251 .257 .227 .217 .114 
Nagelkerke R square .620 .336 .375 .342 .324 .204 
       
Predictor variables 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ 
       
Efficacy -.164 .227** .251 -.018 .144 .039 
SE .132 .075 .099 .108 .123 .109 
       
Political activity too much time and 
effort .653** .513** -.010 .031 .017 -.058 
SE .242 .165 .191 .237 .240 .256 
       
People are too busy to vote -1.027*** -.451** -.470** -.401* 
-
.846*** -.106 
SE .188 .151 .167 .190 .240 .218 
       
How do you feel about the Labour 
party? .173 -.081 -.074 .002 .164 -.110 
SE .138 .089 .103 .098 .107 .111 
       
How do you feel about the 
Conservative party? .089 .079 -.029 .053 .198 -.045 
SE .131 .075 .103 .102 .117 .123 
       
How do you feel about the Liberal 
Democrats? .341** .415*** .137 .142 .155 -.027 
SE .116 .089 .105 .114 .118 .114 
       
I feel a sense of satisfaction when I 
vote 1.259*** .265 .096 -.324 -.068 .519 
SE .355 .160 .107 .250 .301 .345 
       
I would feel very guilty if I did not 
vote in a general election 1.249*** -.358** -.610** -.424* -.447 -.398 
SE .268 .136 .183 .207 .238 .268 
       
Being active in politics equals 
group benefits -.759* -.410* -.528 .231 -.503 -.672* 
SE .307 .176 .262 .310 .299 .324 
       
Voting makes a difference .582* -.050 -.108 -.469* .233 .029 
SE .267 .166 .191 .227 .261 .256 
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Duty to vote -.284 .033 .303 .920** .210 .511 
SE .284 .153 .228 .292 .278 .315 
       
Democracy only works properly if 
most people vote .920* .155 -.049 -.395 .354 .474 
SE .377 .204 .207 .298 .404 .362 
       
Most of my family and friends 
think that voting is a waste of time .667** .107 -.038 -.427* .255 .137 
SE .251 .136 .183 .203 .232 .278 
       
Most people around here voted in 
the general election -.009 -.147 .532 -.071 .269 .219 
SE .253 .148 .202 .223 .261 .242 
       
                                                                                                   
N 155 214 244 230 281 268 
 
 
Note: ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05. 
 
The general incentives model also predicts the voting behaviour of the 25-34 group with 
some accuracy. Unlike their younger counterparts, efficacy is important to this age 
group along with costs. Individual and groups benefits are also significant, but 
interestingly system benefits and social norms are less important. Efficacy and costs 
were also important for 35-44 year olds in 2001 as were social norms, but benefits had a 
lesser impact.  
 
6.3.3 Modelling interaction effects  
 
The analysis so far reveals that clearly the general incentives model has the strongest fit, 
confirming Clarke et al’s (2004) findings, but three of the models of voter turnout, the 
civic voluntarism, the social capital and the cognitive mobilisation models, provide 
important additional information on the factors specific to electoral turnout amongst 
today’s young adults. Before discussing the implications of these results it is necessary 
to perform a test to verify the statistical significance of the difference between the age 
groups in the models. Tables 6.13-6.15 use the whole 2001 BES data set to interact age 
with each of the significant variables in the above models. Age is coded 18-24: 1, 25+: 
0. Table 6.13 interacts the significant variables in the civic voluntarism model and 
confirms that social class and political recruitment have a greater effect on the 18-24 
groups than on the other age group. Table 6.14 does the same for the social capital 
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model, confirming that for 18-24 year olds social trust was a more important factor in 
their decision to vote than for other age groups. The interactions for the remaining 
variables in the social capital model do not fully support the separate age group 
analysis. Volunteering is not significant when interacted with age, whilst perceived 
fairness of others is a more important factor here than in the age group models. Table 
6.15 interacts the political knowledge variables included in the cognitive mobilisation 
model, showing that one of the three knowledge variables is significant. In summary, 
whilst the results of the interactions do not confirm the statistical significance of all the 
difference in the age group models, they still support the conclusion that social class, 
social capital and political knowledge were key predictors important to the youngest 
groups of adult’s decision to vote in 2001 and 2005. 
 
Table 6.13 Interaction terms in the civic voluntarism model 
Base Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
    
Educational qualifications -.494*** -.455*** -.487*** -.478*** 
Social class  .309**  .318** -.244 -.355 
Leisure time  .140*  .175**  .171**  .173** 
Asked to participate  .464**  .437**  .444**  1.567** 
Anyone convince to vote -.201 -.164 -.17 -.16 
Party mobilisation: home .157 .148 .143 .129 
Party mobilisation: telephone  .486*  .450*  .463*  .487* 
Voluntary activity -.045 -.056 -.055 -.053 
Political efficacy .034 .043 .041 .042 
Interest in campaign -.483*** -.455*** -.448*** -.434*** 
Strength of partisanship  .216**  .247**  .249**  .253** 
          
Control variables         
     
Age   .456***  .456***  .456*** 
Gender  -.14   
Ethnicity  .004   
          
Interacted variables         
     
Social class*Age    .282***  .282*** 
Asked to participate*Age     1.549* 
          
     
 
Table 6.14 Interaction terms in the social capital model 
Base model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Trust in others .289 .289** .275** .275** .275** 
Perceived fairness of others .42 .420*** .425*** .425*** .425*** 
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Recruited to politics/com affairs .071 .071*** -.040*** -.040*** -.040*** 
Volunteered .088 .088*** .089*** .089*** .089*** 
            
Control variables           
      
Age .286*** .286*** .248*** .248*** .248*** 
Gender (0 female, 1 male) -.113     
Ethnicity (0 other, 1 white British) -.03     
            
Interacted variables           
      
Trust*Age  .058** .058** .058** .058** 
Perceived fairness*Age   .058** .058** .058** 
Recruited*Age    -.443 -.443 
Volunteered*Age     -.403 
 
Table 6.15 Interaction terms in the cognitive mobilisation model 
Base model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Education qualifications -.552*** -.176 -.172 -.182 -.182 
Political knowledge Q1 .601*** .581*** .654 .578 .623* 
Political Knowledge Q2 .549*** .439 .439* .306 .405 
Political knowledge Q3 -.316 -.177 -.18 -.167 1.304 
Television coverage .175* .206 .208 .206* .215* 
Interest in election -.807*** -.733*** -.734*** -.731*** -.739*** 
gvt handle crime -.114 -.082 -.081 -.082 -.084 
gvt handle education -.093 -.101 -.1 -.103 -.091 
gvt handle the NHS .226*** .278* .277** .277* .266** 
gvt handle transport -.047 -.059 -.062 -.053 -.076 
  
          
Control variables 
          
      
Age 
 .184*** .184*** .184*** .184*** 
Gender 
 -.580*** -.580*** -.580*** -.580*** 
Ethnicity 
 -.101    
            
Interacted variables 
          
      
knowledge 1 * Age   -.036   
knowledge 2 * Age    .067  
knowledge 3 * Age     -.674* 
            
 
6.3.4 Preliminary conclusions 
 
The data analysis confirms the conclusions presented by Clarke et al (2004) that the 
general incentives model provides a range of variables that are critical to our 
understanding of the decision to vote in Britain. The model performs particularly well 
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for the youngest age group, the 18-24 years olds. These young citizens appear to have 
assessed the costs and benefits of voting in 2001 and influenced by others around them, 
most decided not to vote. The similarity of the finding that the general incentives 
models is strongest in its predictive power, to that of the BES team at Essex is positive 
and it would suggest the analysis is procedurally and technically robust. The method of 
splitting the data into separate age groups for the analysis provides additional 
information which would not have been available had the alternative methods of 
including a dummy variable for age in each model been used. This method would not 
have enabled me to address the uniqueness of a generation of young people as 
adequately. The results of the data analysis suggest the need to build a model of youth 
turnout which incorporates a range of other predictors. The following discussion 
outlines how these variables may come together to form a new model, which I will aim 
to test in Chapter seven.  
We might have expected a pivotality calculation (efficacy), to have played a key 
role in the 18-24 year olds decision to vote, given that, as discussed in Chapter two, one 
of the most frequently cited reasons by young people for their lack of engagement in 
formal politics is that they feel unable to ‘make a difference’, that is, influence, formal 
politics. However, it appears that the youngest group of voters in 2001 were not 
motivated by whether or not their vote was pivotal. One of the most cited explanations 
for low levels of electoral turnout is based on closeness of electoral competition (e.g., 
Pattie and Johnston 2001; Curtice 2005). When an election is seen as a foregone 
conclusion many voters decide not to vote as their vote is unlikely to influence the 
outcome. The 2001 British general election was widely seen as a foregone conclusion. 
Whilst this explanation appears to hold for the 25-34 year olds, for whom efficacy is 
significant the youngest group do not appear to have been influenced by the lack of 
electoral competition. This is interesting as it shows that there are likely to be different 
factors affecting the decisions of the two youngest groups. It suggests that a more 
competitive election is likely to increase turnout in this age group. It also appears that 
there is a life-cycle component to rational choice calculations. The 18-24 year olds 
appear to be concerned with a range of somewhat more ideological group and system 
benefits, but looking at the 25-34 year olds these considerations are dropped and 
replaced by a purer rational choice calculation that focuses on individual benefits and a 
pivotality calculation. 
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Consistent with rational choice accounts of political behaviour the youngest 
group of enfranchised citizens in 2001 did make an assessment of the costs and benefits 
of voting. Those who felt that they would acquire individual benefits from voting were 
more likely to vote, as long as the costs did not outweigh these benefits.  It appears that 
25-34 year olds were less concerned with ‘system’ and ‘group benefits. They were 
concerned primarily with purely individual rational cost-benefits calculations including 
a judgement of whether their vote was significant. Whilst the general incentives model 
was strongest in its overall predictive power, one of the advantages of the selected 
method of logistic regression is that it enables the identification of variables which are 
uniquely significant for young people from all the other models outlined. These can 
then be pooled to draw out a set of hypotheses and model these using similar regression 
methods.  
 
Table 6.16 Summary of significant variables in sociological and rational voter 
models 
18-24   
   
SC model Trust in others  .000*** 
SC model Asked to participate  .006** 
SC model Volunteering  .001*** 
CV model Social class .033* 
CV model Asked to participate  .006** 
EF model Perceptions of economic deprivation (Prospective) .017* 
EF model Financial feelings (angry) .000*** 
EF model Policy satisfaction (transport) .001*** 
CM model Political knowledge 1 .007** 
CM model Political knowledge 2 .037* 
CM model Interest in election .000*** 
GI model Political activity too much time and effort .007** 
GI model People are too busy to vote .000*** 
GI model How do you feel about the Liberal Democrats? .03* 
GI model I feel a sense of satisfaction when I vote .000*** 
GI model I would feel very guilty if I did not vote in a general election .000*** 
GI model Being active in politics equals group benefits .014* 
GI model Voting makes a difference .030* 
GI model Democracy only works properly if most people vote .015* 
GI model Most of my family and friends think that voting is a waste of time .008** 
   
25-34   
   
SC model Perceived fairness .000*** 
CV model Leisure time .041* 
CV model Party mobilisation: telephone call .040* 
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CV model Interest in campaign .000*** 
EF model Government treats people like me fairly .000*** 
CM model Education .041* 
CM model Political knowledge 1 .048* 
CM model Political knowledge 2 -.001*** 
CM model Television coverage of the election .000*** 
CM model Interest in the election .000*** 
GI model Efficacy .003** 
GI model Political activity too much time and effort .002** 
GI model People are too busy to vote .001*** 
GI model How do you feel about the Liberal Democrats? .000*** 
GI model I would feel very guilty if I did not vote in a general election .008** 
GI model Being active in politics equals group benefits .020* 
 
Overall the models in the sociological framework perform less well than those in the 
rational voter framework. We might expect sociological explanations for declines in the 
youth vote to fare relatively badly given that the sociological factors tend to change 
gradually over time rather than from election to election. However, given that turnout 
has declined among the youngest age groups at the last three elections it is reasonable to 
conclude that long-term factors might also be at work. Other research has confirmed the 
importance of considering variables in rational choice, social capital and civic 
voluntarism model (Fieldhouse et al 2007).  
It is clear that whilst the rational choice focused models fare better than the 
sociologically focused ones; the latter have something very important to add to the 
conclusions. Of particular importance is the social capital model which fares uniquely 
well amongst the 18-24 year old age group when compared to the other five groups. The 
model manages to classify 92.7 per cent of non-voters in this age group, and three of its 
four composite variables are significant at least to the 0.01** level. This is a strong 
indication of the need to build a testable hypothesis of generational change which 
incorporates ideas of increased individual rationality, the key finding of Clarke et al’s 
(2004) analysis, but which also takes into account the significance of norms of 
reciprocity and trust which the social capital model aims to operationalise.  
The socio-cultural version of the social capital model briefly outlined at the 
beginning of this chapter, works on the basis that ‘civic engagement and social trust 
form a mutually reinforcing syndrome’ (Putnam 2000). The data analysis suggests that 
today’s young people are less likely to be recruited into politics or community affairs 
and have lower levels of trust in others than previous generations did. An important 
feature in the rational cost-benefit version of the social capital model is the ability of 
144 
 
groups and institutions to produce desired outputs and, by doing so generate trust 
(Becker 1975, 2001; Coleman 1988). Trust in this sense is based on the extent to which 
individuals receive particular benefits from institutions and is reliant on the ability of 
institutions to deliver policies that address multiple needs. The data analysis suggests 
the need to look more closely at levels of social capital amongst young people and 
understand if, how and why these different forms of capital are declining. 
A key feature of the social capital thesis is that citizens make informed choices 
to participate and become active in community politics on the basis of political 
knowledge. Research has shown that levels political knowledge among young people 
have fallen in the last ten years or so (e.g., Park 2000). The data analysis appears to 
confirm that political knowledge is an important determinant of the decision to vote for 
young citizens. The significance of the political knowledge variables in the cognitive 
mobilisation model suggest that one of the key questions for future research to address 
is where young people receive their political information from and how this has 
changed in the last ten years. Norris et al (1999) found that 17-24 year olds were the 
least likely of all groups to report the regular watching of television news or to regularly 
read a newspaper. Research has also found that television was the main source of 
political information for most first-time voters (Harrison and Diecke 2000; Russell et al 
2002). If young people do not watch television news, but get most of their information 
about politics from television – what kinds of information are they exposed to and how 
does this affect their political orientations? 
Of the other variables especially significant to the youngest groups, social class 
is amongst the most striking, and perhaps most important to consider in more detail, 
given its importance traditionally as a predictor of political behaviour. As discussed in 
Chapter two, it is generally accepted that social class has had a declining influence on 
political participation as class secularism and partisan dealignment weakened and 
blurred the distinctions and anchors to voting behaviour. We also might expect class to 
figure as a more prominent predictor of turnout amongst those older generations who 
were socialised in an era before traditional class divisions declined. Two variables in the 
equity fairness model add to the case for investigating social class. Where young people 
perceive themselves to be likely to experience economic hardship, which we might 
expect to be a proxy for social class, they were less likely to vote as were those who 
reported themselves to be ‘angry’ about their economic situation.  
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The empirical evidence presented points to the need to test explanations which 
take into account the impact of social and political change. Social psychology 
explanations of political participation argue that early life experiences imprint political 
psychological attachments on voters, most notably partisan attachments. These types of 
explanation point to the need to understand the political socialisation of this generation 
of young non-voters. Those aged between 18 and 35 in 2001 were socialised in a unique 
social and political environment of accelerated individualisation and the marketisation 
of society and by the increasingly negative reporting of politics by the media. If early 
socialisation experiences imprint political psychological attachments on voters, it is 
reasonable to conclude that negative early experiences could similarly condition 
political participation.  
If the early political socialisation of a generation of young people, those who 
came of age in the Thatcher era and after, and who were first eligible to vote in 2001, 
was comparable to previous generations, lacking in the traditional cues to political 
participation, then this group are likely to have been affected disproportionately by 
shorter-term ‘period’ factors. These factors, I suggest, may have in the past been 
reduced or mitigated by psychological attachments. But in the absence of these and in a 
unique political period – an era of hegemonic politics, with one party dominating 
electoral politics for long periods – this generation experienced no examples of elections 
changing governments and little to persuade them it was worthwhile voting. To 
compound this situation, many of this generation, reached their teens towards the end of 
the Thatcher administration and during the Major years in government. This was a 
period dominated by the negative reporting of politics by the media, as the conservative 
government struggled to deal with the highest rate of ministerial resignation of any 
previous parliament that century. Between 1992 and 1996, fifteen MPs and Ministers 
resigned, only three of them on policy related grounds, the remainder over personal 
conduct. These problems were compounded by persistent divisive splits in the 
government over Europe and, even after John Major’s victory in the 1995 leadership 
election, the continual battle for succession (Butler and Kavanagh 1997).  
 
Towards a theory of modern youth turnout 
 
On the basis of this elaboration of the findings of the data analysis presented in this 
Chapter, it is possible to outline some hypotheses through which to explain a 
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generational change in voter turnout which aim to account for the disproportionate 
decline in the youth vote since 1992.  
 
1. Today’s young people are not endowed with as strong a partisan framework 
through which to understand and engage in formal politics.  
2. This is a generation who were socialised in a significantly less participatory, 
reciprocal and social trust-forming environment than their predecessors. 
 
These changes have meant that: 
 
3. In the absence of an environment conducive to forming traditional psychological 
attachments to political parties and politics and through which to understand 
political issues; and in the absence of an environment conducive to forming 
close social networks to achieve common collective aims; young people are 
more susceptible to the factors associated with their early political socialisation.  
4. Two aspects of the period of their socialisation are particularly important in 
understanding their participatory and attitudinal characteristics; firstly, the 
hegemonic political period they experienced, where elections were seen to make 
little difference to governments.  
Secondly, they are exposed to, and are more susceptible to less valuable political 
information to form their political knowledge and engagement, than previous 
generations were.  
 
Lastly, given the significance of social class and economic related variables to the 
prediction of turnout amongst the youngest generation, these factors are particularly 
evident amongst young working class citizens, who are less likely to have alternative 
mechanisms for political engagement, social capital and are less likely to be exposed to 
high value information sources. Chapter seven expands on this broad theory and the 
findings of the data analysis conducted in this chapter and attempts to test a theoretical 
explanation of low turnout amongst young people derived from these as well as the 
secondary literature.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Towards a generational model of youth disengagement in 
Britain 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In the preceding chapters the thesis has sought to outline the uniqueness of recent 
cohorts of British citizens voting behaviour. The data analysis identifies a decline in 
turnout at British General Elections since 1992 amongst all age groups. But it finds that 
the decline has been disproportionately located amongst the youngest sections of the 
population. Looking at the life-cycles of previous age cohorts, these declines are 
unprecedented and it would appear, although this cannot be demonstrated conclusively, 
that generational changes are at least part of the explanation. Whilst it is entirely 
possible that this cohort could return to follow a similar life-cycle turnout trajectory to 
previous generations, it would be unprecedented in modern British electoral history for 
a cohort to make such a significant change. What we can conclude is that these cohorts 
are unique in the sense that their participatory characteristics have never been witnessed 
before. Chapter six built on the result of the bivariate analysis a set of logistic regression 
models using 2001 BES survey data, revealing that for the youngest two age groups – 
those whose turnout fell most dramatically in 2001- the key predictors of their decision 
to vote were social capital, social class and political knowledge. This chapter establishes 
an evidence based link between these variables in the context of electoral change.  
Investigating political change by focusing on a society’s youngest citizens is 
always prone to problems associated with separating life-cycle, period and cohort 
effects. It is acknowledged that it is impossible to conclusively demonstrate that these 
variables are linked in such a way as to comprehensively account for the sharp drops in 
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turnout in 1997 and 2001. These limitations are largely the result of a lack of panel data 
needed to track individuals over time. However, having recognised these limitations, 
there is a strong prima facie case which will be elaborated in this chapter, given the 
evidence available, that recent cohorts have experienced a unique combination of long 
and short-term social and political changes that help explain their recent participatory 
characteristics.  
We can trace the origins of electoral change in Britain to the movement away 
from a frozen electoral arena, towards a more open market for votes. The evidence 
suggests that broad changes in how citizens identify with politics and political parties 
are likely to have played a critical role in shaping a generation of modern voters. By the 
1970s stable attachment between social groups and political parties came into question. 
Butler and Stokes had argued that socialisation played a crucial role in forming party 
attachments. Those growing up in the mid to late 1970s and after, who came of voting 
age in the 1990s, experienced an altogether different political socialisation to their 
predecessors. The dynamics of modern political participation in this era need to be 
understood through the move from a stable aligned era of political support to a 
dealigned modern era. The findings of the data analysis can be understood through a 
nuanced approach to three prominent explanations for class and partisan dealignment 
since the 1970s. Firstly, the idea of class secularisation, according to which voters class 
identities and values are weakening as classes lose their cohesion; secondly, that factors 
deriving from the performance of political parties are generating partisan dealignment; 
and lastly, the idea associated with the work of Russell Dalton and Ronald Inglehart that 
electorates have undergone a period of ‘cognitive mobilisation’ and their levels of 
political sophistication have rendered political parties functionally obsolete (Inglehart 
1977, 1990, 1997 and Dalton 2003).  
 Class secularisation is usually held to derive from various types of social 
mobility. The main source of this mobility in Britain has been the declining 
manufacturing sector and the replacement of manual jobs associated with this sector 
with non-manual positions in the service sector. Social mobility has had two important 
consequences. Firstly, it has weakened the relationship between class and voting. The 
1992 British Election Survey shows that, while 58 per cent of the static working class 
supported Labour, and only 17 per cent of the static middle class did so, 31 per cent of 
those who experienced upward mobility from manual to non-manual status voted for the 
party (Webb 2000: 73). This social mobility increased steadily from the 1960s – with 
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the vast majority experiencing upward mobility (Ibid). Thatcher era reforms accelerated 
class secularisation by ending many traditional working class sources of employment 
and by creating a new generation of entrepreneurs with totally different values to the 
solidaristic class based values held by their predecessors. I will argue that the period 
also had a dramatic impact on working class social cohesion as the Thatcher 
government weakened the power of the trade unions and their membership declined.  
 The second explanation for partisan dealignment relates the performance of 
political parties. One school of thought argues that as countries became more complex 
and more difficult to govern, trust amongst the electorate for politics, politicians and 
political institutions was undermined (e.g., Birch 1984). Another argument about the 
performance of political parties argues that party strategies have been a source of 
dealignment (Webb 2000). The extent to which young adults have remained aligned to 
political parties and the factors that could further influence their dealignment are 
relatively rarely discussed by political scientists. I will contend that the failure of 
political parties since 1979 to respond to electoral defeat and provide effective 
competition in subsequent elections seems likely to have weakened voter’s sense of 
political efficacy. I will also argue that whilst we might understand the transformation 
of political parties to ‘catch-all’ organisations as a rational response by parties to a 
dealigning electorate, it may have had the effect of further undermining any 
identification young people have with political parties. To understand this we can 
examine the ‘paradox of voting’. If voters act rationally, the paradox is that they vote at 
all given that their individual vote is unlikely to influence the outcome of any election. 
But the majority of voters do. We can perhaps best understand this paradox by 
suggesting that voters probably were not, and probably still are not, (completely) 
rational. At least part of the reason they voted was because of their political 
socialisation and enduring party attachments. But in a dealigned era, many younger 
citizens have little or no experience of voting and have no psychological attachments to 
political parties. In these circumstances their sense of political efficacy is likely to be 
weakened if they are offered little choice between the political parties and the nature of 
the electoral contest, revealed through pre-election polls and the media indicates that 
their vote is unlikely to have any impact. It may be rational not to vote. Thus the 
interaction of long-term (class and partisan dealignment) and short-term (lack of clear 
difference between parties and lack of electoral competition, political hegemony) would 
appear to be plausible reasons for disproportionate youth turnout.  
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A third explanation for partisan dealignment is that citizens are more 
sophisticated consumers of politics today than ever before and that they no longer need 
political parties to provide cues in evaluating political issues. This leaves them 
particularly exposed to other sources of political information. Scholars widely concur 
that the most important of all these sources of information is television (Dalton 2003). 
Cognitive mobilisation theory implies the need to investigate the increase or decrease in 
political information and its quality, as well as important distributional issues. There is 
an increasing body of research investigating the role of the mass media and its 
informational function (e.g., Norris 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2001; Semetko 1999). Whilst it 
is beyond the scope of the thesis to investigate in detail the influence of a changing 
media environment, I will outline a case, based on the existing literature and the 
available evidence, for future research which investigates changing media consumption 
habits and their impact on political participation and wider civic engagement. 
There is good evidence that the types of politics that young people are involved 
in are changing (e.g., Marsh et al 2007 and Dalton 2008) and from Chapters four and six 
of this thesis that young people appear to be unique in their attitudinal and participatory 
characteristics. This would suggest that a further explanation for continued class and 
partisan alignment might lie in the formative socialisation experiences of young people. 
One of the central arguments in electoral research is that between the partisan 
identification and issue voting schools. Issue-voting models were seen to be more 
appropriate in accounting for the voting behaviour of an increasingly sophisticated and 
rational electorate. Childhood socialisation and habitual group and party ties were seen 
as less important on this basis. Clarke et al (2004) argue that modern partisanship 
conforms more to the accumulation of party performance assessments than it does to the 
social-psychological concept of an enduring affective attachment. They argue that a 
‘valence model’ of political participation best accounts for patterns of turnout and party 
support in recent elections. Although Clarke et al (2004) are critical of the social-
psychological conception of partisanship from the early British Election Studies, their 
conclusions point to an important way in which we might distinguish between today’s 
young voters from their older predecessors. Partisan or anti-partisan identity may now 
be conditioned by party and leadership evaluations rather than long-term social 
psychological attachments. This might be one reason why the operationalisation of 
Partisan Identification in the BES does not appear to be a predictor of youth turnout in 
the previous chapter.  
151 
 
 
At least since the work of Mannheim (1928) social scientists have been 
interested in the idea that youth is a critical period for the development of attitudes, 
values and beliefs. During these impressionable years, young people are particularly 
receptive to political ideas but also to the prevailing social climate and philosophy. 
Once established, these beliefs and values will tend to crystallise and stabilise and will 
often persist through an individual’s life. If recent cohorts of young people have been 
exposed to a unique social and political environment then this might help explain why 
they are unique in terms of their political behaviour and attitudes. Moreover, a strong 
reason for suspecting that we might be witnessing a generational change in political 
participation stems from the work of Franklin (2004) whose cross-national research 
shows that there is a strong habitual element to voting behaviour. Those who vote at 
their first few elections are likely to acquire the habit of voting and continue doing so at 
subsequent elections, but, those who abstain are likely to acquire the habit of abstaining. 
The impact of being raised during a period of class and partisan dealignment may have 
meant that recent generations were particularly susceptible to the context of their first 
electoral experience. If the psychological engagement with politics derived from 
partisanship and social group identity has a strong informational function, which we 
might suspect given research showing the politically relevant information available 
from daily life experiences (Fiorina 1990; Popkin 1991), then it may be that today’s 
youth are simply not endowed with the same kinds of information and impetus towards 
political engagement. With this in mind one task of this thesis is to use the available 
evidence to try and understand how particular long and short-term social and political 
circumstances have impacted on a generation of young citizens. How do the earlier 
findings of the data analysis - the importance of social capital, social class and political 
knowledge help us to understand what was specific about the political socialisation of 
young adults in the late 1970s and 1980s that impacted on their turnout characteristics 
in such a dramatic way? The data analysis revealed that it was amongst those aged 
between 18-34 at the 2001 general election that turnout declined most dramatically. 
This age group can be described as ‘Thatcher’s children’. The oldest of this group 
experienced their political socialisation firmly in the Thatcher era and had already had 
the opportunity to vote at three previous elections in 1987, 1992 and 1997.  
One of the most significant aspects of this period was the Conservative 
government under Margaret Thatcher’s battle with the trade unions. The decline of the 
unions signified a decline in the key linkage between working class voters and politics 
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and meant that future generations of working class people were significantly less 
exposed to traditional working class social networks through which partisan 
attachments and social group reciprocity are likely to have been reinforced, and 
channels of participation embedded. Some of the younger portion of the 18-34 year olds 
in 2001 had their first opportunity to vote in 1997, after New Labour, under Tony Blair, 
had moved to the right, closing in on the centre – centre/right ground previously 
occupied by the Conservative Party. This would have undoubtedly presented first time 
voters with a less clear distinction between the parties, although many are likely to have 
voted for New Labour as a means of unseating the beleaguered Conservative’s. One 
question, given the idea that this generation were susceptible to the experiences of their 
formative political period, is whether their attitudes and participatory characteristics 
were affected most by the final years of the Major government, or by the period 
between 1997 and 2001, when many voted for the first time. We might suspect the 
former because of the nature of the Conservative Party’s demise between 1992 and 
1997, but there may be reasons why Tony Blair’s first term in office had a particular 
impact, given its media managed and highly centralised tendencies.  
With these questions and explanations in mind and based on the evidence of the 
data analysis in Chapters four and six, we can return to the theoretical ideas developed 
at the end of Chapter six to specify some research question for examination in the 
remainder of the chapter. The general idea behind the theory is that a combination of 
long-term factors rooted in class and partisan dealignment, combined with the factors 
associated with the political period a generation of young voters were socialised in have 
had profound consequences for their voting behaviour. Whilst we cannot yet be sure 
whether these characteristics are ‘habits’, it is reasonable to suspect this may be the 
case, and to test these evidence based assumptions.  
 
7.2 Theoretical explanations for low youth turnout  
 
1. Today’s young people are not endowed with as strong a partisan framework 
through which to understand and engage in formal politics as their predecessors.  
2. This is a generation who were socialised in a significantly less participatory, 
reciprocal and social trust forming environment than their predecessors. 
 
These changes have meant that: 
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3. In the absence of an environment conducive to forming traditional psychological 
attachments to political parties and politics and through which to understand 
political issues; as well as one of close social networks; young people are more 
susceptible to the factors associated with their political socialisation.  
4. Three aspects of the period of their socialisation are particularly important in 
understanding their participatory and attitudinal characteristics; a hegemonic 
political period; the ideological convergence of the main political parties; and 
the political information environment through which their political knowledge 
and engagement was conditioned.  
5. Working class citizens, who are less likely to have alternative mechanisms for 
political engagement, social capital and are less likely to be exposed to 
alternative high value information sources are most likely to be negatively 
affected.  
 
The theory argues that the forces of change at work between 1979 and the early 1990s 
hit those socialised during the Thatcher era and becoming eligible to vote after 1992 
most acutely. These young adults were socialised outside the reach of the traditional 
mobilisation forces associated with partisan identification and social capital, but this has 
been particularly significant for working class young people who rely on a narrower set 
of alternative networks through which they receive and consolidate their political cues. 
Two key features of the political period in which they were socialised turned them off 
from politics. Firstly, they came of age in a hegemonic period where The Conservative 
Party (1979-1997) and New Labour (1997-2001) had virtually unchallenged political 
tenures. For this generation, yet to acquire the habit of voting, there seemed little point 
in voting, as their vote was perceived to make no difference to electoral outcomes. 
Secondly, during the later part of this period, post-1992, as the cohorts became eligible 
to vote for the first time in 1997 or 2001, the two main parties converged on the centre 
ground. New Labour’s apparent shift right under Tony Blair left young people, 
particularly those from working class backgrounds, unsure about the differences 
between the major parties. This shift affected young people most as they had yet to 
establish habitual patterns of political allegiance. The idea that young people are not 
endowed with a strong framework through which to condition their understanding and 
engagement in politics is tested in research question two, below. The second element of 
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the theory of change – that this generation were socialised in a less participatory and 
social trust forming environment is also examined in question two, which also looks at 
class differences. Question 4 probes the idea that this cohort may have been particularly 
affected by factors associated with the political period during which they came of age. 
The notion that these young adults are not exposed to a valuable political information 
environment is examined in question 5, whilst the idea that these effects are most 
pronounced amongst working class groups is addressed through all five questions.  
 The most difficult aspect of the theory to test is the idea that as a result of the 
changes outlined young people are more ‘susceptible’ to the factors associated with 
their early political socialisation. One way of addressing this is to look at the 
relationship between social networks, partisanship and levels of political knowledge 
(question 2).  
 
Research questions: 
 
1. What evidence is there that working class people rely on a narrower set of social 
networks than middle class people? 
2. Have traditional social networks, partisanship and levels of political knowledge 
declined more among working class people than middle class people since 
1979? 
3. What evidence is there that working class social networks and partisan identity 
were important to levels of political knowledge? 
4. What evidence is there that factors associated with the political period 1979-
2001 exacerbated the disinclination of young people, particularly those from 
working class backgrounds, to vote? 
5. If young people are increasingly reliant on the media for political information 
how has the media environment they are exposed to and the media they are 
consuming changed? 
 
  
7.3 Question 1: What evidence is there that working class people rely on a 
narrower set of social networks than middle class people? 
 
One of the problems with researching social capital is the conceptual vagueness which 
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surrounds the concept. This gives rise to obvious measurement and comparability 
problems. These problems, in part, stem from the differing origins of the term. Social 
capital’s theoretical precursors can be found in the works of many of the early social 
and political theorists from Aristotle, de Tocqueville and Adam Smith. However, recent 
conceptions can largely be traced to the work of three key authors – Bourdieu and 
Passeron (1976), Coleman (1988) and Putnam (1993, 1995a, 1995b, 2000) – who take 
quite different approaches to its measurement. Bourdieu used social capital as a way to 
explain how economic forces create and maintain capitalist culture. He proposed that 
economic, cultural, and social capital were convertible. For example, the upper classes 
convert economic capital into cultural and social capital by sending their children to 
private schools. Social and cultural capital gain their value because people with status 
recognise the value of each other’s capital, so even though these capitals are utilised by 
individuals (and individual families) they have collective effects.   
Coleman’s view of social capital placed more emphasis on the collective aspects 
of social capital, and less on it as a tool of social control. He argued that ‘social capital 
is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a variety of different entities, with 
two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they 
facilitate certain actions of actors’ (Coleman 1988: 98). This functionalist view of social 
capital rings true on many levels, but raises substantial questions about what the concept 
includes and what it does not. Coleman outlines three aspects of social capital: 
obligations and expectations, information flow capability, and norms accompanied by 
sanctions. The most obvious common ground between Coleman and Bourdieu is the 
notion that social capital can be converted into other forms of capital. 
However, it was Putnam’s work on social capital in Italy and his later book on 
America that became most influential in the social sciences. Putnam (1993) argued that 
the differential success of the regional governments in Italy resulted from stable 
differences in social capital between the regions. For Putnam the regions in the North of 
Italy tended to have the most successful governments and these areas also had high 
levels of social capital as measured by membership or participation in associational 
organisations and high levels of reported social trust between strangers. Regional 
governments in the south of the country were typically less effective and were 
characterised by high levels of distrust between strangers, with people turning to their 
families for trust and support. Putnam found that in these regions membership in 
voluntary organisations was very much lower and that the predominant social 
156 
 
 
organisation was hierarchical in nature, with relationships often based on patronage and 
power. However, it was Putnam’s (1995b) Ithiel de Sola Pool lecture which caused 
much controversy and sparked debate in the academic literature. Here Putnam argued 
that the USA was witnessing a dramatic decline in social capital. Social capital was 
defined by Putnam as ‘features of social life-networks, norms, and trust-that enable 
participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives’ (Putnam 
1995b: 664). He concluded in his lecture that: 
 
The concept of ‘civil society’ has played a central role in the recent global 
debate about the preconditions for democracy and democratization. In the 
newer democracies this phrase has properly focused attention on the need to 
foster a vibrant civic life in soils traditionally inhospitable to self-government. 
In the established democracies, ironically, growing numbers of citizens are 
questioning the effectiveness of their public institutions at the very moment when 
liberal democracy has swept the battlefield, both ideologically and 
geopolitically. In America, at least, there is reason to suspect that this 
democratic disarray may be linked to a broad and continuing erosion of civic 
engagement that began a quarter-century ago. High on our scholarly agenda 
should be the question of whether a comparable erosion of social capital may be 
under way in other advanced democracies, perhaps in different institutional and 
behavioral guises. High on America's agenda should be the question of how to 
reverse these adverse trends in social connectedness, thus restoring civic 
engagement and civic trust (Putnam 1995: 77).  
 
Here Putnam raised the question of whether the decline of social capital he found in 
America was mirrored in other democracies. In Bowling Alone (2000) Putnam provides 
the most detailed exposition of his arguments. His data demonstrates that in America 
voting, political knowledge, political trust, and grassroots political activism are all 
down. His research revealed that Americans sign 30 per cent fewer petitions and are 40 
per cent less likely to join a consumer boycott, as compared to the decades prior to his 
research. He also found that these declines were equally visible in non-political 
community life: membership and activity in all sorts of local clubs and civic and 
religious organisations fell at an accelerating pace. In the mid-1970s the average 
American attended some sort of club meeting every month, but by 1998 that rate of 
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attendance had been cut by nearly 60 per cent. 
Putnam’s second set of findings revealed changes in informal social activity. 
Putnam found that in 1975 the average American entertained friends at home 15 times 
per year; but the equivalent figure in 1998 was half that. He found that virtually all 
leisure activities that involve doing something with someone else, from playing 
volleyball to playing chamber music, are declining. But here Putnam distinguishes 
between what he calls ‘machers’, those who are involved in more formal types of 
activity and ‘schmoozers’ who spend more time in informal friendship and family 
groups. The distinction is important because ‘machers’ for Putnam tend to be better 
educated, have higher incomes and are disproportionately home-owners, whereas 
informal social involvement is common at all levels of the social hierarchy. Formal 
community involvement, Putnam argues is relatively modest early in life, peaking in 
middle age and declining with retirement according to what we understand as a life-
cycle effect of social participation. But, ‘informal social involvement follows the 
opposite path over the life-cycle, peaking among young adults, entering a long decline 
as family and community obligations press in, the rising again with retirement..’ 
(Putnam 2000: 94). This point, which I will return to later, has important ramifications 
for research into youth participation in politics. The third set of findings Putnam 
revealed relate to social trust. Putnam is careful to distinguish between social trust and 
trust in government or other social institutions (Ibid: 137).  He found that Americans are 
more tolerant of one another than were previous generations, but they trust one another 
less.  
These three foundational views of social capital have significant areas of 
overlap, but there are also some very important incompatibilities. Bourdieu’s 
conception of social capital is relatively dark. Putnam’s language is far friendlier, and 
seems to regard association between people as positive in its own right. Coleman’s 
perspective, while viewing social capital as more neutral, emphasises the use of social 
capital as a precursor of human capital. While these differences are subtle, they make 
the task of measuring or assessing social capital far more challenging. This is further 
complicated because there is a lack of data sets with sufficient political and social 
capital variables to test the relationship between political factors and social capital over 
time. This is a particular issue for a longitudinal research design that seeks to 
understand the explanatory role of social capital in the investigation of changing 
electoral turnout.  
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Social capital and youth research  
 
Conceptualising and measuring social capital is further complicated when focusing on 
young people by research showing that standard approaches to measurement and 
conceptualisation are inappropriate to the lives of young people (Harper 2001; Whiting 
and Harper 2003). Standard measures of social capital indicate that young people are 
less likely to participate in social and civic activities, but these quantitative indicators 
may under-estimate the kinds of activities young people are involved in (Ibid). Morrow 
(2002) argues that existing work on social capital does not tend to take into account of 
the ways that young people socialise in friendship networks, participate in local 
activities, generate their own connections and make links for their parents. 
 The idea that young people’s social activity is under-represented is not a new 
one and is echoed in the literature on political participation. As discussed in Chapter 
two, survey based research has frequently been criticised for its narrow definition of 
what constitutes political activity. Qualitative research has found that young people are 
engaged in a broad spectrum of activities that are often not seen as political (Kimberlee 
2002; Henn et al 2002, 2005; Marsh et al 2007). These studies have provided important 
evidence to counter claims of youth apathy. Moreover, recent large scale survey based 
research confirms that citizens in Britain have not contracted out of politics but are 
engaged in a number of non-traditional forms of political participation (Pattie et al 
2004). Pattie et al found that collectivist forms of participation have decreased whilst 
individualistic ones have increased. The study found that all forms of political 
participation from voting to associational activity are related to age, education and 
socio-economic status, but not to gender or ethnicity. The young were least likely of all 
to belong to formal organisations, but are most likely to be involved in informal 
networks or friendship groups (2004:104-5).  
 Implicit in the traditional life-cycle understanding of political participation is 
that youth is a transitionary stage before adulthood. But mounting evidence of 
generational change or the underlying assumption that it is taking place has led to a 
focus on youth participation which tends not to consider the social and political life-
cycle. I would argue that whilst this approach has its value, as discussed at various 
stages in the thesis, it often fails to take into account the political life-cycle as a 
fundamental element in our understanding of youth politics. Simply because we know 
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that participation changes over the life-cycle (e.g., Verba and Nie 1972, Barnes and 
Kaase 1979; Parry 1992; Verba et al 1995) indicates that we should be wary about 
making conclusions, implicit or explicit from one stage of the life-cycle to another. 
Throughout the thesis I have attempted to root the findings of change in electoral 
turnout amongst recent generations in the context of wider social changes as well as in 
the short-term political context. 
 Implicit in the concern that young people are not voting is the understanding that 
if these habits adhere to them as they age, the proportion of the electorate voting could 
fall significantly. But there appears little evidence as to whether engagement in 
unconventional activity will adhere to today’s cohorts as they age, or whether they are 
likely to engage in formal types of activity later in life. Barnes and Kaase (1979) 
suggested that young people are more likely to be involved in protest politics because it 
provides an ideal medium for them to challenge the power concentrated in the hand of 
‘old men’. It is my contention that unconventional types of social and political 
involvement such as those undertaken by younger people may have, to a significant 
extent, the opposite life-cycle trajectory to conventional participation; that is a 
downward one. Putnam (2000: 94) argues that for both men and women, marriage 
increases the amount of time spent at home and in formal community organisations, 
whilst reducing the time spent with friends. Having children further cuts into informal 
social connections (Puntnam 2000). Whilst there are fewer people marrying and having 
children in Britain now than ever before, we would still expect the effect of middle age 
and marriage to push down informal social connections.  
 One of the problems with social capital as a predictor of electoral turnout is that 
many measures of social capital, including Putnam’s (2000: 16), include turnout at 
elections. This seems oddly tautologous. But if we believe Franklin (2004) that voting is 
habitual, this can be seen as less problematic as the experience of voting itself may well 
be an important influence on future voting. However, we are primarily concerned with 
how other forms of associational activity might influence electoral turnout so will 
exclude turnout as a measure of social capital. The measures of social capital used in the 
previous chapter follow those used in the wide literature on social capital and political 
participation. It is acknowledged that these measures are not comprehensive, in that 
they do not measure all possible conceptualisations of social capital, but their usage is 
justified as they are the most commonly used and comparable measures across data sets 
and across time. This approach is consistent with the way turnout has been treated in the 
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thesis. I acknowledge that other definitions and measurements of social capital may 
reveal different trends, as different measurements and definitions of political 
participation do. But it remains important to understand what has changed according to 
existing measures. These changes can then be the basis for understanding what new 
measures are needed. 
There is strong and consistent evidence from existing literature that working 
class social networks tend to be narrower than middle class ones. In a major study of the 
impact of class on social mobility in Britain, Goldthorpe et al (1987) found that ‘kin’, 
that is family, played a greater role in the associational pattern of working class life than 
in the service class. Typically Goldthorpe et al found that amongst the service class 
‘voluntary associations are joined at relatively frequent intervals, so that, over the 
course of his life, the individual steadily accumulates memberships.’ (Ibid:185). 
Whereas the working class pattern was for associations to be joined far less regularly, 
but to be held for longer period of time (Ibid). Goldthorpe et al found that amongst the 
working classes, working men’s clubs and ‘overwhelmingly’ trade unions accounted for 
well over half of all memberships. However, amongst the service classes associational 
involvements were clearly more diversified (Ibid). 
More recently, studies have confirmed the idea that there are important 
distributional issues in relation to social capital (Johnston and Jowell 1999).  Li et al 
(2003) utilise Social Mobility Inquiry and British Household Panel Survey data to 
consider the types of social capital specific to class groups. They confirm the 
established knowledge that working class groups draw their organisational affiliations 
disproportionately from trade unions and working men’s clubs. Li et al show that there 
are two broad types of association: trade unions and working men’s clubs which are 
working class dominated and all other types of organisations which are ‘service class’ 
dominated.  
  
7.4 Question 2: Have traditional working class social networks, partisanship and 
levels of political knowledge declined more among working class people than middle 
class people since 1979? 
 
(a) Social networks 
 
There is a considerable body of work that shows that differences in social networks are 
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transmitted across generations (Goldthorpe et al 1987; Kiernan 1996; Aldridge 2001). 
This might be one reason we might expect working class associational activity not to 
have grown in the same way as middle class activity. Peter Hall argues in his influential 
articles on social capital, that whilst we might expect differences in social capital 
between social groups to have diminished over time, as social convergence theories 
might predict, they have actually grown since the 1950s (Hall 1999, 2002). According 
to Hall ‘the two groups who face marginalization from civil society are the working 
class and the young’ (Hall 2002: 53). In 1959, the average person in the working class 
belonged to almost two thirds as many associations as someone from the middle classes. 
By 1990, he belonged to less than half as many. In 1959 the average Briton under the 
age of 30 belonged to 84 per cent as many associations as an older person. By 1990, he 
belonged to only 75 per cent as many (Hall 2002: 53). 
The evidence from the data analysis, confirmed by recent research, suggests that 
there is something particular that has changed amongst working class groups, something 
that has had an impact on their rate of electoral participation. I have suggested that long-
term factors such as class dealignment may have impacted on working class 
partisanship and participation. But whilst class dealignment hints at a set of social 
changes we need to be more specific as to how long and short-term factors have 
influenced the electorate. Much of the recent literature on social capital has explored 
trends in voluntary organisations, but there is relatively little robust evidence on how 
participation accentuates or bridge social divisions. However, two important studies in 
the recent literature on social capital reveal important trends. Li et al (2003: 508) show 
that memberships of the ‘Labour’ type organisations experienced a significant decline 
from 1992 to 1999 whereas the decline in the other types of associations was much 
smaller and non-significant. They also found that ‘the civic type of membership is more 
diffused, less related to the work-place and more likely to engender a generalized source 
of social capital (Ibid: 511).  
The trend of declining working class associational membership is confirmed by 
Warde et al (2003) who also used the British Household Panel Survey to consider the 
changing volume and distribution of associational membership in Britain. Investigating 
the period between 1991 and 1997, Warde et al found increasing differences in levels of 
participation between the service classes and all other classes. They conclude that the 
trend in the later 1990s increase the plausibility of Hall’s concern that the working class 
might become increasingly marginalized and that the decline in trade-union 
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membership may be one of the key reasons for declining involvement of lower class 
groups in formal associations. These results provide further evidence of the relationship 
between social class and social capital. But they also reveal that there was an important 
change in participatory dynamics in the 1990s. Although it is very difficult to attribute 
cause, it is reasonable to suspect, given the evidence of the data analysis, that the 
decline in trade unionism, the main source of working class associative activity, played 
a crucial role in declining working class identification with political parties and 
participation in politics.  
When Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1979 it was made clear that the new 
government’s key priority was to reduce and control inflation, not to try and recover full 
employment. One of the main reasons for the decline in unions was the impact of 
recession on Britain, aggravated by the government’s insistence on reducing the rate of 
inflation. The recession aided the governments curbing of union power as the increase 
in unemployment in the period was largely concentrated in the heavily unionised 
manufacturing industries. Between 1979 and 1986 membership of the National Union 
of Miners fell by 72 per cent, the Transport and General Workers Union by 34 per cent, 
the Amalgamated Engineers Union by 34 per cent, the Electrical, Electronic, 
Telecommunications and Plumbing Union by 24 per cent and the General Municipal 
and Boilermakers Union by 16 per cent (Roberts 1989). The Conservative manifesto 
had promised action on picketing as they sought to avoid a repeat of the humiliation of 
the last Conservative government by the miners. The following decade saw a raft of 
legislation curbing the powers of the unions.  
Beside the political changes often associated with Thatcher’s governments, the 
period saw drastic changes in attitudes towards the trade unions. Employers began 
moving away from building collaborative relationships with the unions in favour of by-
passing them in favour of direct links between management and employees. Another 
factor was the changing technical and product market environment of the 1980s. 
Employers hit by a sharp increase in competition responded by accelerating the 
introduction of new technology. With new technology came increased automation 
which cut across conventional skill demarcations in the workforce and demanded 
employers to seek more flexibility in their use of labour (Atkinson and Meager 1985). 
Confronted with a trade union movement still profoundly influenced by historic craft 
traditions, the achievement of the necessary flexibility required a marked reduction in 
union influence. In addition to these factors there was a significant move away from 
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collective bargaining to a more invidualised model of industrial relations which 
emphasised direct communications between employers and individual employees and 
closer evaluation of performance. This meant that the unions were increasingly seen as 
a constraint on the possibilities of effective management. 
The percentage of employees who were union members fell by over a third 
between 1983 and 2001, from half (49 per cent) to just under a third (31 per cent). But 
as Bryson and Gomez (2003), utilising British Social Attitudes data, show, there was 
also a significant decline in union density in the 1990s relative to the 1980s. Bryson and 
Gomez cite two main possibilities to explain the decline in union density in this period: 
either the desire for unionisation has fallen, or the costs of membership have risen 
relative to the benefits. Given that we know voters are increasingly inclined to decide 
whether to cast their vote on the basis of a cost-benefit calculation, we might expect this 
to be the case for other types of participation. With unions less able to provide tangible 
benefits, their power weakened, prospective members were less likely to see any benefit 
in membership. The changes associated with Thatcher’s policies on the trade unions 
were set within broad changes to the occupational structure of Britain. The decline in 
manufacturing and the increase in service sector employment accompanied by broad 
cultural changes emphasised individualist rather than collectivist values. The relative 
decline of manual work and the expansion of non-manual occupations meant that the 
proportion of the workforce in manual occupations fell from 80 per cent in the period 
immediately prior to the first world war to 52 per cent in 1987 (Routh 1987).  
 
(b) Partisanship 
 
Since the 1970s and particularly since the publication of a seminal article by Crewe, 
Sarlvik and Alt (1977), partisan dealignment has been identified by political scientists 
as a key process underlying changing political behaviour. The data analysis suggests 
that political knowledge is an important predictor of the youngest group’s decision to 
vote. This indicates a need to understand what sources of political information are 
available to young voters today and how the traditional sources of information have 
changed. The Michigan election studies demonstrated the significance of partisanship in 
forming political identities (Campbell et al 1960, 1966) and this was recognised in 
seminal works of political change in Britain (e.g. Butler and Stokes 1969). One of the 
key functions of partisanship has been an informational one. Partisan ties help orient the 
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individual to the complexities of politics, and provide a framework for assimilating 
political information, understanding political issues, and making political judgements 
(Dalton 2000). But partisanship also mobilises citizens to vote at elections given that 
they have a psychological bond to a political party. The functional importance of 
partisan identification means that it is crucial to understand how it has changed over 
recent years and what impact this might have on younger voters at recent general 
elections. 
 We can see from Table 7.1 that the percentage of both middle class and working 
class respondents with a sense of partisan identity remained stable until 1992-1997 
when it began to fall. Unsurprisingly, the percentage of those identifying with the 
conservative party began to drop after 1992 and the drop is particularly pronounced 
between 1992 and 1997 among both middle class and working class respondents during 
a period of widespread allegations of sleaze and political corruption. Equally 
unsurprising is the increase in those identifying with Labour post 1992 as the New 
Labour machine gathered momentum. Looking at those working class respondents 
identifying with Labour between 1979 and 1983, there is some indication that 
Thatcher’s early union reforms may have led to the decrease in partisanship in this 
period. But the main change in partisanship appears to have been related to the period 
1992-2001.   
 
Table 7.1 Direction of partisanship in Britain 1964-20011 
 
 1964 1966 1974F 1974O 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 
% with partisan           
identification MC 98 97 95 95 94 95 95 95 92 86 
% with partisan           
identification WC 95 97 94 93 92 93 93 94 92 87 
% identifying           
with Conservatives MC 59 56 53 50 56 54 53 54 35 30 
% identifying           
with Conservatives WC 27 27 29 27 31 31 32 31 19 18 
% identifying            
with Labour MC 20 27 25 25 23 19 21 22 37 37 
% identifying            
with Labour WC 53 54 52 54 48 42 44 46 55 55 
Total Cons+           
                                                          
1
  Class is measured using the Goldthorpe-Heath 5 point schema and recoded: Salariat; Routine non-
manual and Petty bourgeoisie as middle class (MC), Manual Foreman and Supervisors and Working class 
as working class (WC).  
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Labour identifiers MC 79 84 78 75 79 73 74 74 71 67 
Total Cons+           
Labour identifiers WC 80 81 81 81 79 73 74 77 75 73 
 
Source: British Election Survey data 
 
Table 7.2 shows that it appears to be a different story for strength of partisanship in the 
same period. Whilst the percentage of ‘very strong’ identifiers declined throughout the 
period, it is among the ‘fairly strong’ and ‘not very strong’ identifiers that there is most 
change. Unsurprisingly, relating to recent elections, there was a significant jump in 
middle class respondents reporting a ‘not very strong’ identification 1992 and 1997 as 
their traditional party lost its footing on its way to electoral defeat in 1997. But the most 
significant differences occur among working class respondents, with an 8 per cent 
decrease in those with reporting a ‘fairly strong’ identification between 1979 and 1987 
and a 7 per cent increase in those with a ‘not very strong’ identification between 1979 
and 1983. This supports the tentative conclusions from Table 7.1 that working class 
partisan identity was affected by the Thatcher era reforms and plausibly by the union 
reforms in particular.  
 
Table 7.2 Strength of partisanship in Britain 1964-2001 
 
 1964 1966 1974F 1974O 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 
% Very strong           
identifiers MC 44 49 29 24 24 25 22 19 16 14 
% Very strong           
identifiers WC 44 50 34 32 26 27 24 23 22 19 
           
% Fairly strong           
identifiers MC 42 42 51 53 53 50 50 50 47 47 
% Fairly strong           
identifiers WC 46 43 43 54 53 44 45 48 44 47 
           
% Not very strong           
identifiers MC 15 9 17 22 26 25 28 30 37 39 
% Not very strong           
identifiers WC 10 7 23 14 21 28 30 30 33 34 
 
Source: British Election Survey data 
 
Table 7.3 reports the percentage of those with no party identification for the youngest 
age group, compared to the whole BES sample. The percentage of those reporting no 
party attachment in Britain rose from 5.1 per cent in 1992 to 16.1 per cent in 2005 
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amongst all age groups. A rise of over ten percent since 1992. But we can see that this 
trend is much more pronounced amongst the 18-24 year olds groups, 24.8 per cent of 
whom reported no identification in 2005 compared to 6.5 per cent in 1992, a rise of 
almost 20 per cent in the same period.  
 
Table 7.3 Respondents reporting no party identification 1964-2005 by age 
 1964  1966 1970 
  
1974F 
 
1974O  1979  1983  1987  1992  1997  2001 2005 
             
Aged 18-
24 4 0 8 4 5 11 8 9 7 13 19 25 
All Adults 3 3 5 4 4 6 5 5 5 7 11 16 
 
Source: British Election Survey data 
 
Clearly those with a strong sense of partisanship have become fewer since 1970. The 
evidence supports the theory advanced at the beginning of the chapter that working 
class respondent’s partisanship was particularly damaged during the Thatcher years. It 
also supports the idea that the period between 1992 and 2001, had a damaging effect 
and that this was particularly pronounced among younger people yet to acquire a sense 
of partisanship.  
 
(C) Political Knowledge 
 
Of the three variables supporting the hypotheses; political knowledge is perhaps the 
most difficult to measure. This in part stems from the reluctance of those designing 
social surveys to include questions which respondents may not want to answer and 
which might make them increasingly reluctant to answer further questions. Another 
difficulty is that in surveys such as the BES knowledge questions have varied from year 
to year making a comparison of scores over time unreliable. It is possible to calculate, 
for example, the number of respondents in a demographic category who scored over 50 
per cent in the political knowledge quiz and compare this between 1992 and 2001, but 
this is problematic as it would mean comparing answers to different questions.  
The Young People’s Social Attitudes Surveys carried out in 1994, 1998 and 2003 
charts the attitudes of teenagers between the ages of 12 and 19 and includes a small 
battery of political knowledge questions. Table 7.4 reports the findings of the 
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knowledge quiz. The results are not conclusive. The differences between 1994 and 1998 
on the question on European elections almost certainly stem from there having been 
European elections during the fieldwork for the 1994 survey (Park 2000), and the 
question is not included in the 2003 survey. We also might have expected a rise in 
knowledge scores in 1998 given the proximity of the fieldwork to the 1997 election. In 
addition, with regard to the question on women sitting in the House of Lords: we may 
attribute the low score here in 2003 to a general awareness of lords reform, but a lack of 
knowledge of the detail causing more wrong answers. These issues highlight the 
problems of measuring political knowledge.  
 
Table 7.4 Political knowledge amongst teenagers 1994-1998 
 
% who gave correct answer 1994 1998 2003 
    
Great Britain is a member of the EU (true) 84 81 79 
Northern Ireland is part of the UK (true) 76 75 71 
Women are not allowed to sit in the Lords (false) 66 67 12 
Britain has separate elections for the European and British parliaments (true) 65 50  
The longest time allowed between general elections is four years (false) 19 21 54 
    
% of correct answers    
    
4 or 5 answers 43 30 - 
3 answers 30 38 - 
2 answers 16 22 - 
0 or 1 answer correct 11 10 - 
 
Source: Park (2000:28) and Young People’s Social Attitudes Survey 2003.  
 
Park’s (2000) analysis, limited to the 1994 and 1998 data shows that in 1994 older 
teenagers were significantly more knowledgeable than younger ones, but by 1998 this 
difference had all but vanished. Park puts this down to a substantial fall in knowledge 
among the older age group – those approaching voting age. This difference was evident 
even after excluding the question about the difference between European and British 
elections (Park 2000). But perhaps the most important finding of Park’s analysis was 
that she was able to identify a cohort of teenagers whose knowledge had not increased 
with age. Significantly, this group were all born between 1979 and 1982. Amongst this 
cohort; the proportion of 12-15 year olds who gave three or more correct answers in 
1994 actually dropped as they were asked for a second time, aged 16-19. After four 
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years and one general election, according to these measures, there was no growth in 
political knowledge amongst this cohort (Park 2000). The pattern is similar if we follow 
those 12-15 year olds in 1998. We find that there was also a small drop in knowledge 
scores as they were asked for a second time, aged 16-19, in 2003. Park’s regression 
analysis of the social characteristics predicting political knowledge shows that class was 
the most significant factor.  
Whilst the evidence is somewhat inconclusive we can add to the evidence we 
have by asking a slightly different question to the one originally posed. We know that 
information and knowledge are part of the same equation. Delli Carpini and Keeter 
(1996) define political knowledge as ‘...the range of factual information about political 
that is stored in the long-term memory’. By focusing on political information rather than 
political knowledge we are simply bypassing ‘knowing’ what is actually stored, and 
supplanting it with what is available to be stored, and by observing the habits which 
enable us to make conclusions about which information individuals are likely to be 
storing.2 One might argue that there is no way of knowing for sure what a person 
decides, consciously or unconsciously, to store, but by observing how media 
environments and consumption habits have changed we can make reasonably reliable 
conclusions. I shall return to this in question five where the focus will be on the 
changing media environment young people are exposed to. 
 
7.5 Question 3: What evidence is there that partisan identification and trade union 
membership (working class social capital) are predictors of political knowledge? 
 
I have so far shown that there is strong, if not conclusive evidence that working class 
social networks; levels of partisanship; as well as levels of political knowledge have 
declined in the period between 1979 and 2001. If we can demonstrate that partisanship 
and associational activity are good predictors of political knowledge this will increase 
an understanding of how these variables are linked. It seems intuitive to suspect that 
those with a psychological tie to a political party have that tie at least partly based on 
some sense that their political values are reflected by a party. This implies a degree of 
knowledge of these values. In the same sense involvement in associational activity 
implies a sense of what that activity means, the value of being involved as well as a 
                                                          
2
 Delli Carpini and Keeter go into much more detail about what can accurately be described as political 
knowledge. 
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level of knowledge about the other people involved in that activity. All of which points 
to a wider civic knowledge than I am able to test here. But using the available political 
knowledge questions we can at least examine part of the wider picture.  
 To establish whether partisanship and trade union membership / activity have 
influenced levels of political knowledge I create a political knowledge scale from the 
political questions asked in the BES 2001. This is the main dependent variable in the 
regression model below. One difficulty is that, as mentioned earlier, the absence of 
political knowledge questions in the datasets prior to 1992 means that we are unable to 
test the theory prior to this time. The theory suggests that partisan identity and group 
membership have been key linkages between working class people and their politics, so 
testing this over a longer period would have been ideal. However, as the key changes in 
turnout occurred in the period between 1992 and 2001, and the most notable changes in 
2001, we are justified in conducting an analysis using the 2001 data. In order to test the 
relative importance of a range of explanatory variables, the model includes education, 
which we would expect to have an impact on political knowledge, as well as other 
demographic control variables. The model then includes the main types of media usage 
through which voters are known to acquire their information about politics: newspapers 
and television. In stage three I include, to address the research question, partisan 
identification and strength of partisan identification to estimate the additional benefits 
these bring to the predictive ability of the model. In stage four I add trade union 
membership and being active in a voluntary association. The model is specified as 
follows: 
 
Political knowledge = education+gender+ethnicity+marital status+newspaper 
readership+tv news+partisanship+trade union activity 
 
Dependent variable: political knowledge is a derived variable from the BES 2001 
political knowledge quiz. The quiz consists of five true/false questions. A political 
knowledge scale was created by coding correct answers as 1 and incorrect answers as 0 
and computing the variables to form one political knowledge scale with a minimum 
value of 0 and a maximum of 5.  
 
Independent variables: 
Education summary: recoded as 0=no educational qualifications, 1= educational 
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qualifications 
 
Gender: recoded as 1=female, 2=male 
Ethnicity: recoded as 1=other, 2=white British 
Marital status: recoded as 0=other, 1=married or cohabiting 
 
Read a daily morning newspaper: recoded as 0=no, 1=yes 
Number of days a week watches TV news: recoded scale 1-7 days 
Partisan identification: recoded as 0=no, 1=yes 
Strength of partisan identity: recoded 0=none, 1=not very strong, 2=fairly strong, 
3=very strong.  
Trade union membership: recoded 0=no, 1=yes 
Active in a voluntary association: recoded 0=no, 1=a little, 2=fairly, 3=very 
 
Table 7.5 Predictors of political knowledge in 2001 by class 
     
Working class Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
 Beta Beta Beta Beta 
     
Education 0.041 0.091 0.109 0.067 
Gender 0.21* 0.21** 0.212** 0.231** 
Ethnicity 0.164 0.185 0.198 0.172* 
Maritial status -0.020 -0.057 -0.052 -0.021 
Read Morning newspaper  0.082 0.112 0.319 
Days a week watch TV news  .397*** .347*** 0.134*** 
Party Identification   0.247** .249** 
Strength of PID   -0.020 -0.052 
Trade union membership    -0.054 
Active in voluntary association   2.271* 
     
R square 0.07 0.243 0.299 0.351 
N 750 750 750 750 
     
     
Middle class Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
 Beta Beta Beta Beta 
     
Education 0.069 0.086 0.087 0.033 
Gender 0.239** 0.254*** 0.251** 0.212** 
Ethnicity 0.145* 0.156* 0.162* 0.184 
Marital status -0.018 -0.040 -0.042 -0.046 
Read Morning newspaper  -0.096 -0.089 0.156 
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Days a week watch TV news  0.157* 0.157* -0.099* 
Party Identification   -0.062 -0.071 
Strength of PID   0.023 -0.018 
Trade union membership    0.091 
Active in voluntary association   0.078 
     
R square 0.094 0.121 0.125 0.162 
N 1024 1024 1024 1024 
     
 
Table 7.5 summarises the results of the regression analysis. For both middle class and 
working class groups men were more likely to have high levels of political knowledge 
than women, perhaps reflecting the male oriented British political environment. Being 
white British was also associated with higher levels of political knowledge than the ‘all 
other groups’ category, but this was only significant among the middle class 
respondents. Marital status and education had no significant predictive impact on either 
group. Perhaps surprisingly, reading a morning newspaper has no significant effect for 
either group. As question five will address, below, newspaper readership has 
traditionally been associated with high levels of political knowledge. We might in part 
explain this by noting the trend of declining newspaper readership and the increasing 
reliance on television for information. This is supported by the coefficients for the 
number of days a weeks respondents reporting watching television news. The 
coefficient suggests that whilst significant for both class groups, television is more 
important as a source of political information to working class people than to middle 
class people. This is a significant finding in itself and will be an important part of the 
discussion about changing media habits in question five.  
 In relation to the research question: what evidence is there that partisan 
identification and trade union membership are good predictors of working class 
political knowledge?, Table 5 suggests that partisan identification is an important 
predictor as theorised. We can see that the coefficient indicates that there is an increase 
in political knowledge for working class respondents who report identifying with a 
political party. This is strengthened by the absence of a significant effect in the middle 
class group. Given that we know that the proportion of the population with very strong 
partisan identity has declined (see Table 7.2) we might have expected strength of party 
identity to be stronger in the model. However, we can see that identifying with a party is 
significant. This is important as we can see that whilst overall levels of partisanship 
have remained stable, at least until 1992, for younger adults there has been a significant 
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rise in those reporting no partisan identity. The model also tells us that membership 
alone of a trade union does not appear to have an impact on political knowledge for 
either class group. However, being active in a voluntary association does have a 
significant effect and whilst this does not measure activity in trade unions, specifically, 
we have already established that trade unions are a central form of working class 
associational activity and can therefore reasonably assume that it measure this. We can 
also see that controlling for a basic set of demographic variables as well as media 
variables, the model fares better for the working class group than for the middle class 
group. When fully specified it predicts around 35 per cents of the variance in political 
knowledge scores for working class respondents, but around half of this for the middle 
class respondents. This evidence shows that, at least in 2001, partisanship and trade 
union activity were good predictors of political knowledge. Although care is needed 
when making conclusions based on this limited evidence, given that we know that 
partisanship and political knowledge have declined and television usage has increased, 
it is not a huge jump to conclude that television has an increasingly important influence 
on working class levels of political o knowledge.  
 
7.6 Question 4: What evidence is there that factors (lack of electoral competition, 
valence judgements and ideological convergence) associated with the political period 
1979-2001 exacerbated the civic disengagement of working class young people? 
 
The aim of answering this research question is to understand the political period young 
people socialised in the 1980s and 1990s were exposed to and how it might have 
impacted on their political characteristics. Butler and Stokes (1969) emphasised the 
importance of socialisation processes by arguing that in the ‘impressionable years’, 
when young, voters are influenced by the party loyalties of their families. In this period 
the decision to vote and who to vote for was, at least to some extent, removed from the 
election context. But as we have seen partisan dealignment has meant that the 
generation of young people who came of voting age around 1990 or after were among 
the first not to have received a strong sense of partisan identification from their parents. 
I argue that this left them particularly susceptible in their ‘impressionable years’ to the 
impact of the political period and their formative electoral experiences.   
If parental values and loyalties were crucial long-term influences on voting 
behaviour in the era of aligned politics, then in the era of dealigned politics, the crucial 
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influences are those associated with the political period. Franklin (2004) argues that in 
order to understand turnout we need to understand the character of elections not just the 
characteristics of voters. In an era of dealignment the argument that voters are 
increasingly affected by elections has an intuitive appeal, particularly, as I will discuss 
below, when we consider the specifics of the elections in question between 1992 and 
2001. Perhaps the main reason we should be concerned with the character of elections is 
Franklin (2004) provides strong evidence that voting is a habit. Voters either acquire the 
habit of voting or of non-voting based on their experience of their first few elections. 
Elections that fail to stimulate a high turnout such as 1997 and 2001 threaten, according 
to Franklin, to leave a ‘footprint’ of low turnout as individuals who have their first 
electoral experiences at these elections, fail to vote in subsequent elections.  
 With this in mind it is reasonable to argue that it is particularly important to 
understand the period in which recent generations were socialised. I have examined 
some of the long-term changes that appear to be particularly relevant, but it is also 
crucial to investigate how the character of the elections between 1979 and 2001 may 
have shaped voters characteristics. One of the critical aspects of the period between 
1979 and 2001 is that it was one of political hegemony, where one political party 
remained in power for a considerable period. Between 1979 and 2001 there was only 
one change of party in government, despite there having been five opportunities for 
change. The cumulative effect of the five elections between 1979 and 2001 may have 
been that voters, particularly young voters, saw little point in turning out to vote. As  
 
Table 7.6 Average Lead in Final Polls 1945-2001 
 
1945 6 
1950 1 
1951 5 
1955 4 
1959 3 
1964 2 
1966 10 
1970 3 
1974Feb 4 
1974Oct 9 
1979 5 
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1983 20 
1987 8 
1992 1 
1997 16 
2001 14 
 
Table 7.6 shows, prior to 1979, an average final poll lead of over 10 per cent had not 
been witnessed. But the period between 1979 and 2001 produced three elections with an 
average poll lead of over 14 per cent. And of the remaining two, the 1992 election failed 
to produce the Labour victory that many, particularly working class voters had hoped 
for after the hugely unpopular poll tax. These figures suggest one reason that it would 
be unsurprising to find negative attitudes towards voting amongst those who came of 
age in this period and is supported by research showing the one of the key reasons 
young people are apathetic about conventional politics is that is it seen as 
‘unresponsive’ (e.g., Bentley et al 1999; White et al 2000). 
 
Valence politics and the youth of the 1990s 
 
A second set of factors to emerge from this period relate to the role of what has been 
termed ‘valence politics’ – that is the ability of a given government to perform in the 
areas most valued by the electorate. In Britain the valence issue par excellence is the 
economy, but central to the valence model is the notion that evaluations of party leaders 
provide voters with a shortcut to a political party’s policy competence. Butler and 
Stokes (1969) distinguished between ‘valence issues’ and ‘position issues’, the former 
being those where voters identify with leaders dependent of the goals or symbols they 
uphold or represent. Clarke et al (2004) developed a valence model of political choice to 
explain modern voting behaviour. Their analysis found that whilst these valence 
judgements were important to the modern voter, partisanship remained highly 
significant. In order to encompass partisanship and valence considerations which at first 
seem at odds, Clarke et al (2004: 211) argue that partisanship can be reconceptualised as 
a ‘storehouse of accumulated party and party leader performance evaluations’. Deep 
rooted psychological identifications are replaced by judgements of how parties appear 
to be performing.  
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 Given the decline in traditional voter loyalties and the context of the political 
period, a valence model of political choice certainly seems consistent with what we 
know about youth attitudes and participation in the 1990s. There are at least two types 
of evaluations prospective young voters were likely to have made in this period. The 
first concerns Margaret Thatcher’s distinctive style of political leadership. In 1979 
Thatcher replaced negotiation and compromise with direction and leadership and 
reasserted the authority of the core executive over organised interests and the public 
sector (Crewe 1992c). This was at least in part a reflection of the views held by many 
Conservatives at the time as to the way previous governments had been held to account 
by the trade unions. In policy making Thatcher bypassed cabinet and worked through 
small groups of personal staff. It was the breakdown of relations with senior cabinet 
ministers in 1989 and 1990 which eventually precipitated her downfall in November 
1990. One image of politicians voters socialised in the 1980s and 1990s seem to have 
received was of unresponsive leaders who make decisions without consultation. As 
mentioned above, a common explanation given for young people for their 
disengagement from formal politics is that politicians don’t care what they think and are 
unresponsive to their needs (e.g., Bentley 1999; White et al 2000). A second image 
these voters may have been exposed to was one of opposition arrogance. Neil Kinnock 
epitomised this at the Labour Party’s Sheffield rally, proclaiming that ‘in nine days 
Britain is going to have a Labour government’ (Butler and Kavanagh 1992: 126). But 
Labour went on to lose the election, despite the Conservatives being hugely unpopular.  
Another image may have been taken from the contrasting styles of leadership of 
Margaret Thatcher and John Major. The country went from having a leader who, by the 
time of her downfall, was hugely unpopular, particularly for the poll tax which she had 
been seen to push through without regard for widespread opposition. In contrast John 
Major was perceived by many as a non-dynamic and old fashioned looking prime 
minister who many saw to be a weak leader (Butler and Kavanagh 1992). If the Major 
government was evaluated on policy grounds, electors had a number of examples 
through which their negative perceptions of politicians may have been fuelled in this 
period, perhaps the most prominent of these being ‘Black Wednesday’ when in 
September 1992 the Conservative government was forced to withdraw the Pound 
Sterling from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) after they were unable to 
keep sterling above its agreed lower limit.  
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In terms of the evaluation of leaders and leading figures in the government, it is 
reasonable to suspect that the1990s could have had a crucial impact on the public’s 
perceptions of politicians and political parties. Firstly, in the period between 1992 and 
1997 there were a number of incidents  of reported sleaze and policy incompetence and 
there were more ministerial resignations than in any previous parliament that century 
(Butler and Kavanagh 1997). These resignations were all the more likely to have been 
damaging to the government and to voters perceptions because only three of the fifteen 
were policy related, the remainder were over personal conduct. Moreover, few of these 
were seen to resign with much dignity and most resigned only after pressure from 
public opinion and the 1922 committee (Butler and Kavanagh 1997). Given the 
importance of television as a source of information, the fact that the televising of 
parliament began in 1990, meant that those receiving their formative impressions of 
politics and politicians were far more likely than any previous generation to have been 
exposed to these political events.  
What then were the attitudes of young adults growing up in the period towards 
political parties, but particularly to political leaders and is there any evidence that 
valence evaluations may have an important component in the shaping of a generation’s 
attitudes towards politics? A common theme to emerge from White, Bruce and Ritchie’s 
(1999) research based on a series of focus groups and interviews of young people aged 
between 14 and 24 in the 1990s was the belief amongst young people that politicians are 
untrustworthy. One of the most recurrent statements in their focus groups was that 
politicians lied and failed to keep their promises In addition, media reporting of political 
scandals left the impression that politicians were hypocritical: on the one hand 
advocating good behaviour, but on the other behaving badly themselves. They 
consistently referred to sleaze and scandals reported in the media as evidence of 
politician’s bad characters. This image of sleaze and dishonesty also featured strongly in 
Marsh et al’s (2007) more recent focus groups. A common theme running though the 
groups that young people perceive politicians to be dishonest and remote from their 
interests.  
 
I think young people are very suspicious of MPs…I mean, we’ve grown up in the 
era of sleaze…..Credibility is the real problem for politicians 
 Female, University student, 20, white (Source: Marsh et al 2007: 103) 
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This contextual evidence from focus groups supports the notion that young people were 
negatively affected by a period of political sleaze. Whilst it is impossible to assign cause 
to a particular political period, and clearly we cannot be sure that these types of views 
pass the ‘reliability’ test, being representative of British young people, but this evidence 
supports my contention that this generation may have been particularly affected by the 
political period in which they received their first images of politics and politicians. The 
focus group examples above are also supported by more representative survey studies 
that all find negative attitudes towards politicians amongst young people socialised in 
this era (e.g. Harrison and Diecke 2002; Henn et al 2002, 2005; Park 2005). But, of 
course it is hardly surprising to find negative attitudes towards politicians amongst the 
young. We know that young people tend to have lower participation rates and are less 
interested in politics than older people. We would need reliable time series data to make 
conclusions about changing attitudes as the result of a political period. But there is a 
strong prima-facie case, given what we know about the political period and the long-
term decline in traditional loyalties that it has impacted on a generation’s politics.  
 
Ideological convergence and perceived differences between the political parties 
 
A third factor commonly cited in the youth literature as a reason that young people tend 
not to vote, which is supportive of theoretical position advanced at the beginning of the 
chapter, is that they are unable to see any meaningful difference between the political 
parties. Of course, somewhat ironically changes in the ideological positions of political 
parties are to a large extent a rational response by political parties trying to catch the 
median voter in an era where traditional loyalties to parties have been eroded. Political 
parties have had to adapt to the decline in class and partisan voting by becoming more 
‘catch-all’ in their electoral strategies. Both of the main political parties in Britain learnt 
from their respective positions in relation to the media voter since the 1970s. Firstly, 
Labour under pressure from its activists shifted left in the 1980s and were punished by 
the electorate in 1983. In the late 1990s the Conservatives moved to the right of the 
median voter limiting their appeal.  
In more recent elections Budge and Bara (2001) using party manifesto data 
show that after Labour’s shift right in the mid 1990s the ideological distance between 
the two parties was very narrow. This is reflected in the specific party positions of 
Labour and Conservatives in the 2001 general election. Budge and Bara (2001) show 
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that all the parties had a common focus on government effectiveness as well as 
education, social services and law and order. Whilst we might expect these to be key 
issues in any party manifesto, the finding that the emphasis in all party manifestos was 
so similar underlines the point that the main parties have converged since the mid 
1990s.  
 British elections survey data analysis confirms what we might expect that 
voter’s perceptions of the differences between political parties have moved in tandem 
with these changes. Table 7.7 below shows that the number of people who were able to 
see a great deal of difference between the political parties fell after 1992 and those who 
saw not much difference between them rose. Two age groups were merged here in order 
increase the number of respondents in each category. Perhaps the most important 
difference, at least as far as age is concerned, appears when we split the 18-24 year olds 
from the 25-34 year olds in 2001. This reduces the number of cases, but shows the 
difference between the ages. Only 17 per cent of 18-24 year olds were able to seen any 
difference between the parties in 2001.  
 
Table 7.7 Perceived difference between the Conservative and Labour parties 1979-
2001 by age 
  1979   1983   1987  
          
 18-34 35-54 55+ 18-34 35-54 55+ 18-34 35-54 55+ 
             
Great deal 40 47 50 78 87 82 80 86 84 
Some 33 27 25 14 8 9 14 9 9 
Not much 23 29 22 6 4 8 5 4 5 
             
N 600 674 603 1303 1349 1283 1167 1340 1288 
          
          
  1992   1997   2001  
          
 18-34 35-54 55+ 18-34 35-54 55+ 18-34 35-54 55+ 
             
Great deal 48 57 55 24 34 37 223 26 26 
Some 37 29 26 51 41 38 52 43 43 
Not much 11 12 15 21 22 23 18 27 29 
             
N 1055 1304 1183 1001 1280 978 400 818 716 
 
Source: British Election Survey data 
                                                          
3
 Any aggregation of age groups is likely to mask some important differences between them. Here, the 
figure for 18-24 year olds is significantly lower (17 per cent) than for the combined 18-24, 25-34 group.  
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Whilst the traditional anchors to political support have declined and forced parties 
towards ‘catch-all’ policy programmes and professionalisation, these responses appear 
to have alienated new voters, who, in the absence of traditional motivations to vote, 
require the incentives provided by differences in ideology, policy and by competitive 
elections to encourage them to vote.  
Earlier I discussed the paradox of voting, arguing that the paradox could perhaps 
best be answered by arguing that voters never made purely rational decisions. Whilst 
the lack of any pivotal influence for each individual vote makes the act of voting 
somewhat irrational; this can be explained by understanding long-term party 
attachments which anchored voters and increased their likelihood of voting, whether 
rational or not. I previously suggested that in the absence of these traditional anchors it 
has become increasingly rational for voters, particularly those young people who have 
not acquired the ‘habit’ of voting, not to vote. The argument is strengthened if we add to 
the equation what we know about the political period. As discussed earlier, in these 
circumstances, if young people are offered no discernible choice between the political 
parties and when elections are seen as foregone conclusions, there appears to be little 
reason for them to vote. In addition, they were exposed, in their formative years to a 
period of alleged unprecedented level of ministerial incompetence and personal 
misconduct (Butler and Kavanagh 1997). Perhaps most crucially, however, is that this 
period saw dramatic changes in the way politics was reported. Parliament was first 
televised in 1990 which meant that these negative images were for the first time 
witnessed through the medium of television.  
 
Question 5: If young people are increasingly reliant on the media for political 
information how has the media environment they are exposed to and the media they are 
consuming changed?  
 
Earlier in the chapter I provided evidence that both partisanship and associational 
activity have declined most among working class young people in Britain. I also 
provided some evidence that one reason for falling levels of political knowledge among 
working class young people is that they are less endowed with the civic knowledge 
integral to group membership and partisanship. Whilst it is probably impossible to 
establish exactly what kinds of civic knowledge, partisanship and associational activity 
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previous generations were bestowed with, I contend that in the relative absence of these 
civic orienting stimuli – young people are increasingly susceptible to other influences. 
Moreover, these ‘other’ sources have become their main sources of information. This 
being the case it is important to understand the media environment young people are 
exposed to today. Denver (2003) argues that the decline in partisan identification was 
mirrored by a changing media environment. This is crucial because we know that at 
least until the 1950s there was a close configuration between the party system and the 
media system (Ibid). 
A starting point for investigating this research question is to look at trends in 
newspaper readership as there is good evidence that those who regularly read a daily 
newspaper tend to have higher levels of political knowledge (e.g., Norris et al 1999). 
The massive growth in television since the 1950s followed by an even more 
sophisticated electronic media environment has led to the slow death of newspaper 
readership in Britain. Table 7.5 illustrates the decline in newspaper readership in 
Britain. We can see that twenty years ago over three quarters of people regularly read a 
daily morning newspaper, whereas in 2002 the figure had dropped to just over half. The 
figures are similar for 18-24 year olds.  
 
Table 7.8 Percentage reading a daily morning newspaper at least 3 times a week 
1983-2002 
 
 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 
           
All age groups 77 73 73 73 71 70 68 65 62 61 
18-24 year 
olds 70 73 73 75 68 67 64 56 52 50 
          
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
          
All age groups 62 59 61 60 56 57 53 54 53 
18-24 year 
olds 51 51 49 49 47 51 47 55 46 
 
Source: British Social Attitudes data 
 
Declining newspaper readership has caused widespread concern because in a 
democratic society it is assumed that the news media can best fulfil their functions if 
there is a rich and pluralistic information environment that is easily accessible to all 
citizens (Norris 2000). Wattenberg (2007) examines United States trends in newspaper 
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readership, demonstrating that over recent decades, each new cohort of young people 
entering the electorate has been less and less likely to have developed the habit of 
reading a daily newspaper. This emphasis on acquiring a ‘habit’ of newspaper 
readership is crucial and consistent with the general vein of argument through the thesis. 
I have argued elsewhere that, if as Franklin (2004) contends, voting has a strong 
habitual element, we might reasonably suspect that other activities also have this 
‘learnt’ element. And this is the key point that Wattenberg (2007) argues in his chapter 
on newspaper readership: ‘reading a newspaper every day is a habit that, once acquired, 
is generally continued throughout one’s lifetime, and for most people such a routine 
either is, or is not developed by the time a person reaches voting age. What has 
happened in recent years is that relatively few young adults have picked up this habit.’ 
(Wattenberg 2007:10).  
 Wattenberg’s analysis of American trends reveals a clear generational dimension 
to the decline in daily newspaper readership. Since the beginning of the television age, 
new generations have been less and less likely to report reading a newspaper everyday. 
If increasing competition from television is the principal reason for declining newspaper 
readership in America, then we might, as Wattenberg suggests, expect similar trends 
throughout much of the world. Looking back at Table 7.8 above, the evidence suggests 
that recent cohorts of 18-24 year olds have been significantly less likely than their older 
counterparts to report reading a daily newspaper. Whilst it is impossible to account for 
all the intervening factors that  may accelerate or decelerate the trend of declining 
newspaper readership, the evidence suggest that, as in America, if this trend continues 
unabated, comparatively few people will be reading newspapers on a daily basis in fifty 
years time.  
 Why then does this matter? If new generations of young people are simply 
receiving their political information from alternative sources then what reasons should 
we be concerned? We know that despite the continuing advance of the internet, 
television remains the principal source of political information for most people in 
Britain (Semetko 2000: Pattie et al 2004: Hyland 2007). Moreover, we know that young 
people get most of their information about politics from television (Harrison and Diecke 
2000; Russell 2002). We also know that there were significant changes in the structure 
of the television environment during the Thatcher era; the result of which the cohorts 
socialised in the 1980s and 1990s were the first to be exposed to. 
 Broadcast signals were first relayed though cable to improve radio reception in 
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the 1920s. By the 1950s, nearly 1 million homes across Britain received their radio on 
programmes by wire. The first British cable television system was installed in 
Gloucester in 1951 and the following two decades saw massive rises in subscription to 
cable television, jumping tenfold between 1956 and 1961 to 554,700 and to over 2.5 
million by 1973 (13.8 per cent of those with a television) (Tracey 1998). But whilst the 
Heath government of the early 1970s was keen to push ahead with the development of 
cable television, the new Labour government of 1974 was far less enthusiastic, setting 
up the Annan Committee to look at the future of broadcasting. But in the following 
decade the Thatcher government, motivated by technological advancement and 
modernisation set up the Information Technology Unit within the cabinet office to 
promote the use of IT within government as well as the Information Technology 
Advisory Panel (ITAP) consisting of leading members of IT industries. Its first report 
laid the path for the development of cable and satellite technology in Britain (Tracey 
1998). The Broadcasting Act of 1990 represented the most significant transformation of 
the character of British broadcasting since the 1920s. In more recent years there has 
been a huge jump in the proportion of households that receive a digital television and 
who as a result have access to a wider range of television channels. Digital television 
usage increased, from 19 per cent in 1996/97 to 65 per cent in 2005/06 (ONS 2007).  
The replacement of public broadcasting channels with private commercial 
channels fuelled widespread concern that the tradition of broadcasting for the public 
good and combining entertainment with informational programmes would disappear. 
Concern about the commercialisation of the media is hardly new and as far back as the 
1940s authors were expressing concern about the “social effects” of different types of 
ownership (Lazersfeld and Merton 1948: 108). One of the key concerns about a 
changing television environment is the move away from a broad appeal programming 
environment, where viewers would be exposed, in their period of television viewing, to 
political news; to one where they are able to avoid politics altogether. The plethora of 
‘narrow appeal’ channels mean that audiences are more likely to tune in to programmes 
they are interested in and tune out from ones they are not. This is of particular concern 
if we take Wattenberg’s (2007) argument that media usage is ‘habitual’ because it 
strongly implies that young people who have not developed the habit of reading 
newspapers or watching political news, now have the choice to avoid it altogether. Such 
an insulation from politics, although difficult to prove with any reliability here, would 
be consistent with the findings of the data analysis that low levels of political 
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knowledge have played a critical role in shaping an electorally disengaged generation. It 
is also consistent in time; trends in turnout, declining political knowledge and social 
capital would all appear to be consistent with what we have found about the political 
period.  
The first television related argument is the ‘time argument’ which posits that 
television competes for scarce time resources and draws people away from more 
meaningful and socially constructive activity. The argument centres on the amount of 
time that people spend watching television.  Putnam (1995, 2000) placed a large portion 
of the blame for the decline in civic life in America on television. He identifies three 
ways in which television watching is likely to inhibit civic engagement. It competes for 
scarce time; it has psychological effects that inhibit social participation and specific 
programmatic content on television undermines civic motivations (Putnam 2000: 237). 
Critics of the video-malaise thesis have argued that empirical evidence about the alleged 
negative effects of the amount of television watching reveal only weak significant 
effects (Uslaner 1998; Newton 1999; Bennett et al. 1999; Norris 2000a, 2000b). 
The second argument focuses on the changing television environment argues 
that the shift from the broad appeal television associated with the broadcasting era of 
television (roughly 1950-1990 in Britain) to a narrow appeal commercialised television 
(post 1990), has meant that people are no longer exposed to a diet of programmes which 
include news and good quality information shows. Instead, ‘narrow appeal’ channels 
focus on specific interest for example music, sport, cartoons and when the particular 
type of programme that the viewer has chosen is interrupted, he or she is able simply to 
choose from a multitude of other channels of interest. What this means for a generation 
of young people who are not used to consuming news, is that they are the most likely 
group to avoid exposure to news altogether. Norris (2001) found that there are 
significant differences in levels of political knowledge between those watching 
commercial television when compared to public television. Whilst public broadcasting 
is said to stimulate civic attitudes, the proliferation of commercial channels show a 
tendency to broadcast totally different kinds of programs resulting in less civic minded 
value patterns among its audience (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995; Tracey 1998; Holtz-
Bacha and Norris 2001) and marked differences in value patterns when compared to 
those of people preferring public broadcasting stations (Holmberg 1999; Elchardus, 
Huyse and Hooghe 2001).  
Wattenberg (2007) found that young Europeans are now much less likely than 
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their elders to watch television news. With cable/satellite news included there is an 
overall bias towards an older audience for television news in Europe. As the number of 
channels to choose from has increased, younger people have been the ones least likely 
to choose the news (Ibid). Research by Ofcom, the government watchdog in Britain has 
echoed these finding showing that 16 to 24 year olds now watch less than 40 hours of 
television news a year, compared with around 90 hours a year for the wider population 
(Ofcom 2007).  
  
Table 7.9 Sources of news for 18-24 year olds 
 
Source of News 1st mention (18-
24 year olds) 1991 2001 
   
   
TV 66 80 
Radio 10 5 
Newspapers 22 12 
Internet n/a 1.2 
   
N 202 234 
 
Source: Television: the publics view data: 1991 and 2001. 
 
But as Table 7.9 shows, those reporting TV as their first source of news is rising, the 
clear implication being that young people are simply not getting much information. This 
presents an interesting and important research question. We know from the data analysis 
and from the preceding discussion that knowledge is an important predictor of voter 
turnout. It is reasonable to suspect it is likely to be linked to wider civic engagement.  
 
A multivariate model of turnout, 2001 
 
If young people are receiving a greater proportion of their political information from 
television but are watching less television news; what types of programmes do they 
receive their political information from? The evidence presented above strongly 
supports the contention in the theoretical model advanced in Chapter six and elaborated 
in the introduction to this chapter. In order to subject the theory to a more rigorous 
examination, below I re-operationalise the general incentives model specified in 
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Chapter six, which had the strongest predictive power of the set of models tested. In 
order to tease out the effects of partisanship and political knowledge on propensity to 
vote of this generation I combine 18-24 and 25-34 year olds in the 2001 data set. There 
are two good reasons for doing this, one theoretical and one methodological. Firstly this 
group constitute ‘Thatcher’s children’ and ‘Blair’s Babies’, but who might more aptly 
be defined as the ‘post-partisan generation’. Whilst it is possible that there are 
significant differences between the groups not explored in detail in this thesis, the 
theory advanced clearly views them as having more common characteristics in terms of 
their attitudinal and participatory traits, than they have significant differences, as far as 
the antecedents of voting are concerned. The second reason for this decision is that the 
general incentives model is already composed of a relatively large number of variable 
sand with each increase in the number of variables included in the model, the number of 
missing cases rises.  
 For the pooled group of 18-34 year olds, the general incentives model correctly 
predicts the voting behaviour of 81.2 per cent in 2001. The psuedo R square statistics 
tell us that between 37 and 50 per cent of the variance in whether respondents voted or 
not can be explained by this set of variables. A number of variables relating to time 
pressures felt by respondents and consideration of the importance of voting both for 
individuals themselves and for democracy as a whole were important predictors, as in 
the model specified and tested in Chapter six with the two age groups separated.   
 At the next block of the regression procedure the hypothesised central 
importance of strength of partisanship and political knowledge is tested by adding to the 
general incentives model the strength of partisanship variable included in the civic 
voluntarism model and the six political knowledge variables included in the cognitive 
mobilisation model in Chapter six. The summary statistics of the predictive power of 
the model in Table 9, below, show that adding these variables significantly increases the 
models predictive power, boosting the percentage of those correctly classified to almost 
85 per cent. The Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke psuedo R square statistics show that the 
proportion of the variance in the decision to vote improves, increasing to between 
almost 46 to 62 per cent. Three of the six questions measuring political knowledge 
remain statistically significant when controlling for the battery of variables included in 
the general incentives model. Two are significant at the 0.01** level, increasing the 
likelihood that respondents will vote by up to two times if they answered the knowledge 
questions correctly.  
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Table 7.10 Generational model of political participation  
 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Overall classification 81.2 84.9 87.5 88.3 
Classification of non voters 75.3 81.5 81 82.5 
Classification of voters 85.7 87.1 91.7 92 
Cox and Snell R Square .373 .459 50.9 .510 
Nagelkerke R Square  .506 .621 68.9 .690 
     
Predictor variables     
     
Political efficacy (perceived influence) .075 .125 .186 .185 
Pol activity too much time and effort .210 .559* .942** .946** 
People too busy to vote -.553** -.647** -.702** -.714** 
How do you feel about Labour .239 .273 .417* .414* 
How do you feel about Conservatives .098 .158 .166 .171 
How to you feel about LD .505*** .679*** .866*** .876*** 
Sense of satisfaction when vote .175 .109 .271 .278 
Feel guilty if do not vote -.836*** -.782*** -.736*** -.745*** 
Being active=group benefits -.214 -.250 -.122 -.104 
Voting can change Britain .085 .114 .216 .190 
It is duty to vote -.270 -.251 -.062 -.061 
Democracy works only if vote .776** .547 .364 .379 
Family/friends think voting waste of time .253 .201 .180 .150 
Most people around here voted -.258 -.319 -.836** -.821* 
     
Additional variables     
     
Political Knowledge     
     
Polling stations close at 10pm  2.149* 2.770** 2.570* 
Conservative policy never to join Euro  1.733*** 2.413** 2.426*** 
Liberal Democrats favour PR  -.806 -.737 -.807 
Minimum voting age is 16  -1.350* -1.430* -1.511* 
Unemployment fallen under Labour  .708 1.054 1.104 
Only taxpayers allowed to vote  -.087 -.310 -.320 
   
  
Strength of partisanship  .846* 1.364** 1.325** 
     
Social Capital      
     
Trust in others   -.242* -.235* 
Perceived Fairness   .383** .378** 
Asked to participate   1.665** 1.744** 
Volunteering   -3.432** -3.402** 
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Social class    -.308 
 
The model is also stronger with the variable measuring respondent’s strength of 
partisanship included, indicating that whilst partisan identification has declined 
markedly in recent years, it remains an important factor in understanding why today’s 
generation of young people are the least of all likely to vote at general elections. Each 
increase in the scale from ‘no identification’; ‘not very strong’; ‘fairly strong’; and ‘very 
strong’ boosts the chances that an individual will vote, with all other factors in the 
model controlled for.  
 At the next block, the model is further strengthened as the four variables 
operationalised to measure social capital are added. All four of these variables; 
perceived trust (0.05*); perceived fairness (0.001**); having been recruited into politics 
or community affairs (0.001**); and volunteering in politics or community affairs 
(0.001**) are statistically significant, providing strong support for the hypothesised 
effect of social capital. The power of the model in predicting turnout increases with it 
classifying 87.5 per cent of respondent’s decisions to vote, and accounting for almost 51 
and 69 per cent of the variance in turnout at this stage.  
 Finally, social class – the market research definition, as used in Chapter six – is 
added to the model to ascertain whether or not the importance of class to the 
generational, political knowledge, social capital theory is confirmed. Although the class 
variable itself is not statistically significant at the 0.05* level or better, its inclusion does 
improve the predictive power of the model which now correctly classifies 88.3 per cent 
or respondents and accounts for between 51 and 69 per cent in the variance in the 
decision to vote.  
 
7.8 Conclusions 
 
As I have argued at various points throughout the chapter, class and partisan 
dealignment are the lenses through which changing youth turnout and wider political 
participation are perhaps best viewed. Butler and Stokes model of voting identified how 
long-term attachments were formed during the ‘impressionable years’ – but as we have 
seen, these enduring attachments have been in decline since the 1970s. This chapter has 
sought to understand the salience of class, political knowledge and social capital as 
determinants of younger adults’ political decisions, within the context of partisan and 
188 
 
 
class dealignment.  
 In answering the research questions the chapter has sought to demonstrate the 
waning of class and partisanship as predictors of party choice has far from rendered 
class as defunct as a variable for understanding voting behaviour. Returning to the three 
explanations of partisan dealignment put forward by Webb (2000), I have suggested that 
the process of class secularisation whereby voters have lost a sense of class identity and 
values and have lost class cohesion, was continued by the Conservative government’s 
trade union reforms. These reforms, I argue, had a considerable impact on working class 
associative activity which was dominated by the trade unions and by working men’s 
clubs. Given the ties between the trade unions and The Labour Party we would 
reasonably suspect that declining trade union activity would lead to a drop in working 
class partisanship. There is some evidence to suggest this is the case. 
The second explanation for partisan dealignment Webb (2000) outlines is that a 
process of cognitive mobilisation amongst modern voters has rendered political parties 
obsolete. According to cognitive mobilisation theory, a vast expansion of education and 
access to television has facilitated the independence of the electorate from political 
parties (Barnes and Kaase 1979). I argue that the decline in working class social 
networks and partisanship have meant working class people are particularly susceptible 
to other influences on their voting behaviour. This is particularly important for our 
understanding of voting behaviour because Franklin’s (2004) influential work on voter 
turnout provides strong evidence that voting is habitual. I argue that recent generations 
of young people are distinctive in that they are amongst the first to have been socialised 
in an environment devoid of traditional party attachments. But they have also been 
exposed to an array of short-term factors which appear to have impacted in their 
political attitudes and participatory characteristics. These short-term factors have been 
magnified in their impact by the role of television as an information source for young 
people.  
 These changes relate to Webb’s (2000) third explanation of partisan 
dealignment: the performance of political parties. The first point I argue is that the 
period between 1979 and 2001 when the young abstainers in question received their 
political socialisation, there was little in the way of effective electoral competition 
between the political parties. Whilst this was most noticeable after New Labour’s 
general election victory in 1997, the whole period between 1979 and 2001 was one of 
political hegemony where voters saw only one change in government in over twenty 
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years. Secondly, the ideological convergence of the Labour and Conservative party’s 
post 1992 meant that many voters failed to see any difference between the political 
parties. The early chapters of the thesis provides evidence that in these circumstances, 
many older voters, those who had acquired the habit of voting, continued to vote in the 
1997 and 2001 elections, although there was a significant decline. But amongst 25-34 
year olds who had only experienced one or two previous elections and amongst first 
time voters, more than half abstained. The combination of factors arising from the 
weakening of the social anchors to voting, and the failure of political parties to respond 
to electoral defeat and to provide distinctive policy agendas appears to have turned 
many away from conventional politics. The most worrying aspect of this is that if 
voting, as Franklin (2004) argues, is an acquired habit, many of these citizens may not 
return to the ballot box as they age. 
 In the absence of traditional ties to political participation and the informational 
role of social group identities, we might wonder where citizens receive their political 
information from. Cognitive mobilisation theory implies a somewhat optimistic 
approach to understanding the combined effect of rising educational standards and a 
huge increase in the amount of political information available. It implies that quantity 
equals quality in political information. Whilst it is beyond the scope of the thesis to test 
the role of the media in civic disengagement in Britain, we have been able to show that 
the timing fits and that there is a strong case for suspecting television’s involvement in 
civic disengagement and declining voter turnout. Changes in the media environment: a 
decline in newspaper readership and an increase in television viewing, but a decline in 
television news viewing have occurred at roughly the same time as declining levels of 
political knowledge amongst young people. Having shown that knowledge is an 
important driver of turnout and that partisanship and associational activity are both 
positively related to increased levels of political knowledge, we are on reasonable 
grounds to suspect that television has, if not replaced, superseded the more subtle 
informational role of partisanship and associational activity. It is also reasonable to 
suspect that, given what we know about formative socialisation and the habitual nature 
of voting, younger people are more likely to have been affected by these changes the 
older people. But we also know that working class people, partly as a result of their 
particular patterns of associational activity are also more likely to be affected than their 
middle class counterparts.  
Inglehart (1990) classified partisans and non-partisans into two groups: those 
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who are cognitively mobilised and use their information resources to provide them with 
political cues, who do not need partisanship. And those who are not cognitively 
mobilised and rely on partisanship. Inglehart found that the percentage of sophisticated 
non-partisans in Europe had increased over a decade and that there are more of these 
sophisticated non-partisans among younger generations. The above chapter suggests 
that there is another group, at least in Britain: those who are not partisans but have not 
either been cognitively mobilised because of their social position. I would therefore 
suggest that there is a darker side to the argument. Whilst cognitive mobilisation might 
paint an accurate depiction of the role of mass education and the rise of the media we 
need to have a nuanced understanding that there are likely to remain important 
differences between social groups.  
This chapter has elaborated on the findings of the data analysis conducted in 
Chapters four and six, and a reading of the related secondary literature, a plausible 
theory of youth abstention. I recognise that the findings are tentative in nature, but argue 
that recent cohorts are susceptible and have been affected by the factors which 
characterised their political socialisation, at least in part because their psychological 
engagement with politics is weaker than that of previous generations. In the concluding 
chapter I will draw together the main findings of the thesis and make some observations 
about future research in the field as well as returning to discuss the implications of the 
findings presented in the thesis for the participationists and realist visions of democratic 
engagement.  
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusions 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
Central to this thesis has been the investigation of electoral change through the lens of 
British democracy’s youngest voters. I have suggested that this age group have a special 
place in understanding change because they are relative blank canvasses and react 
differently to political contexts or periods than older sections of the population who have 
imprinted on their lives their specific social and political experiences. These experiences 
clearly have something to do with the development of attitudinal characteristics which in 
turn impact on participation in social and political life.  
 What we know about political participation is that it has traditionally been 
conditioned by the psychological engagement with political parties which in turn has 
stemmed primarily from economic and social class positions. But it is becoming clearer that 
it is not only attachments to parties and how they have changed that is key to our 
understanding of political participation, but the attachment and engagement of individuals 
with social groups; families, neighbourhoods and communities. Whilst this thesis does not 
examine this latter point in detail it provides some indicative evidence towards this 
contention and is suggestive of the need for further research to examine the long-term 
nature of electoral change.  
 
8.2 Revisiting the research questions 
  
The central questions the thesis has sought to address are to what extent has electoral 
turnout declined amongst young people; what evidence is there of a generational effect 
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occurring in electoral turnout in Britain; and what might explain these trends? These are 
important questions for a number of reasons. First, because profound changes in political 
participation, away from electoral politics could pose serious questions for the legitimacy 
of our political system if the trend continues. Whether we come to a participationist 
conclusion that declining participation is a bad thing for democracy, or a broadly elitist one 
which might argue that it is desirable to have limited participation, observing and 
explaining trends in political participation is a key task of political science.  
 I have argued that there has been a significant contribution to our understanding of 
the changing nature of political participation by those who have identified a growing trend 
of activity in unconventional types of politics. But there is far less research on the 
relationship between conventional and unconventional activity. Related to these central 
questions, this thesis has focused solely on voting behaviour amongst young people, 
arguing that there is a significant gap in our understanding of the extent and reasons for 
young people’s disinclination to vote.  
 It is clear that these questions are of fundamental importance to the study of 
electoral change and the nature of democratic politics. Generational shifts may only occur 
very occasionally and may result in entirely new understandings of politics and new forms 
of political participation. In order to best understand what is happening in relation to 
electoral turnout the thesis has focused on why change and why change at this juncture? In 
answering this question I found that a significant proportion of the recent literature in this 
area can be viewed as a ‘participationist’ reaction to the idea that young people are 
apathetic towards politics. Denver (1997) writing just prior to the explosion of interest in 
this area pointed out that young people have always been relatively apathetic, this is 
nothing new. The response to this view is evident in much of the subsequent literature 
which has tended to argue along the lines that young people are only apathetic towards 
politics when narrowly defined and are shown to be interested and involved in politics 
when more broadly conceived (eg. Henn at al 2002; O’Toole et al 2003a, 2003b; Marsh 
2007). In identifying gaps in existing research through which to build the research 
questions for this thesis, this response seemed inadequate because the argument that young 
people are interested and involved in alternative forms of political or social activity does 
not prove they are not apathetic about conventional politics, or explain why this is the case. 
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Although it is highly likely that the two are likely to be linked, there is a lack of 
information in this area and certainly not enough to assume that participation in 
unconventional types of politics can or will replace participation in conventional forms. 
One of the reasons it is simply not possible to prove this contention is because no research 
to date has adequately ascertained whether the trajectory of new, alternative forms of 
political activity is not the opposite to that of electoral turnout, that is that it declines with 
age.  
 
8.3 Contributions made by the thesis 
 
Given the identification of this gap in the literature the thesis is able to make some valuable 
contributions to the existing work on political participation and electoral change and also 
points directly to the need for further research in this area, both to elicit and explore in 
depth the findings presented here and also to explore a range of new research questions. 
Chapter four provides a unique analysis of the trajectories of turnout for ten age cohorts. 
Whilst again making the necessary caveats with respect to the limitation of an analysis of 
pseudo cohorts in the absence of panel data and of life-cycle, period and generational 
effects, the analysis provides an original picture of the uniqueness of the most recent 
cohorts of young people’s voting behaviour. 
 Chapter four examines in detail turnout characteristics to conclude there is sufficient 
prima-facie evidence of a generational change taking place to warrant an investigation into 
why this might be the case. The turnout characteristics of cohorts 1 to 7 are generally 
supportive of the life-cycle theory of political participation, but the remaining youngest 
cohorts, those who came of voting age in 1987 and after, appear to be following a different 
pattern. Clearly there is strong evidence that this generation are unique. Their low levels of 
turnout in 1997 and 2001 are unprecedented. This represents one kind of generational effect 
as we can say for sure that they are different from their predecessors at the same stage in 
the political life-cycle. Neither is there a precedent amongst any of the age cohorts to 
recover from such low levels of turnout for these lows to be accounted for simply by life-
cycle explanations. 
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 Notwithstanding how strong the evidence appears to be, Chapter four details that it 
is impossible to attribute these electoral characteristics to a set of enduring generational 
changes until these young people age. With this important point re-stated, there are two 
further reasons to suspect the existence of a generational change from the data. The second 
reason we might suspect a generational element to turnout change is that between 1992 and 
2001 the most pronounced decline in turnout was amongst the 25-34 year olds, not the 
youngest 18-24 year olds. This is significant because according to the life-cycle explanation 
of voter turnout this is an age where we would expect turnout to begin to increase as a 
cohort ages and has more at stake in society and is encouraged to vote. Another reason is 
provided by the pseudo cohort analysis in Chapter four. Table 4.6 shows that cohort 9 
turned out at 75.3 per cent in 1992, but thereafter, at the point where we might expect it to 
increase, the experience of the period and election context meant that in 1997 the figure 
declined to 63.2 per cent and in 2001 to 54.3 per cent. According to Franklin (2004) this 
cohort is likely to maintain these habits if the 2010 election does not provide the impetus 
for an increased level of turnout.  
  A further contribution from the analysis of trends in turnout is insight into the 
paradox of voting associated with rational choice theory: why do people vote at all when 
the likelihood of their vote being pivotal to the outcome is, at best, minimal? The results of 
the data analysis suggest an answer: the paradox is best explained with reference to 
understanding partisanship as a psychological engagement with politics which meant that 
people identified with a political party and felt the duty to vote. In contrast what we see 
amongst today’s young people is the beginning of the end of this paradox. Young people 
are no longer anchored to politics in the same way as previous generations and they do not 
vote because they realise their vote is not going to make a difference to the outcome and 
because they feel that politicians do not offer them any reason to. This may shed some light 
on our understanding of the reported rise in unconventional activity. Young people 
unshackled from the psychological chains of conventional political engagement now 
rationally deduce there is no point in them voting. However, it doesn’t follow that they 
have necessarily become rational in all aspects of their participation. We might argue that, 
exposed to an increasingly consumer focused media environment, as discussed by Russell 
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(2005), their participation has mutated into that of particular demands on single issues 
concerns.  
 The second contribution the thesis makes to the existing literature on youth 
disengagement is to rigorously test a variety of established explanatory models of voter 
turnout and party choice on young voters. The approach follows Clarke et al (2004) and 
Pattie et al (2004). Clarke et al (2004) found that age was the most consistently statistically 
significant variable in their analysis. They also test for the significance of political 
generations using dummy variables for the Macmillan, Wilson/Callaghan, Thatcher and 
Blair generations finding no life-cycle effects and significant generational effects ‘with the 
decline in turnout across generations starting with people who entered the electorate during 
the Thatcher era. This pattern continued during the Blair years’ (Clarke et al 2004: 270). 
Chapter six builds on Clarke et al’s findings, probing in more detail the specific factors 
contributing to young people’s turnout. By doing so it enables the thesis to take the analysis 
of turnout decline a step further towards an understanding of generational change, as the 
factors specific to a generation are separated out from those of the whole sample. The 
contribution is highlighted by the difference in the findings of this research. Clarke et al 
argue that social capital and most of the sociological variables are of little value in 
exploring turnout over time. But by examining the age groups in detail it is possible to 
ascertain that the effects of specific variables on different age groups are masked by 
modelling the whole sample as one. Clarke et al’s central argument in relation to the 
significance of sociological variables is that they cannot account for the major changes in 
turnout ‘across successive elections, such as the massive drop that occurred between 1997 
and 2001’ (274). Both Chapter six and Chapter seven argue that it is possible to identify the 
period between 1979–2001 as one which formed the attitudes related to these declines. It is 
not possible using BES survey data to measure the underlying factors associated with 
turnout and political socialisation prior to a person’s first experience at an election with any 
accuracy. Nevertheless, it is plausible that long-term societal changes were having a 
gradual and disproportionate effect on a generation who had not yet had its first experience 
of voting and who had therefore yet to reveal its turnout or attitudinal characteristics in 
surveys. The fact that turnout declined for all age groups in 1997 and 2001 is consistent 
with this argument as it declined markedly less. I argue that this is because older portions of 
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the population were and are relatively immune to these changes as a result of their 
particular socialisation experiences which would have engendered in them enduring 
partisan anchors to voting. In contrast, those who entered the electorate for the first time 
after 1992 were amongst the first to be devoid of any party identification through which to 
mitigate specific factors associated with their pre-political socialisation as well as the 
election specific contexts of their political socialisation. This is far from conclusively 
demonstrated in this thesis, but the evidence provided is consistent with this theory and it 
points to the need for further research to examine the interaction of long and short-term 
factors on political participation.  
 The results confirm the relative importance of the variables in the general incentives 
model. Clearly the motivations to vote, or not to vote encapsulated in the general incentives 
model fare best of all those tested in the analysis. We might expect this to be the case given 
the core hypothesis relating to change. Today’s young people are least of all anchored to 
political parties through partisanship and social class affiliations and as a result their voting 
behaviour is best understood, at least partly through the prism of the various cost, benefits 
and incentives to voting which they must weigh up in deciding whether or not to vote and 
who to vote for if they do. However, the elitist/realist understanding of democracy would 
lead us to suspect that citizens may not be capable of making the most rational decisions 
when it comes to this decision. Participationists view engagement as having an educative 
function; but given that the majority of young people do not vote, or at least have not done 
so since 1992, we might consider that they have not experienced or been able to take 
advantage of the educative element of participation and that this leaves their understanding 
of politics as well as their participatory and attitudinal norms even further from their 
counterparts from previous generations.  
 A broader picture of young voter disengagement began to emerge from the results 
combined with the assumption relating to the importance of the absence of traditional 
anchors to participation. The significance of the variables in the social capital model 
suggested that the anchors to political participation provided by partisanship may not be the 
only types of socio-psychological ties which provide strong underlying motivations 
towards political engagement. The composite model operationalised in Chapter seven 
sought to combine an understanding of a combination of long-term and short-term 
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influences on voter turnout. This understanding of engagement turns cognitive mobilisation 
theory on its head because it criticises the assumption that increases in access to higher 
education means that citizens are more able to process large amounts of politically relevant 
information. The assumption that quantity equals quality is, in my view, flawed and there is 
a growing body of work suggesting this may be the case (eg. Norris 1999, 2000, 2003; 
Wattenberg 2007; Prior 2007). Having said that it seems that another contention of the 
cognitive mobilisation model may be closer to the truth – those who are more educated, 
media reliant, politically interested and knowledgeable tend to be more likely to protest. 
But, again there is a problem. Whilst it is intuitive to suspect that those more educated and 
interested are more likely to protest, especially if the core assumption of this that they are 
no longer tied to parties through partisanship is true; it assumes that rising educational 
standards equal a concomitant rise in knowledge about politics. I would argue that it is 
more reasonable to suspect that knowledge of political issues is likely to cause a rise in 
protest activity, only when combined with a lack of knowledge about conventional politics 
and what it is realistic to expect from conventional politics. Without a broad understanding 
of what politics can realistically be expected to deliver and therefore what citizens can 
achieve by participating in politics, politics is likely to appear unresponsive to them.  
 To return briefly to the participationist vs realist / elitist debate. One argument 
against the participationist view of democracy is that politics has traditionally had as one of 
its aims the redistribution of unequally distributed resources – and this has been a great 
source of citizen participation. If those resources are now distributed more equally, at least 
to the extent to which the majority of people have their basic economic needs met and they 
are no longer tied to politics by their material needs, then, as Hibbings and Theiss-Morse 
(2002) suggest, the majority may desire for nothing less than to be involved in politics.  
 The results support the hypothesis that in the absence of long-term economic and 
social psychological anchors to participation, the development of voters’ participatory 
norms are far more susceptible to factors associated with the political period in which they 
were socialised. The results of Chapter seven are consistent with the theorised  importance 
of political information. Butler and Stokes (1969) argued that a major change in the 
political climate may mean voters dropping their partisan cues learnt at childhood in favour 
of those received at their first voting experience. They also suggested that partisan identity 
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had an informational function. Party attachments provided a frame of references which 
allowed voters to process new problems into an established pattern. Without these 
references we might suspect that Wattenberg’s (2007) diagnoses in close to the truth – 
young people are becoming insulated from politics, their levels of knowledge are low and 
the sources of political information they are exposed to are not conducive to participation in 
conventional forms of politics – including voting at elections.  
 The second element of the generational model I propose theorises the influence of 
election contexts, previously shown to have been important factors in young people’s 
voting (Russell 2002). I argue, after Crewe (1992c) that the period 1979-2001 can be 
characterised as a ‘hegemonic political period’ and one of ideological convergence between 
the main political parties. There is much evidence from the existing literature that young 
people report being unable to see a difference between the political parties and feel that 
voting will not make a difference. As Labour shifted to the right in the mid 1990s the 
ideological difference between parties narrowed and BES survey data confirms the 
expected fall in the number of young people who report being able to see a difference 
between the political parties after 1992. 
 These election-specific contextual factors may have helped account for why young 
people did not vote in 1997 and 2001. But I argue that the period immediately before this, 
one where many will have received their political socialisation was one dominated by 
images of sleaze and media portrayals of incompetence and dishonesty. This is reflected in 
research showing that many younger people perceived politicians as untrustworthy (eg. 
White et al 1999; Marsh et al 2007). Whilst the thesis does not directly test the contention 
that these period specific factors were exacerbated by young people relative susceptibility 
to negative images of politics and politicians as well as politics being unresponsive and the 
parties providing little alternatives from one another, the intuitive appeal is strong after 
having tested the effects of long-term factors on the decision to vote in 2001 and adding to 
existing evidence on the importance of the political period.  
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8.4 Implications for participationist and realist theories 
 
Returning to the participationist / realist debate: the findings and conclusions presented 
above can be interpreted in a number of different ways. For participationists the findings 
are rather negative in that they do not point to a citizenry involved in politics, at least not in 
voting. Political parties have tended to move closer together to reflect the position of the 
electorate and this has begun to consolidate relatively low levels of electoral engagement. 
Clearly this could change and as we approach another General Election. Firstly, after ten 
years of Labour in government, voters may feel similarly exercised towards change as they 
did in 1997 and this could increase turnout from 2005 levels. The General Election is also 
likely to be more closely fought than the ones in 2001 and 2005 and there is now significant 
ground opening up between the two political parties as Labour under pressure to start 
rebalancing the books lurch leftwards, raising taxes on top earners.  Nonetheless, it is rather 
unlikely to be a coincidence, that even before the details of MPs expenses were revealed 
ahead of their publication by the House of Commons in July 2009, that allegations of 
corruption, sleaze and incompetence rear up to cloud the political landscape as they did in 
1991 and in the period after the 1992 election up until Labour’s victory at the polls in 1997. 
Separating out the effects of those things likely to encourage voters to the polls with those 
likely to discourage them will remain problematic. Whatever the influence of these factors, 
the General Election of 2010 and subsequent analysis may prove more positive for the 
participationist vision. 
 It is my contention that the participationist view is weakened in one respect by the 
findings of this research, but that it may be strengthened by an increasingly prevalent 
feature of our modern communications environment – one which has and must continue to 
be the basis of much future research into citizen participation. I believe the participationist 
position to be weakened simply because the evidence suggests that there are good reasons 
that people are not involved in regular, time consuming mass participation – they probably 
do not want to be. Or they have become involved in particular issue based politics as they 
arise. The fact that conventional political participation would appear to be changing 
dramatically over recent years, but that there is little evidence to suggest that politics, 
political institutions or politicians have changed in such a way as could adequately explain 
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this, indicates that we should be looking for explanations which focus on citizens or the 
way in which politics is mediated to reach citizens.  
 Whilst the participationists view of democracy sees the essence of citizen 
participation lying in its ability to achieve a common good, these findings suggest that 
citizens have become less likely to vote because their personal economic fortunes have 
improved and having independently weighed up the costs and benefits of voting, they 
decide not to vote as it is not sufficiently in their interest to expend time doing so. This 
rather implies that citizens are somewhat more self-interested that the participationist model 
would allow for.  
 Participationists argue that participation has an educative function. It may be that 
the participationist vision of democracy was more achievable when citizens were more 
palpably tied to politics by a fundamental need for improvement of their economic 
circumstances. But we might argue along Schumpeterian lines that low levels of knowledge 
about politics and about the nature of politics make it dangerous to involve more people in 
complex decisions. If demands are unrealistic and channels to participation are increased 
this could lead to instability. The participationist might retort that citizens are capable of 
ascertaining for themselves the limitations of politics and would therefore appreciate the 
need to balance their demands with those of their fellow citizens.  
 It depends on one’s view of the relative importance of the findings of thesis as to 
which side one ends up on the participationist / realist debate. We might view the decline in 
the importance of long-term structural and psychological anchors to voting as proof that 
citizens no longer need to vote and therefore make the rational choice not to do so. Or we 
might consider that the political period has turned them off politics and that if people were 
able to see more opportunities to be involved in a meaningful way where they can make a 
difference they would do so. One would suspect that the truth lies somewhere in the middle 
of the two positions with the participationists over estimating the capacity and desire of 
citizens as well as the logistical possibilities for mass participation; and the realist/elitist 
position underestimating the educative function, ability and will of citizens to be involved 
in mass participation. Perhaps we might conclude that evidence that the positive aspects of 
mass participation would materialise should the political system incorporate a significantly 
more participatory approach is not strong enough to risk changes to an inherently stable 
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system. That said, it is entirely possible that the rise of unconventional political activity 
charted by Dalton (2008) and others will lead, as they age, to a youth more engaged with 
conventional politics.  
 Viewed in one way, the rise in unconventional forms of political activity supports 
the realist/elitist position. These types of activity tend to be by their nature based around 
single issues such as the environment, war, animal rights, or the territorial rights of 
populations such as the Tibetans in what is now China. This would seems to reinforce the 
view that people are increasingly coming to see politics as sets of single issues that 
somehow governments have a moral obligation to address. But these demands tend to lack 
an understanding of the nature of modern pluralist politics, where issues are inter-related 
and where there are significant limitations on government is addressing any one policy 
area, both financially and through the diversity of interests involved to achieve even a 
modest outcome. But this is not to deny the role pressure groups have had in highlighting 
the importance of issues to governments and instigating changes, for their much more 
radical, in many cases, sets of demands. I would suggest that these kinds of groups may 
become more problematic should they become the choice of a larger proportion of the 
population as a means of participation rather than a minority of activists and protestors. 
However, as has been suggested, the jury is still out on whether we are likely to see a 
significant increase in these forms of participation.  
 The participationist view of democracy that people should be involved in more day 
to day decision making, if not all decisions, is strengthened logistically by the massive 
surge in the use of the internet which has and will continue to transform the way we live 
our lives. This is no less the case for democratic politics as it opens up huge possibilities for 
mass involvement in everyday politics. There are a huge number of websites which aim to 
give citizens the chance to respond to government consultations, to view the record of MPs 
and to contact any of their local representatives, as well as a large number of ways in which 
people can be involved in less conventional types of activity. A concern is that it not 
uncommon to hear people talk of ‘e-democracy’, as if somehow electronic means of 
participation are a panacea for disengagement and social exclusion. There is good reason to 
suggest that the internet is not such a simple answer to disengagement. One example is 
recent article by Baumgartner and Morris (2009) showing that whilst social networking 
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sites, amongst the most popular with young people, are recognised by them as a source of 
news, the news they consume from these types of sites offer them little in terms of good 
quality information. Moreover, users of this type of media are no more likely to participate 
in politics than are users of other types of media.  
A related concern is the ability of the internet to connect with traditionally 
disadvantaged groups. There would seem to be scope for the internet to help many of these 
groups, for example in cases where anonymity encourages engagement, or where it is 
simply more convenient for a single parent to interact with a computer at home, where 
physical interaction may not have been feasible. However, while there seems great potential 
for these kinds of benefits and many more, there is perhaps greater potential for new 
technology to maintain the status quo.  Furthermore, this may exacerbate it simply because 
there are still very significant portions of the population who do not have access to the tools 
for electronic engagement and even when disadvantaged groups do have access they are 
less likely to know what channels of engagement are open to them and use them less than 
the rest of users (Ofcom 2009). Clearly more research is needed to unearth the types and 
quality of media that young people are consuming, particularly as the internet looks 
increasingly set to become part of everyday life. 
 The internet may be the medium par excellence for non face to face and single 
issues participation. Its rise is inevitable and governments across the globe are harnessing 
its potential to, amongst other things, make savings and to consult effectively with citizens. 
The concern is that web-based politics could exacerbate common consumer based 
misunderstandings of politics and lead to a rise in unrealistic demands on the state, simply 
by virtue of its capacity to aggregate huge numbers of people on single issues. I conclude 
hesitantly that it may be necessary to reform politics not specifically because it is desirable 
to involve more citizens in democratic processes, but because it is undesirable for 
unrealistic demands which cannot be met by government to grow and threaten the stability 
of representative democracy.  
The case for generational change made by Wattenberg (2007) and others is 
strengthened by this research which clearly shows that there are good reasons to suspect 
that recent generations are distinct from their older counterparts. The case made by the UK 
based ‘anti-apathy’ school and by Dalton (2008) that the emergence of new forms of 
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political behaviour represent a shift in the norms surrounding political participation may 
well be true.  Nonetheless, this conclusion is the victim of the central methodological 
difficulty established in this thesis that we simply cannot be certain what changes in voting 
behaviour or the rise in new forms of political participation mean, in terms of generational 
change until these cohorts age. However, the reason that we can be significantly more 
confident of the conclusion made about election turnout is that we have the data on election 
turnout covering a period which allows us to compare previous generations with current 
ones. This means we can say with confidence at least that young people are unique in their 
voting behaviour. The challenge is somewhat more complex when looking at other forms of 
political behaviour. Firstly because there is little reliable and comparable longitudinal data 
through which to make conclusions as to how far young people have always been involved 
in ‘other’ types of political activity. Second, because the types of activity and engagement 
have changed over time so it is difficult to assess and compare the extent of involvement.  
 
8.5 Reflections and implications for future research 
 
There is clearly a need for further research in this area and it is possible to identify some 
specific areas. The first is the need to probe further the compelling findings of Chapter six 
and Chapter seven. The methodology of this thesis set out that it is impossible to provide 
anything but strong prima facie evidence of generational changes results from a number of 
related limitations. Firstly, the impossibility of conclusively separating life-cycle, period 
and generational effects in looking at the turnout characteristics of the youngest age group 
will be possible to overcome as cohorts age and it is possible, using panel survey data, to 
compare their attitudinal and participatory characteristics with other cohorts in existing 
panels. This should provide a clearer picture of their distinctiveness. There is also a case for 
conducting some qualitative interviews or focus groups to elicit the attitudes of this 
generation and comparing with the reflective evidence from older cohorts.  
 Another area where we need further evidence is on the explanatory variables 
modelled in Chapter six. A post-doctoral research agenda might seek to test the extent to 
which the explanatory findings are generational. A key limitation of the methodology 
utilised was that the explanatory analysis was limited to one period in time and can 
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therefore only make reliable conclusions about the factors that were involved in young 
people’s decision to vote in 2001. Extrapolating from this to argue these variables are 
associated with a generational change is problematic as it is entirely possible that these 
factors are those that have always been involved in causing young people not to vote; life-
cycle factors. With the data limitations discussed in the methodology, the decision was 
made that a set of hypothesis should be test based on existing knowledge of electoral 
changes and the likelihood that at least some of the reasons for the unique decline in the 
youth vote in 2001 would be picked up in the analysis. This would be strengthened by 
investigating through qualitative methods older generations’ anchors to political 
participation and social life such as social capital and partisanship. It would also be possible 
to examine the impact of short-term factors on older generations to probe further the 
finding that an absence of anchor to engagement renders young people more susceptible to 
short-term factors. In their report to the Electoral Commission, Russell et al (2002) identify 
the need for more information on the differences in voter engagement amongst gender and 
ethnic groups. Whilst it has not been the aim of this thesis to probe these specific 
differences, there is clearly a need, based on the findings of previous research for a need to 
investigate what underlying differences and explanatory factors amongst these groups 
exists. One of the possibilities for post-doctoral research in this area is to examine 
differences between ethnic groups. This is likely to become an increasingly important area 
for research as the UK become increasingly multi-ethnic.  
 The second area which urgently needs addressing through further research is the 
relationship between conventional and unconventional political activity. In particular we 
need to ascertain how a decline in voting amongst young people is related to other forms of 
political participation. How prevalent is unconventional political activity in Britain; what 
are its main channels; is it something which primarily young people are involved in and 
does it decline with age? Is its rise something that politicians should be concerned about: 
does it pose a risk to representative politics? Answers to these questions would 
considerably improve our understanding of the current state of politics and help political 
parties to reengage with the electorate more effectively. 
 Perhaps one of the most important areas of research relates to the impact and 
potential of the internet on politics and its potential for democratic engagement. There is a 
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considerable body of work which looks at this already and it has been beyond the scope of 
this thesis to investigate this. Even during the course of writing this thesis there have been 
considerably advances in the content of the internet and in the quality of connections. On 
commencing this research using the internet was far less user friendly than now and the 
growth of Web 2.0 environments is likely to transform the user experience radically in the 
coming years. One of the most intriguing aspects of government’s use of online methods of 
engagement is whether the Conservative Party will be as enthusiastic in promoting online 
engagement as the Labour Party have been, given the demographic of Conservative 
support. This said, it will be interesting to see how the so called ‘Silver Surfers’, that 
increasing proportion of the population of over 60s using the web, can be empowered by 
online methods of service delivery and political engagement. 
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